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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the 21st century, the credit market has witnessed several major defaults
including the defaults of Argentina and Enron. These two events had a wide
spread impact on businesses, and were treated as case studies on how an entity
approached default. As it is the case for many other default events, Argentina
and Enron had their unique path that led them to bankruptcy. Argentina was
affected negatively from the Russian default in 1998 and from the collapse
of Brazil’s exchange-rate-based stabilization program in 1999 (Zhang (2003)).
The country entered the year 2001 with many financial problems. The gov-
ernment could not reverse the ongoing situation in Argentina, and after the
increase of the severity of problems, the country announced default in Decem-
ber 2001. Unlike Argentina, the default of Enron was more of a surprise to
financial markets. The auditing scandal of Arthur Andersen came out, and
Enron’s financial health was questioned only about a period from October
to December 2001. When filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2001,
the credit ratings have only just been reduced to below investment grade by
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)).
1
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What differentiates the defaults of Argentina and Enron from those in pre-
vious decades is the presence of an infant credit default swap market. These
defaults probably did not lead to more serious financial difficulties or any chain
reactions due to use of credit derivatives, which provide efficient allocation of
risks (Deutsche Bank Research (2004)). Credit default swaps belong to the
large family of credit derivatives, which are among the most successful finan-
cial innovations of the last decade. Recent practice in financial engineering has
focused on these new instruments, which is reflected in a rapidly expanding
market. Credit derivatives are contracts whose payoffs depend on the credit-
worthiness of corporate or sovereign entities. According to British Bankers’
Association’s Credit Derivatives Survey (2006), the global market is expected
to reach USD 33.1 trillion by the end of 2008. Among other over-the-counter
traded derivatives, such as interest rate, equity, and FX derivatives, the credit
derivatives market is one of the fastest expanding branches of instruments in
terms of volume (Bank for International Settlements (2005)).
Credit derivatives make risk management more efficient and flexible for fi-
nancial institutions. By reducing the aggregate risk in the economy, credit
derivatives may also diminish the chain effects of any individual defaults such
as Argentina and Enron. Banks have higher power to alleviate financial diffi-
culties, which results in a more stable banking sector. Moreover, the credit risk
which has been primarily overtaken by banks in the past, can now be distrib-
uted to other financial institutions such as hedge funds or insurance companies.
Therefore, risks are better allocated in the presence of credit derivatives. It is
necessary to understand how markets of credit derivatives operate and how
pricing can be accurately done. This study contributes in understanding some
of the issues raised with the introduction of these multi-dimensional instru-
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ments, including the functioning of its markets and pricing.
Alternative credit derivative products have been developed to satisfy the dif-
ferent needs of counterparties. The term “credit derivative” refers to a wide
variety of instruments that have a similar purpose but not necessarily the same
features. The basic choices comprise of credit default products, credit spread
products, and total return products. Credit default products are commonly
used to offset default risk, whereas credit spread products offset the whole
credit risk, i.e. the risk of increasing or decreasing spreads. The third type,
total return products, transfers both credit and market risk between counter-
parties. There are more advanced forms of credit derivatives, which include
credit-linked notes, basket credit derivatives, and asset-backed securities.
This study focuses on single-name credit default swaps (CDSs), which have a
33 per cent share in the expanding market, being the most frequently traded
type of credit derivatives (British Bankers’ Association (2006)). A credit de-
fault swap is a contract that provides insurance against the risk of default of a
specific entity. In this system, the buyer agrees to make periodic payments to
the seller in exchange for compensation in case of a predefined default by the
entity specified in the contract. Counterparties have to agree upon these pe-
riodic payments, the CDS premiums, which are a percentage of the contract’s
notional amount in basis points upon contract initialization. The seller pays
nothing, if default does not occur. If the specified entity defaults during the
lifetime of the CDS, there are two forms of settlement: In a “physical” settle-
ment, the buyer delivers the eligible bonds of the underlying defaulted entity
to the seller (these “deliverable obligations” might cover a set of bonds with
the same rank as the underlying bond), in exchange for the contract notional
amount. In a cash settlement, however, the buyer keeps the underlying bond,
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but is compensated for the loss. In either case, the buyer’s loss is fully covered.
An earlier British Bankers’ Association report shows that 86 per cent of the
transactions contain a physical settlement clause, whereas the rest are based
on cash settlements (British Bankers’ Association (2004)).
A Numerical Example for a CDS Contract:
An example on the mechanics of CDS would be as follows: Let us suppose,
e.g. on June 20, 2007, the insurance buyer agrees to enter into a 5-year CDS
contract with the seller, written on a bond of DaimlerChrysler AG, with a CDS
premium of 80 basis points, on a contract notional amount of USD 5 Million.
The buyer may or may not own the corporate bonds of DaimlerChrysler. Let
us assume the buyer owns 5,000 of underlying corporate bonds that mature on
April 15, 2012, each having a par value of USD 1,000, so that the buyer would
have fully covered protection against the loss (5,000 × 1,000). In exchange of
the protection, the buyer has to pay quarterly installments of approximately
1/4 × 80 basis points of the notional (depending on the actual days in a quar-
ter). In monetary terms, this corresponds to quarterly payments of 5,000,000
× 1/4 × 0.0080 = USD 10,000. The buyer will be paying this amount quarterly
for 5 years. If default does not happen, the seller pays nothing. If it happens
during the lifetime of the CDS, there can be either physical or cash settlement.
“Credit events” are default occurrences described in the Credit Derivatives
Definitions by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) in
1999 (revised in 2003). They include the bankruptcy, obligation acceleration,
obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium, and restructuring
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of the underlying entity. All these instances require the seller to make the
full notional payment to the buyer of the CDS. The default of Argentina and
Chapter 11 filing for bankruptcy of Enron are examples of recent credit events.
Nevertheless, the lack of consensus on the definition of a credit event is still seen
as the major drawback of a CDS contract in practice. The British Bankers’
Association (2004) reveals that of the major problems incurred in the CDS
setting, the non-agreement on the nature of a credit event is ranked first. This
issue underscores the importance of standardization for further development
of the market.
A typical CDS contract possesses several other attributes. For instance, the
maturity of the contract describes the coverage of the insurance in terms of
years. The most common practice in the industry is to agree on a 5-year con-
tract, whereas liquid entities may have CDSs in the range from 1 to 10 years.
Another important contractual attribute is the rank of the underlying, which
can be either senior or subordinated. Due to the difference in priority of pay-
ments to debt holders, subordinated CDSs command a higher insurance pre-
mium than senior CDSs. A third aspect is the restructuring clause applicable
in the contract. The European and North American clauses differ in that North
American contracts limit the set of deliverable bonds in case of default, which
again should be reflected in CDS premiums (see Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh
(2005); Houweling and Vorst (2005)).
Another major issue is the counterparty risk inherent in CDS trades. Nev-
ertheless, this risk is reduced by the fact that trades are usually conducted
between dealers of major institutions with relatively high credit ratings. As a
consequence, the composition of market participants differs from that of the
corporate bond market. According to Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005),
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this structural difference is one reason why the CDS market provides time-
lier price information than the bond market. In addition, two further aspects
work towards the lead effect in the price discovery process. First, short-sales
constraints in the bond market are not present in the CDS market, as CDS
contracts can be set up synthetically at any time. Moreover, the transfer of
credit risk can be done in relatively higher volumes in a single contract. Sec-
ond, the CDS market blends participants from different pools. Both aspects
make the CDS market the easiest place to trade credit risk.
This study analyzes the credit default swaps in two aspects: First, the markets
where credit default swaps are traded are discussed. In order to understand
the markets of CDSs, alternative trading venues are analyzed with one of
their most discriminating component, their liquidity. Until recently, the non-
intermediated over-the-counter market (OTC) and the intermediated inter-
dealer broker (IDB) market have been the alternatives. The analysis in Chapter
2 starts with describing the instrument, and continues by introducing the OTC
and the IDB markets. The differences in transparency, immediacy, and level
of trade execution are highlighted. As an alternative, how electronic broker-
age might replace voice brokerage in the long run is discussed. Current hybrid
market structures of brokers are given as an example for dual platforms. Af-
terwards, an empirical analysis is undertaken so as to look at the determinants
of liquidity in the brokered market. It has been shown that various contract
specifications are a determinant of the bid-ask spread. Finally, the liquidity in
OTC and IDB markets are compared, where it has been found out that the
higher transaction costs in the IDB market may account for the added value
of the brokerage services.
The second aspect, which is considered in the remaining of the study is how
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credit default swaps are correctly priced. This is a challenging issue: Recalling
the example of Argentina and Enron defaults, should the financial credit risk of
an entity be modeled as a continuous process which may eventually deteriorate
in time (case of Argentina) or as a surprise event which happens at short notice
(case of Enron)? The CDS prices of entities fully reflect the financial health,
as can be seen from Figures 1.1 and 1.2. Figure 1.1 depicts the CDS prices of
Argentina from an interdealer broker for the year 2001. The evolution of the
CDS price shows how the credit risk of the entity deteriorated over time. In
contrast, Figure 1.2 shows how the credit market did not expect a deterioration
of financial health until October 2001.
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Figure 1.1: Premiums of Argentina CDSs (bps) vs. Time
The field of credit risk modelling has been trying to give a robust answer to the
question of what the theoretically fair price of credit risk should be. Structural
models assume the asset value of the firm to follow a Brownian motion, and
this is in accordance from what we observe from the case of Argentina. There
is a continuous process, and the entity defaults as a result of gradually deteri-
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Figure 1.2: Premiums of Enron CDSs (bps) vs. Time
orating credit quality. On the other hand, reduced-form models accommodate
surprise defaults, which we observe in the case of Enron. There is a jump prob-
ability modeled as a Poisson process. Unfortunately, neither the theory nor the
empirical studies have so far reached a consensus on which type of framework
better prices credit risk. Structural models have been criticized for their inaccu-
rate predictions, whereas intensity models have been thought to lack economic
intuition. Chapter 3 gives a brief overview on empirical studies with credit
risk. First, tests of structural models with bond prices are introduced, with
a further breakdown into exogenous and endogenous default barrier models.
Then, studies with reduced-form models are discussed. The chapter continues
with empirical studies with credit default swaps, both with those which models
are tested, and with those in which various features of CDSs are highlighted.
The main question in Chapter 3 has been which type of framework better prices
credit risk. The overview in Chapter 3 does not give a clear answer to this
question since alternative studies with different datasets have yielded mixed
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results. In order to give this answer, this study puts forward that in order to
compare the CDS pricing ability of different frameworks, the same procedures
have to be applied to the same dataset. For this purpose, Chapter 4 starts
from the basic structures of the structural and reduced-form frameworks, and
provides a basis of comparison. The most basic structure of a structural model
has been taken as the initial approach of Merton (1974). On the other hand,
the constant intensity setup of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) has been selected
to represent the basic case of reduced-form models. A third approach has also
been brought to analysis. Support Vector Machines (SVM) method has shown
competitive empirical performance to traditional neural network approaches
in recent studies. So, the out-of-sample CDS price prediction performances of
three alternative approaches are tested. Structural models having the high-
est financial structure on one edge, and the reduced-form models having a
lower financial structure, could be then compared with the SVM method with
no financial structure at all. The analysis is carried out in two parts: First,
companies are divided in risk classes that ought to have the same risk charac-
teristics with the same rating, seniority, and currency. This “cross-sectional”
analysis looks at whether prices of CDSs of companies in a risk class are a
good indicator of the prices of CDSs of other companies in the same risk class.
The second analysis looks at individual time series of prices of companies. This
“time series” analysis hypothesizes that CDS prices are a good indicator of fu-
ture CDS prices, namely the one-day, five-day, and ten-day-ahead prices. The
three approaches are compared regarding these aspects, and out-of-sample pre-
diction errors are tabulated. The results indicate that although the intensity
model incorporates early default, the Merton model has competitive perfor-
mance in cross-sectional and time series analyzes. The SVM method has failed
in the cross-sectional setup, but has overperformed the financial models in the
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time series setup.
The setup in Chapter 4 accommodates the simplest versions of structural and
reduced-form models. In order to correctly price CDSs, a more comprehensive
setup can be built. Chapter 5 considers the state-of-the-art versions of struc-
tural and reduced-form models: By using leverage as a key credit risk variable,
the two frameworks are brought into close proximity. On the structural side,
the stochastic leverage model of Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) (CDG)
is tested. In this model, the interest rate process follows Vasicek (1977) dynam-
ics, and the asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion. Moreover, unique
for the CDG model, the leverage follows a stationary process. If the leverage
ratio of the firm is lower than a certain threshold, the firm issues new debt, and
would not issue if the ratio is above the target. In order to understand whether
the modeling structure makes a difference, this study contributes to the liter-
ature by developing a reduced-form model which is comparable to the CDG
model in pricing the CDSs. The intensity model that this study utilizes has an
adjusted discount rate as the affine sum of three variables: a constant, which
represents the systematic risk; the short rate, which also follows a Vasicek
process; and the log-leverage ratio, which follows exactly the same dynamics
as in the CDG model. This setup creates a fair comparison possibility between
the structural and reduced-form models in pricing CDSs. For the implemen-
tation, the interest rates which follow a Vasicek process are calibrated using a
Kalman filter. In contrast to Chapter 4 which uses only CDS prices for cali-
bration, bond prices, stock prices, and balance sheet information are utilized
in this section to estimate model parameters. Finally, a simulation is used to
generate paths of the leverage and interest rate processes in order to correctly
price credit default swaps. In-sample fit to bonds and out-of-sample fit to CDSs
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are presented as the main results of the chapter. The prediction errors are then
discussed in the light of structural and reduced-form model structures. It is
shown that the out-of-sample prediction results with both models are simi-
lar, with the intensity model slightly dominating the CDG model, possibly
due to more free parameters. Chapter 6 concludes with remarks and provides
implications for future research.
Chapter 2
Credit Default Swap Markets
Financial markets are born, they evolve and become extinct over time. New
necessities for products arise the need for a new market. After abundant liq-
uidity is established, markets are constructed where trades for new financial
products take place. The continuous growth of the market is maintained, if
the product satisfies the needs of the counterparties. After time, in such cases
where the product no longer meets the demands, it is of no surprise that the
market eventually becomes extinct.
Credit default swap markets also follow this path of market maturity. Obvi-
ously, being still in its infant stages, CDS markets are still developing. The
product has started to be traded in the early 1990s by direct over-the-counter
trades via phone or quotation. As the market expanded, interdealer brokers
emerged. Finally in 2007, Eurex initiated the first exchange-traded credit deriv-
ative products, which are based on the iTraxx Europe CDS index. Within this
structure, it is highly interesting to understand how these markets operate, and
how do individual venues contribute to the liquidity of trades. In this chapter,
12
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the basic over-the-counter and interdealer broker markets are contrasted and
hybrid structures of brokers are highlighted. Then, a dataset of CDS prices
is presented which will be further used in analyzing liquidity of these venues.
Overall, this section of the study serves for understanding one of the many
dimensions of the CDSs, the markets in which they are functioning.
2.1 Market Structures
2.1.1 The OTC and Interdealer Broker Market
Credit derivatives are most commonly traded on the over-the-counter (OTC)
market, where interdealer trades are accomplished via the use of different
matching technologies. Similar to other OTC derivatives, the most usual type
of trade is transacted directly between two dealers over the telephone. Since
the dealer has to search for a matching counterparty, this method is costly
and time consuming. Compared to on-exchange derivatives markets, this kind
of OTC market is opaque, non-anonymous, and highly fragmented. In recent
years, increasingly more trades have been conducted through interdealer bro-
kers (IDBs), who match buy- and sell-side dealers while offering some addi-
tional services beyond the pure matching function. The ISDA (2004) Opera-
tions Benchmarking Survey indicates that 34 per cent of the credit derivatives
trades are arranged by brokers. This relatively high market share suggests that
their services must provide some value to the dealers.
In other markets such as the government bond market, most of the interdealer
brokerage firms operate either on a fully automated electronic trading system
or a voice-based system. In a voice broking setting, although the brokers keep
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track of the quotes electronically, the dealers must still contact a broker over
the telephone to place an order or to have a trade executed. Such an interaction
between the dealer and the broker may provide information that may increase
the speed and probability of matching customer orders. This will help to con-
dition trades on a broader set of information which will improve the chance of
order execution. What a broker can do is to surmise if there is more size behind
the order than revealed and learn more about a dealer’s trading incentives and
true preferences. Meanwhile, the dealer can leave order contingencies with the
broker. Obviously, one of the most important assets of an IDB is the network
of dealers who are willing to offer liquidity. This hidden supply of liquidity is
sought by the broker in order to complete a client’s trade. Both electronic and
voice brokers preserve the anonymity of the dealer. However, by using a voice
broker, the dealer may opt to dispense with anonymity. This option has value
depending on market conditions and the dealer’s motivation for trading.
Because of this higher value added to the customer, it is not surprising that
voice brokers charge a higher commission fee in practice. Barclay, Hendershott,
and Kotz (2006) mention that for the US government bond IDB market, a
voice broker’s charge is roughly double the commission levied by electronic
brokers. This is an explicit trading cost for the customer, who has to weigh
this cost against the implicit cost incurred by any delay in trade execution.
While the first type of cost is known before the trade, the second type is only
ascertainable after a trade has been accomplished.
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2.1.2 Hybrid Market Model of CreditTrade
According to the recent study of Gu¨ndu¨z, Lu¨decke, and Uhrig-Homburg (2007),
during the early years, when the market conditions were not yet ready for au-
tomation, the CDS brokerage market was only voice based. As the market
became more liquid, CreditTrade and other major IDBs adapted a different,
innovative strategy from IDBs operating in the FX or Treasury markets. By
integrating voice brokerage and electronic brokerage under one roof, Credit-
Trade and others could internalize the competition and gained revenues from
both matching technologies. In so doing, they succeeded in coping with poten-
tial competition from fully automated trading systems. These IDBs recognized
at an early stage of the market’s development that the fully automated trading
of CDSs would not be achievable in the near future. By complementing voice
brokerage, they could not only offer valuable intermediation services when nec-
essary, but also enhance their efficiency through electronic brokerage and reach
economies of scale. This market structure somewhat resembles an electronic
trading system with an integrated upstairs market1 run by the IDBs.
In CreditTrade’s market model, the electronic system functions as follows: The
firm offers a platform where dealers can enter quotes or hit existing quotes di-
rectly. This is a hit-and-take system where trades are triggered by dealers
without using the voice broker. The firm’s revenue is based on commissions
per trade and a membership fee is not charged. Voice brokers do not have
incentives to discourage customers from using the electronic platform, since
the company charges a slightly lower commission for interdealer trades accom-
plished via its electronic platform compared to those executed by the voice bro-
1Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004)’s empirical results support the work of Gross-
man (1992), who suggests that an upstairs market serves as a pool for unexpressed large
orders.
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kers. Commission schedules are defined in terms of basis points that increase
with CDS premiums. The actual commission is computed as the product of
the notional, maturity, and basis points (with reference to the strike interval
of the premium), and is charged to both sides of the trade. Each client has a
different decreasing scheme of basis points with increasing volume, which en-
courages more transactions. After a trade is executed, the details of the trade
are processed, and a trade confirmation is sent to the buyers/sellers notify-
ing them of their counterparty. Finally, the sides initiate their own post-trade
processing, which is normally conducted by the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation (DTCC).
With this dual approach to CDS trading, the dealers are offered a choice be-
tween two trading venues that differ with respect to trading costs, level of
trade execution services, and market transparency. Unfortunately, electronic
brokerage data from CreditTrade that could be used for analyzing the determi-
nants of a dealer’s choice of trading venue is not available. Nevertheless, recent
literature allows us to derive a view of the market. As discussed before, the
higher commissions charged for voice broking are due to the services supplied
beyond the pure transactional service provided by the electronic trading sys-
tem. The extent to which voice broking is used will vary depending on trade
size, trade complexity, market conditions, and CDS features, such as currency.
While the larger and more complex trades may be left with the voice broker,
the electronic system can be used for simpler and smaller-sized transactions
in the most widely traded CDS currencies, USD and EUR. However, if the
volatility of the underlying market increases or the CDS market is exposed to
asymmetric information, then dealers will be less willing to have their orders
revealed on electronic quotation and will prefer trading via the voice broker.
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Under these market conditions the IDBs can offer greater liquidity because
their market provides access to a wide range of institutions that supply liq-
uidity. The two trading venues also offer a choice between different degrees of
market transparency. For instance, the voice brokerage system with less trans-
parency may be preferred by traders with private information. Uninformed
traders also stand to benefit by dealing through the voice brokers under condi-
tions of asymmetric information; the IDB is able to certify them as uninformed,
which results in trades at better prices. The next section presents a discussion
on the effects of increased automation and transparency through electronic
platforms.
2.1.3 Electronic Trading and Transparency in the CDS
Market
The outlook on the CDS market is towards automation of the full trade process.
Using Web-based technology, IDBs offer screen-based transaction services to
facilitate the execution of trades and to disseminate pre-trade information
via electronic platforms. However, none of the systems provides a forum for
automated trade execution. Compared to similar interdealer markets, such as
the FX market and the US Treasury bond market, which also rely on voice and
electronic IDBs, the OTC market for credit derivatives has reached a relatively
low level of automation for trade processes. Apart from trade execution, the
ISDA (2004) Survey reports significant improvements in the automation of
key functions for trading credit derivatives. For example, the auto-matching
of trades as a method of trade confirmation was used for the very first time in
2004 and managed to corral four per cent of all trades. Nevertheless, the survey
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reveals that there are still potential gains to be had from automation with
respect to improving the operational efficiency of the front office, where many
process frictions occur due to data problems (e.g. errors in trade data, missing
and/or untimely data). The more recent ISDA (2006) Survey indicates that
among other derivatives, the credit derivatives market will be subject to most
plans to increase automation in all trade phases. The rapid growth of volume
in the OTC derivatives market has led to an industry consensus on the need to
achieve “straight through processing” (STP), which means enabling the entire
process from trade initiation to settlement to be conducted electronically. In
January 2004, the ISDA issued a strategic plan calling for substantial industry
automation of all OTC derivatives products by the end of 2006. Meanwhile,
a number of firms offer valuable STP solutions to the industry for improving
the operational efficiency of the OTC credit derivatives market.2 Improved
reference data management in particular represents a major step towards the
achievement of STP.
The research on electronic platforms generally considers transparency to be
an important design feature of financial markets. The implementation of elec-
tronic platforms by interdealer brokers yields more transparent markets, in
which (anonymous) quotes can be tracked. Nevertheless, it is still debated in
the literature whether higher transparency will lead to fairer markets with
better liquidity and price discovery. The evidence on transparency as summa-
rized by O’Hara (1995) includes cases where increased transparency reduces
adverse selection costs so that dealers can spot other traders who are more
informed; this in turn reduces spreads. On the other hand, some studies put
forward that opaque markets may help to improve liquidity (Bloomfield and
2See i.e. http://www.finextra.com, “Creditex spin-off T-zero to provide STP for credit
derivatives”, published on July 29, 2005.
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O’Hara (2000)). Another argument is that under increased transparency, the
dealers in a quote-driven market would be less willing to reveal their strate-
gies, which would also lead to lower liquidity (Madhavan, Porter, and Weaver
(2005)). In addition, the model proposed by Madhavan (1996) predicts that
transparency can worsen price volatility. The tradeoff between accessing in-
formation and revealing identities is hard to separate. Therefore, institutional
traders would be at an advantage if they were able to reach fairer prices through
a transparent market while remaining anonymous (which is feasible in many
electronic interdealer brokerage platforms). Although there are no empirical
studies on electronic CDS markets, some studies analyze the effects of market
transparency in related markets, e.g. the bond market. Bessembinder, Maxwell,
and Venkataraman (2006) have investigated the introduction of the TRACE3
system and found that execution costs substantially decreased for bonds eligi-
ble for the electronic market.
Most of the evidence above is concerned with increased market transparency
for the public. However, the market for CDSs is still a closed shop in which
dealers are not willing to convey their quotes to outsiders. As in other mar-
kets, the vested interests of the dealers slow the train towards fully electronic
trading, because trading profits will erode as markets become more centralized
and more transparent. Hence, the discussion on market transparency is mostly
restricted to this shop gaining deeper insight into the market. Undoubtedly,
with the collection and distribution of quotes and prices, the market is becom-
ing more transparent, although the gains are limited to a countable number
of market participants. Obviously, one aim is to prevent outsiders who do not
3In July 2002, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) began to re-
port transactions in around 500 bonds through Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
(TRACE), which constituted a major step towards the market’s transparency.
Credit Default Swap Markets 20
add value to the market from free riding on dealers’ quotations. To promote
further growth, closed shop trading should be reduced over time with an eye to
opening the market to a wider public. Eroding profits should then be compen-
sated for by the larger trading volume. An increase of market transparency and
liquidity can be expected from the listing of exchange-traded credit derivative
products based on the iTraxx Europe CDS index, which has been initiated by
Eurex in March 2007. The iTraxx index consists of the 125 most liquid single
name CDSs and was exclusively licensed to Eurex by the International Index
Company (IIC) in July 2005. However, the Eurex platform has so far been
unable to attract abundant liquidity. This could be most probably due to the
unwillingness of the “closed club” of dealers to give out their quotes explicitly,
as discussed before. In parallel to this, a short-term success of this platform is
not expected by market participants.4
2.2 Credit Default Swap Data
In order to understand the functioning and pricing in markets of credit default
swaps, daily indicative CDS bid-ask quotes are retrieved from CreditTrade,
an interdealer brokerage company. For the period between January 2001 and
January 2005, there are over 235,000 price quotes for liquid CDS contracts. The
full set of prices comes from voice broking, and the number of daily observations
rises from 70-80 in 2001 to around 300 in 2005. The dataset consists of 256
entities from a wide range of countries from Europe, the Middle East, and
North and Latin America. The underlying entities are mainly corporates or
banks, although CDSs written on sovereign entities also exist.
4Quoted from private communication with Eurex executive Ms. M. Dinc, 2007.
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In a CDS contract, the financial variable of interest is the CDS premium. Obvi-
ously, the CDS premiums should be driven by the credit risk of the underlying
entity; the higher the credit risk, the higher the CDS premium should be. This
credit risk reflected in the premiums has been subject to recent investigation
in the finance literature. Pricing of CDS will be analyzed in a subsequent chap-
ter. Figure 2.1 plots the CDS bid-ask midpoints as a function of credit quality.
As can be seen from the figure, the dataset is in line with the theoretical
hypothesis that the higher the risk of default, the higher the insurance fee.
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Figure 2.1: Average Bid-Ask Midpoints (bps) vs. Credit Quality (Moody’s
Ratings)
The descriptive statistics of the data set can be found in Table 2.1. It can
be observed that the number of observations increase from around 24,000 in
2001 to 76,000 in 2004, indicating an expanding market. One direct measure
for liquidity of the market is the size of the bid-ask spread, which shows the
tightness of orders to buy and sell. The bid-ask spread is observed to decrease
over time, attaining its lowest level in 2004.
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Table 2.1: Number of Observations and Bid-Ask Spreads across CDS Types
and Regions
2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
Type Region Curr. Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread
Corp. Europe EUR 4409 21.38 26719 25.91 31890 13.21 33922 6.35 96940 14.68
Corp. N.America USD 8092 40.72 11749 44.81 15841 27.25 16286 17.10 51968 30.14
Bank Europe EUR 1917 9.90 10402 13.48 11262 8.00 11308 3.25 34889 8.20
Bank N.America USD 3646 13.17 4056 18.62 4000 11.42 3780 9.99 15482 13.37
Sov. Europe USD 777 2.86 1330 3.60 2530 2.80 2570 1.41 7207 2.46
Sov. E.Europe USD 1554 34.27 1746 25.10 3289 15.83 3341 10.82 9930 18.66
Sov. L.America USD 3369 77.70 4539 165.82 5252 72.21 5169 29.48 18329 84.35
Sov. Mid.East USD 259 143.20 158 118.39 253 61.58 257 22.46 927 83.22
Total/Average 24023 35.18 60699 37.14 74317 19.41 76633 10.00 235672 22.53
Moreover, for each subset of the credit ratings, seniority, maturity, region, and
currency, the average midpoints of the bid-ask quotes for the CDS premiums
were calculated. Table 2.2 shows the 5-year CDS premium midpoints with
respect to several subsets. Note that sovereign CDSs are all denominated in
USD, even for the European countries.
Table 2.2: Average Midpoints of 5 Year-CDS Premiums Across Ratings with
respect to Currency, Credit Type, Region, and Rank
Currency Credit Type Region Rank Avg. Midpoint (bps)
EUR Bank Europe Senior 24.96
EUR Corporate Europe Senior 95.67
EUR Bank Europe Subordinate 49.72
USD Bank N. America Senior 53.74
USD Corporate N. America Senior 119.84
USD Sovereign Europe Senior 9.16
USD Sovereign E.Europe Senior 119.17
USD Sovereign Middle East Senior 716.09
USD Sovereign L. America Senior 784.01
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive data on rating classes across different matu-
rities. The most liquid maturity is the 5-year CDS, followed by 10- and 3-year
CDSs.
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Table 2.3: Number of Observations and Bid-Ask Spreads across Ratings, Ranks
and Maturities
Moody’s Rank Maturity(Years)
Rating 3 5 10 Other Total
Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread Obs Spread
Aaa Senior - - 3230 9.11 - - - - 3230 9.11
Aa Senior 767 8.07 25462 8.30 787 10.88 - - 27016 8.37
Aa Subord. - - 5457 8.90 - - - - 5457 8.90
A Senior 2534 9.93 55003 11.97 4649 9.25 717 38.73 62903 11.99
A Subord. - - 6663 10.19 - - - - 6663 10.19
Baa/Worse Sen/Sub 6821 47.21 62773 28.61 5546 46.65 5431 82.49 80571 35.06
Non-rated Sen/Sub 6529 32.73 31152 20.84 4299 29.08 7852 47.03 49832 27.23
Total/Average 16651 34.06 189740 18.24 15281 28.49 14000 60.36 235672 22.53
Interestingly, the EUR-denominated CDSs have lower average midpoints of
bid-ask quotes than their USD counterparts. This result holds even when look-
ing at the premiums within different rating classes, with the exception of Ba
(Table 2.4). A first attempt to explain this phenomenon (which is also present
in other datasets; see Houweling and Vorst (2005)) might come from looking
at the different specifications of deliverable bonds in case of restructuring. The
smaller the set of deliverable bonds, the lower the value of the “cheapest-to-
deliver option”, which reflects the extra premium for the buyer of CDS for the
privilege of being able to deliver any bond from a basket of available deliver-
able obligations. Recent literature has realized the reflection of this contractual
term into prices, which ought to be different in European and North American
markets (e.g. Jankowitsch, Pullirsch, and Veza (2006)). The Modified Modified
Restructuring (MMR), is the clause usually used in Europe, while Modified
Restructuring (MR) is the valid clause for North American entities. MR clause
is more restrictive and this reduces the value of the delivery option. Unfortu-
nately, this argument contradicts the observations gleaned from the dataset.
Since the deliverable bonds are limited for USD-denominated CDSs, which
leads to lower delivery option values, the CDS premiums should be lower.
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In the following chapters, more detailed analysis on regional features will be
carried on.
Table 2.4: Average Midpoints of Senior, 5-Year CDS Premiums with respect
to Rating and Currency
Rating EUR USD
(bps) (bps)
Investment Aaa 14.77 60.12
Grade Aa 22.18 40.25
A 52.81 62.67
Baa 107.83 121.49
Non-Investment Ba 361.61 242.69
Grade B 409.07 866.98
2.3 Empirical Evidence on Trading and
Liquidity of the CDS Market
Within the described brokerage setting, the liquidity in the CDS market is
analyzed in this section. In the first part, the determinants of liquidity in
the IDB market are the focal point. Later, a comparison of liquidity across
alternative trading venues is presented.
2.3.1 Liquidity of the IDB Market
Liquidity is one of the key attributes of financial markets and refers to differ-
ent dimensions, such as depth, tightness, resiliency, and immediacy. Measuring
liquidity is a complex task for which various instruments have been proposed
(see Schwartz and Francioni (2004), pp. 60-63). These are based on transaction
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costs (e.g. bid-ask spread, market impact, total cost of trading), trading vol-
ume (e.g. turnover, number of shares, number of transactions), and volatility
(e.g. price variance, resiliency, intraday mid-point returns). Most of the evi-
dence in the literature on liquidity is provided for stock markets. There are
also recent studies focusing on trading and liquidity in interdealer broker mar-
kets for government bonds using GovPX and CanPX data (Boni and Leach
(2004); Huang, Cai, and Wang (2002); D’Souza, Gaa, and Yang (2003)). How-
ever, relatively little is known about the liquidity of derivatives markets. The
few available studies concentrate on the effect of illiquidity on prices of cur-
rency options (Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser (2001)) or on interest rate options
(Deuskar, Gupta, and Subrahmanyam (2006)).
Concerning the CDS market, there are recent works claiming that the liquid-
ity of CDSs is relatively high compared to corporate bonds, since CDSs are
contracts but not securities. Recent literature has investigated the liquidity
premium in bond spreads (Janosi, Jarrow, and Yildirim (2002); Houweling,
Mentink, and Vorst (2005)), while credit default swaps are modeled to have no
liquidity premium due to several reasons. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)
provide the most comprehensive discussion on the issue, noting that CDSs are
contracts that can be set up arbitrarily, while securities are fixed in supply.
This makes CDSs invulnerable to the “squeezing” effects applicable to bonds.
Furthermore, if liquidation is wanted, the counterparty simply enters into a
new CDS in the opposite direction. Finally, it is quite easy to sell and buy pro-
tection with CDSs, while it is difficult and costly to short bonds (Longstaff,
Mithal, and Neis (2005), pp. 2219-2220). Despite these reasons, which neglect
the presence of a liquidity premium in prices for modeling purposes, it should
be realized that these points show only a relative unimportance with respect
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to bonds. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to focus on the
determinants of CDS liquidity.
The analysis examines bid-ask quotes in the absence of trade data.5 Microstruc-
ture theory explains the bid-ask spreads by means of three components ac-
counting for the different costs that a dealer faces. Viewing the spreads as a
measure for the cost of transacting dates back to the work of Demsetz (1968).
According to this early study, the quoted spread should be a fair compensa-
tion for dealers who offer immediacy by supplying resources to the market.
Demsetz and others show that the spread depends on various proxies for trad-
ing activity, security risk, and competition. Secondly, the theoretical models of
dealer markets put forward that spreads should increase with inventory hold-
ing costs (Ho and Stoll (1983); Biais (1993)). Lastly, information-based models
of dealer markets imply an adverse selection part of the spread, which accounts
for the risk of trading with informed investors (Bagehot (1971); Copeland and
Galai (1983); Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara, and Pa-
perman (1996) provide strong empirical evidence that the risk of trading with
an informed investor explains a large part of the variation in spreads of NYSE
traded stocks. In addition, Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, and Lyons (1999) argue
that these three components of the quoted spread can be extended by an addi-
tional search cost component to account for the asymmetries of counterparty
search.
The quoted spreads should be driven by economic forces that are implied by
the theoretical models of market microstructure, in a competitive CDS mar-
ket. The characteristics of CDS contracts can be used to proxy for the risks a
5Bid-ask spreads have obvious limitations. However, it is difficult to define a single mea-
sure that reflects all dimensions of liquidity, leaving the bid-ask spread as a good proxy for
analysis.
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CDS dealer faces and thus be reflected in the spread. For instance, the CDS’s
maturity, notional amount, and premium will drive inventory costs, because
these features indicate how much risk will be carried in the inventory. Thus, in
a panel regression, the absolute bid-ask spreads is regressed on several contract
features: The Moody’s rating, rank, currency, notional amount, restructuring6,
and maturity have been selected as explanatory variables. Intuitively, credit
risk proxied by ratings should be a determinant of absolute spreads. In an
empirical investigation by Odders-White and Ready (2006) for the stock mar-
ket, it is shown that poorer debt ratings are related to higher spreads due to
both higher adverse selection and trading costs. On the other hand, Acharya
and Johnson’s (2007) study, one of the few empirical studies to address CDSs,
finds no evidence that adverse selection affects prices or liquidity in the CDS
market. Even then the argument of higher trading costs remains, so it is ex-
pected that the spread would widen as the credit quality indicated by ratings
declines. Subordinated CDSs are also anticipated to be less liquid than senior
CDS and carry a higher absolute bid-ask spread. In addition, a higher notional
amount translates into a higher inventory cost and thus could also result in a
higher bid-ask spread. There is no prior expectation for the liquidity differences
regarding the currency and restructuring clauses of the contracts.
After extracting the data points with no rating or maturity information as well
as sovereign entities (due to few data points with mostly low credit quality),
169,009 data points remain within the period of January 2001 to January 2005.
For the whole sample the average bid-ask spread is 22 bid-ask midpoints (bps),
6The restructuring dummy has a value of “0” for the Old Restructuring (OR) clause
where minimum restrictions on delivery option are present: “1” for Modified Modified Re-
structuring (MMR), the valid clause for Europe after June 2003, which constrains the old
clause; and “2” for Modified Restructuring (MR), the valid clause for North American en-
tities. The latter is the most restrictive clause overall and reduces the value of the delivery
option.
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with a standard deviation of 68 bps. The absolute spread could be as high as
2000 bps, as it was the case for CDSs written on Enron just before its default
in 2001. The average bid-ask spread for the rating class Aaa is 9 bps, which
increases to 58 bps for the B class.
The results of the panel regression, in which the absolute bid-ask spread is re-
gressed on several independent variables, are reported in column (1) of Table
2.5. A low percentage of variation is explained (14.52 per cent) and a highly sig-
nificant intercept is present, indicating that there are missing variables. Unfor-
tunately, there is no volume data available from the IDB market, which would
be helpful for understanding liquidity. Nevertheless, all explanatory variables
are highly significant. Not surprisingly, the numerical value for the Moody’s
rating is the variable that contributes most to the explanatory power of the re-
gression, explaining 7.15 per cent of variation. One notch of deterioration with
respect to the rating increases the bid-ask spread by 3.98 bps on average. Cur-
rency and restructuring are other highly contributing variables. A move from
EUR to USD increases the bid-ask spread by 20.72 bps. It is possible that
currency may proxy for other undefined variables, such as settlement differ-
ences or the varying degrees of openness in different CDS market segments. In
keeping with the expectations, the significant and positive parameter estimate
for the notional amount indicates a move from 5 million notional to 10 million
notional contracts, causing the bid-ask spread to increase by 12.99 bps. This
coincides with an increasing inventory-holding cost component with higher no-
tional amounts. A closer analysis of the dataset reveals that this finding is also
related to a timing issue. The first two years in the dataset were dominated by
10 million notional contracts, and during this time the premiums were high. In
the last two years, the average premium declined, as the set was dominated by
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5 million notional contracts, and the CDS market was more liquid than during
the first two years.7 In order to investigate this timing issue, year dummies
have been introduced to the regression (column (2)). It is observed that the
absolute spread in the first two years (indicated by year dummies 1 and 2) are
about 19 bps points higher than the base year, 2004.
For further analysis, separate regressions for each rating group have been un-
dertaken. From columns (3)-(8) in Table 2.5, it can be seen that rank, currency,
and restructuring estimates are consistent across rating classes. While subor-
dinate absolute spreads are higher than that of senior CDSs, a move from EUR
to USD causes the spreads to widen, except for class B (column (8)). Simi-
larly, the restructuring variable coefficient is always negative; indicating that
restricting the deliverable obligations decreases the spreads. Finally, although
the percentage of variation explained seems to increase for low rating classes,
this is not monotonous. Nevertheless, the regressions on non-investment grade
CDS spreads (Ba and B) have a better R2 than investment grade CDS spreads,
on average.8
7Robustness checks executed by taking the log values of ratings and maturity lead to
similar results.
8In order to check for robustness, regressions with the relative bid-ask spread as the
dependent variable have been tested. The relative spreads are calculated by dividing the
absolute spread by the midpoint of the quotes. In the regression, this affects the seniority,
maturity, and rating variables. Due to the fact that subordinated CDSs have higher mid-
points that enter into this calculation than the senior CDSs, parameter estimates with a
reverse sign for the rank variable have been reached. The same is true for the rating variable
in regression (1) in Table 2.5, since the lower ratings simply indicate a higher midpoint divi-
sion. Similarly, these regressions had a negative estimate for the maturity variable, which is
most likely not because of changing absolute spreads but instead due to increasing midpoints
for higher maturities.
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Table 2.5: Panel Regressions with Absolute IDB Spread as the Dependent
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Set Full Set Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B
Intercept -11.92 -19.58 7.07 2.57 5.12 3.43 474.90 364.79
t -25.28 -38.55 21.14 19.75 23.43 4.2 30.20 13.55
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Rank 3.99 3.99 Excluded 2.08 0.85 1.81 Excluded Excluded
t 12.84 12.90 40.43 7.09 1.47
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.1411
Maturity -0.04 -0.04 Excluded 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -6.47 -5.75
t -7.39 -7.80 29.29 3.08 -0.69 -24.09 -12.83
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0021 0.4902 <0.0001 <0.0001
Currency 20.72 13.28 13.03 9.37 9.89 14.70 112.52 -216.24
t 52.12 30.58 23.01 89.40 48.69 17.10 26.61 -27.14
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Restructuring -7.12 -2.16 -3.64 -2.78 -2.09 -0.14 -78.14 Excluded
t -30.11 -8.16 -10.19 -45.34 -17.62 -0.26 -26.30
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.7926 <0.0001
Rating 3.98 4.06
t 122.18 124.83
p <0.0001 <0.0001
Amount 12.99
t 65.16
p <0.0001
YearDummy1 18.68 -2.08 2.59 7.70 40.37 311.78 536.13
t 56.84 -3.3 33.19 54.78 56.81 48.85 47.03
p <0.0001 0.0010 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
YearDummy2 19.64 0.84 4.65 10.32 27.10 68.93 503.92
t 71.54 2.72 70.85 81.27 48.97 29.19 66.89
p <0.0001 0.0066 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
YearDummy3 7.38 -0.38 1.56 3.92 8.66 39.36 280.51
t 34.36 -1.46 29.94 38.76 20.95 19.82 26.52
p <0.0001 0.1443 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
R-Square 0.1452 0.1537 0.3304 0.5521 0.2924 0.1196 0.5609 0.9456
Observations 169,009 169,009 3,230 32,473 62,720 63,577 5,813 1,196
Regression Equation for (1): IDBBAS = β0 + β1 Rank + β2 Maturity
+ β3 Currency + β4 Restructuring + β5 Rating + β6 Amount + ε.
Dependent Variable: IDBBAS is the CreditTrade daily closing CDS absolute bid-ask spread. Explanatory
Variables: Rank dummy, “0” for Senior, “1” for Subordinated contracts; Maturity, one of the values of
“12”, “36”, “60”, “84”, or “120”, in months; Currency dummy, “0” for EUR, “1” for USD denominated
contracts; Restructuring, having a value of “0” for Old Restructuring (OR) clause; “1” for Modified Modified
Restructuring (MMR); and “2” for Modified Restructuring (MR); Rating, a value between 1 and 16, “1”
corresponding to “Aaa”, and “16” to “B3”, assigned by Moody’s; Amount dummy, “0” for 5 million, “1” for
10 million notional amount contracts; Year Dummy1 for prices of 2001, Year Dummy2 for prices of 2002,
Year Dummy3 for prices of 2003, where 2004 is the base year. Rank, Maturity, Amount and Restructuring
variables were excluded in some regressions due to having single class.
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2.3.2 Differences of Liquidity across Trading Venues
It is well documented in the literature that market structure has impacts on
liquidity and trading costs (Stoll (2000)). In particular, bid-ask spreads may
differ in terms of size and composition with respect to the alternative trading
venues available in the CDS market. The early work of Garbade (1978) suggests
that joining an IDB reduces search costs, resulting in lower trading costs. More
recently Reiss and Werner (2005) pointed out that interdealer trades have two
important motives, the risk sharing of dealers, and information asymmetries
(Ho and Stoll (1983); Reiss and Werner (1998)). In their empirical investiga-
tion, they contrast interdealer trading on the London Stock Exchange (LSE)
by using stock prices from the non-intermediated OTC market and brokered
trading systems. They find that differences in liquidity across trading systems
on the LSE are mainly driven by problems of adverse selection. On the other
hand, Acharya and Johnson (2007) provide empirical evidence that adverse
selection does not affect liquidity in the CDS market. However, their study is
based on CDS benchmark products traded via an IDB. Hence, it is an open
question whether this result transfers to the direct OTC market.
Assume that IDB and direct OTC CDS markets are well integrated due to
the informational linkage. Then the asymmetric information component is the
same in both venues. Assume moreover that inventory costs are similar across
venues by virtue of their tendency to attract the same participants. According
to Garbade’s reasoning, this leaves only the trading cost differences between
IDBs and the direct OTC market. An important extension to Garbade’s argu-
ment should incorporate the additional services provided by IDBs. Although
search costs decrease by joining an IDB, if brokers offer additional services, the
trading cost component in bid-ask spreads should also reflect the premium for
Credit Default Swap Markets 32
the added value of the brokerage function. Consider both search costs and the
added value of the brokerage function: If the latter were to dominate, it would
lead to IDB spreads being higher than the non-intermediated OTC market
spreads, which forms the first hypothesis:
H1: The quoted absolute bid-ask spread in the IDB market is higher than in
the direct, non-intermediated OTC market.
In order to analyze the spread differences in these markets, the monthly data of
direct OTC quotes were retrieved from Bloomberg in addition to the quotes of
CreditTrade presented in Section 2.2. The direct OTC dataset includes 12 mid-
month observations for more than 200 entities for the year 2004.9 In order to
match the bid and ask quotes for a given entity on a day with the IDB data, the
direct OTC quotes of multiple dealers are taken to reach a closing inside spread
for each day. This resulting dataset had 1,883 matching observations. Around
ninety per cent of the entities had 5-year contracts, whereas the remaining
entities were written on 1-, 3-, 7-, and 10-year maturity contracts. All quotes
belong to senior CDSs.
For testing the first hypothesis, Table 2.6 presents a significance test for the
differences between the absolute bid-ask spreads of the two markets. In keep-
ing with hypothesis H1, the difference of bid-ask spreads is highly significant,
with the IDB spread being higher than the OTC spread. This suggests that
the IDB spreads include a larger transaction cost component. Apparently, this
conclusion rests on the idea that the information and inventory components in
spreads are the same across the two venues. The asymmetric information and
inventory holding costs affect both markets similarly if the markets are inte-
grated and reflect the same information. This hypothesis of market integration
9In order to eliminate month-end effects, mid-month data are used.
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can be tested by analyzing the percentage of non-overlapping bid-ask spreads
and by also comparing the midpoints of the quotes. If both trading markets
are integrated in prices, then it can be indeed concluded that the extra spread
consists of only the trading costs incurred by the dealers who select the IDBs.
H2: Prices across IDB and direct OTC venues are the same, indicating well-
integrated markets.
Table 2.6: Significance of the Differences of the Absolute Bid-Ask Spreads of
Two Trading Venues
Mean Difference t-Statistic p-Value
IDBBAS - OTCBAS 3.19 23.30 <0.0001
Number of Observations 1,883
IDBBAS is the interdealer broker daily closing CDS absolute bid-ask spread
for the mid-month data, calculated by the absolute difference between ask and
bid prices. OTCBAS is the corresponding Bloomberg closing CDS absolute
bid-ask spread for the same entity and maturity, calculated similarly.
Table 2.7 presents whether the direct OTC and IDB quotes are nested, over-
lapping, or non-intersecting. Seven possible alternatives for the bid-ask spreads
are tabulated. The first three cases indicate when spreads are nested or equal.
The fourth and fifth are overlapping, with higher quotes given in one market.
The last two cases are the non-intersecting spreads, where an arbitrage pos-
sibility is present. As expected, most cases fall into the first five types. 9.02
per cent of the quotes denote arbitrage possibilities; a bid quote in one market
being higher than the ask quote in the other market. However, it is worth
noting that the indicative IDB quotes is compared with the inside direct OTC
closing quotes. It therefore stands to reason that these may not indicate ac-
tual arbitrage possibilities. Overall, these results suggest that the markets are
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integrated.
Table 2.7: Fragmentation of Direct OTC and IDB Markets
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Cases Nested Cases Same Cases Nested Cases O verlapping
Case O TC Inside IDB O TC Matches IDB IDB Inside O TC IDB Ask Higher
Definition
IDB Ask >= OTC Ask >
OTC Bid >= IDB Bid
OTC Ask = IDB Ask >
OTC Bid = IDB Bid
OTC Ask >= IDB Ask >
IDB Bid >= OTC Bid
IDB Ask > OTC Ask >
IDB Bid > OTC Bid
No. of Obs 737 28 201 367
Percentage 39.14% 1.49% 10.67% 19.49%
Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Total
Cases O verlapping Non-intersecting Non-intersecting
Case O TC Ask Higher IDB Spread Higher O TC Spread Higher
Definition OTC Ask > IDB Ask >
OTC Bid > IDB Bid
IDB Ask > IDB Bid >=
OTC Ask > OTC Bid
OTC Ask > OTC Bid >=
IDB Ask > IDB Bid
No. of Obs 380 98 72 1,883
Percentage 20.18% 5.20% 3.82% 100.00%
Additional support for the integrated structure of both markets is presented by
directly comparing the midpoints for the same dataset. Table 2.8 presents the
pricing differences of 1,883 pairs, which are taken to be the difference of direct
OTC and IDB midpoints. It indicates that the prices are not significantly dif-
ferent. In summary, results of these two tables support the second hypothesis,
which states that pricing is consistent across trading venues for the selected
list of companies. This finding can be attributed to two reasons: Firstly, CDS
trading mainly occurs between major institutions with good ratings, which
suggests that dealer base overlaps are present. Secondly, the datasets used for
the analysis are from a selection of major companies that have liquid contracts,
denominated in EUR or USD. This result indicates that the information and
inventory cost components of the two venues are the same. It also confirms
the results obtained by Acharya and Johnson (2007), who do not find evidence
of adverse selection with a similar dataset. In their study, Acharya and John-
son (2007) proxy the number of banking relationships as the measure of the
prevalence of non-public information in the market. The regressions they hold
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do not show a relation between the number of banks indicating the number of
informed players and liquidity.
Table 2.8: Comparison of the Midpoints of Direct OTC and Interdealer Broker
Quotes
Mean Difference t-Statistic p-Value
IDBMID - OTCMID 0.069 0.53 0.5962
Number of Observations 1,883
IDBMID and OTCMID represent the average of bid and ask quotes (mid-
points) of the interdealer broker and direct OTC markets (from Bloomberg),
respectively.
Given that the markets are well integrated, one question remains to be ad-
dressed: What causes the differences in trading costs, or in other words, under
which conditions are the additional services of a brokerage of value? Intuitively,
it could be expected that illiquid, riskier CDS trades are conveyed to IDBs.
This hypothesis would be in line with Barclay, Hendershott, and Kotz (2006)’s
findings in the US Treasury bond market. Their results distinguish between
on-the-run US Treasury securities that are traded by electronic IDBs with a
market share of 80 per cent and off-the-run securities where voice broking is
highly preferred (88 per cent). This is mostly because the intermediaries’ extra
effort is necessary for illiquid, complex, and larger-sized trades. The interme-
diaries’ ability to match complex trades is sometimes referred to as “market
color”. Although the authors compare the automated and intermediated bro-
kerage platforms, their results are relevant in that they indicate the necessity
of intermediation in case of illiquidity. Hence, in the following, it is analyzed
whether the spreads of the two markets are affected by the need of intermedi-
ation in cases of more complex trades. In the CDS market, a direct measure
of trade complexity is the credit quality of the underlying since the CDS pre-
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miums are an indication of credit risk. It is expected that the deterioration of
credit quality will widen the absolute bid-ask spreads, as well as the difference
between IDB and direct OTC spreads. The first part of the argument was
shown in the last section, while the second part forms the hypothesis below:
H3: The difference between the IDB and the direct OTC absolute spreads widens
with decreasing credit quality.
To test this hypothesis, the difference between absolute spreads is regressed on
the midpoint of the direct OTC quotes. The results in Table 2.9 indeed indicate
a high significance of credit quality, which means that the higher the midpoint,
the higher the spread difference between the IDB and the direct OTC mar-
ket.10 This suggests that riskier and more complex trades are conveyed to the
IDBs, and can be interpreted as that the dealers value the additional trans-
action services beyond pure trade execution. Nevertheless, the percentage of
variance explained is low, indicating missing variables. Obviously, one of these
can be competitiveness differences between the quotes posted in two venues.
IDB quotes can be less competitive than the direct OTC quotes, which actually
can be varying for different credit qualities. In fact, these results might indi-
cate that the more competitive direct OTC market may attract the high credit
quality CDS, leaving the IDBs the less liquid and less competitive quotes. Un-
fortunately, a variable to proxy for this factor could not be constructed. Being
still in its development stages, the CDS market does not provide volume data,
which would be a natural candidate for proxying competitiveness. Similarly,
the depth of quotes may be an important factor behind the liquidity differences.
The presence of depth information would lead to an improved understanding
of the overall picture concerning the liquidity in these two markets.11
10Significance is also reached when IDB midpoints are used as the explanatory variable.
11A similar analysis has been carried with relative spreads. Due to the fact that relative
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Table 2.9: Explaining the Difference of the Bid-Ask Spreads of Two Trading
Venues with Credit Quality
Dependent Variable: IDBBAS - OTCBAS
Parameter Estimate t-Statistic p-Value
Intercept 1.293 8.00 <0.0001
OTCMID 0.032 18.73 <0.0001
R2 0.157
Number of Observations 1,883
Regression Equation: IDBBAS - OTCBAS = β0 + β1 OTCMID + ε
IDBBAS is the interdealer broker daily closing CDS absolute bid-ask spread
for the mid-month data, calculated by the absolute difference between ask and
bid prices. OTCBAS is the corresponding Bloomberg closing CDS absolute bid-
ask spread for the same entity and maturity, calculated similarly. OTCMID is
the average of daily bid and ask quotes (midpoints) for Bloomberg data.
To summarize, in this section, evidence concerning the liquidity of intermedi-
ated versus non-intermediated markets has been provided. It has been noted
that the quoted bid-ask spread should account for adverse selection and inven-
tory holding costs, as well as the costs of any transactional service, including
search costs. The results show no significant difference in pricing across trading
venues, indicating a well-integrated CDS market. Apparently, the overlapping
of the set of dealers committed to both trading platforms might be a reason
for this outcome. Despite the fact that the CDS market has a countable num-
ber of dealers and brokerage firms, this study indicates that quotes are not
purely driven by market power but vary due to certain underlying economic
forces. The quoted spread is higher in the intermediated market, which has
been suggested to stand for the added value of the brokerage function. It is
noteworthy to mention that this is only one of the possible explanations for
spreads are computed by a division of the midpoints, the significance of credit quality is in
the opposite direction for Tables 2.6 and 2.9. This is most likely due to midpoints increasing
stronger than the absolute spreads for low credit quality entities.
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spread differences. Certainly, many factors come into picture considering trade
volumes, depths, trade complexities and credit qualities. These results provide
evidence for showing that brokerage has an effective place in the CDS market
despite the higher costs of liquidity. The value of intermediation will exist as
long as complex trades need special handling and explain why voice brokerage
still has an important share in many markets in spite of increasing competition
from electronic trading systems.
Chapter 3
Overview on Empirical Credit
Risk Pricing
3.1 Credit Risk Modeling -
Structural and Reduced-Form Models
In the last decade, credit risk modeling has received increasing attention within
academia and practice. The pricing of credit risky instruments, such as bonds
and credit default swaps, dates back to the 1970s. The introduction of the
Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) valuation framework eventually
led to the development of a new branch of finance. One of the extensions of this
framework was the pricing application of Merton (1974) for corporate bonds.
Merton made use of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) equations
to reach a “risk structure” of zero-coupon bonds. The pathway they opened is
based on the central point that debt and equity can be interpreted as options
on the firm value of a corporation.
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Over time, different approaches to modeling credit risk have been developed,
resulting in two main branches of research in the current academic literature.
Following Merton’s (1974) idea, the structural approach is based on modeling
the evolution of issuer balance sheets. According to this approach, default oc-
curs when the value of assets fall below a certain level and the issuer is unable
or unwilling to meet its obligations. There have been various extensions of Mer-
ton (1974). Black and Cox (1976), Geske (1977), Leland (1994), Longstaff and
Schwartz (1995), Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Collin-Dufresne and
Goldstein (2001) are among the important contributions to the defaultable
claims framework. These models extended Merton’s (1974) approach, most
significantly in terms of (i) allowing default at any time during maturity, (ii)
endogenously deriving the level of the default barrier, and (iii) introducing
stochastic interest rates. Black and Cox (1976) have provided a closed form
solution for the “first-passage time” models. In addition, their study was im-
portant for its derivation of an endogenous default barrier, which has since been
extended by Leland (1994) and many others. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)
carried the debate to include stochastic interest rates. A relatively more recent
model in Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) made use of stochastic interest
rates and further included a stationary leverage ratio.
In contrast to structural models, reduced-form models specify the default prob-
abilities exogenously. According to these models, default time is unpredictable
and is calculated by means of a default intensity function. Instead of rely-
ing upon the diffusion process inherent in structural models, reduced-form
approaches model the default time as the first occurrence of an event in a
jump process. The simplest type of reduced-form models is one in which the
default intensity is constant, as put forward by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995).
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Many variations of this model have been developed. Important contributions
among them include Jarrow, Lando, and Turnbull’s (1997) version with rating-
dependent intensities in a Markov chain setup, as well as the Cox processes
used by Lando (1998) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) for default intensity
modeling. A comprehensive review on both structural and reduced-form credit
risk models can be found in Uhrig-Homburg (2002).
With all these different approaches available, the question becomes: How well
do they represent a good benchmark for real prices? To date, there has been
no common agreement in academia or practice as to which model framework
better represents default risk. This is a crucial question for the pricing of credit
default swaps presented in the last chapter. It is still an open issue of what
type of method better prices CDSs. For this purpose, this chapter serves as
an overview on the empirical literature in credit risk. Firstly, studies with
structural and reduced-form pricing with bonds will be highlighted. Then,
empirical applications concerning credit default swaps as the instrument will
be discussed. It should be noted that only empirical studies with credit risk
modeling are focused on. This leaves aside many other studies with corporate
bonds where a structural or reduced-form model are not involved. Nevertheless,
recent studies with CDSs are included, regardless of involving a credit risk
model test or not. As a result, a broad overview of studies with CDSs will be
presented.
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3.2 Review on Empirical Studies in Credit Risk
3.2.1 Structural Models with Bonds as the Instrument
Structural models can be investigated in two main branches. Merton’s initial
idea defined the default barrier exogenously. Extensions of the Merton model
which kept this assumption include Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993),
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Briys and de Varrenne (1997), Scho¨bel (1999)
and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). An alternative to exogenously defin-
ing the default barrier is when the default is modeled as a decision by the firm.
In these models the barrier is endogenously determined as a result of the man-
agement decisions (e.g. Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996)).
Empirical studies with structural models differentiate most significantly in
terms of (i) type of bonds used, i.e. whether they include call features or not,
(ii) the estimation method for the parameters, most importantly the asset
value and volatility, and (iii) usage of riskless term structure and the inclusion
of stochastic interest rates into the model setup. With an emphasis on these
issues, a review on empirical studies based on the two types of structural
models will follow.
Studies on Structural Models with Exogenous Default
Empirical studies that apply the theoretical framework developed by Merton
(1974) have been scarce initially. This was mostly due to the availability of
reliable data. When earlier empirical studies that test structural models in
their ability to price corporate liabilities emerged, these works suffered from the
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applicable data problem. Prior to 1980s, most corporate bonds were callable,
making it hard to work because observed spreads included also a call premium.
Since it is arguable that on which proportion the observed spreads of corporate
bonds depend on default risk and call options, these early studies have biases
within.
The work of Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984) (henceforth JMR) is one of
these early studies that uses callable bonds as the instrument. In the study,
the monthly data of 27 firms between January 1975 and January 1981 were
used. A simple capital structure was the most important decision variable in
selecting these firms: As described by JMR, the firms had one class of stock,
no convertible bonds, a small number of debt issues, and no preferred stock.
They also had a small ratio of private debt and short term notes payable
to total capital, and they typically had rated publicly traded debt. Ogden’s
(1987) work is best comparable to JMR in terms of data used since Ogden
had a pre-condition of being callable and having a sinking fund while selecting
the 57 bonds between 1973-1985 period. Nevertheless, the approaches of JMR
and Ogden differ when JMR incorporate multiple issues of debt to the Merton
model while Ogden allows only one bond. Ogden selected data of firms with
simple capital structure and with primary market prices. Although Ogden
thinks that a simple capital structure restriction will bias the sample towards
smaller firms, he neglects this in favor of testing the ideal conditions of the
model.
Both studies utilize an extended version of the Merton (1974) model with
sinking fund provisions, callable debt, and - in the case of JMR - multiple
debt issues. Since the resulting partial differential equation is not analytically
solvable in both cases, numerical methods have to be applied. The two studies
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also have similarities in the estimation technique of the volatility σV of the
firm value V to reach σV :
σE = σVEV
V
E
, (3.1)
where σE is the volatility of the equity value E and EV is the partial derivative
of the equity value with respect to the asset value V .1 First, they estimate firm
values from market values of equity and market (for JMR) or book values of
debt (for Ogden), calculate the standard deviation of equity returns of the
firm, and estimate EV . Ogden handles the estimation of EV by first assuming
it to be equal to 1, then he uses Equation (3.1) for a revised estimate, whereas
JMR use a similar method. Finally, JMR and Ogden make use of Equation
(3.1) for an estimate of σV . Besides volatility data also interest rate data are
required. JMR comment that assuming a flat term structure for default-free
interest rates (which is similar to Merton’s original assumption) would cause
biased estimation. Thus, both JMR and Ogden make use of one year implied
forward interest rates estimated from government bond data retrieved from
the Wall Street Journal.
Both JMR and Ogden test Merton’s model in its ability to explain credit
spreads and reach the conclusion that the model computes lower spreads than
observed in the market. JMR compare their results with a “na¨ıve” model that
only discounts the promised payments with the riskless rate. With an entire
sample of 305 coupon bond prices, JMR find an absolute percentage error in
predicting the risky bond prices with the Merton model of 8.5 per cent and a
percentage error of 4.5 per cent. Both error values are above 10 per cent for
non-investment grade bonds. These results are rather high in terms of percent-
age pricing errors. It came out that the Merton model has better predictions
1See Merton (1974) for derivation.
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than the na¨ıve model for lower quality bonds, while the models give similar
results for higher qualities. Moreover, regression analyses reveal that variance
estimation errors affect pricing differences substantially. Observing the indis-
tinguishable results of the Merton model and the na¨ıve model for investment
grade bonds, JMR conclude by suggesting that introducing stochastic interest
rates and taxes would improve the model’s performance.
Ogden’s experiences with the Merton model are also mixed. In his initial pro-
bit analysis for uncovering the relation between bond ratings and the Merton
model’s estimated risk measure (standard deviation, σ, and debt-to-firm value
ratio, D/V ) both variables have proven to be significant. A regression between
observed and model spreads shows that predicted spreads are on average 104
basis points lower than the observed spreads, which indicates a poor perfor-
mance. Ogden undertakes a second regression to understand the potential fac-
tors for the results, with firm size, rating grade, treasury yield, and slope of
the term structure being the independent variables. While there is no evidence
on the significance of bond rating, spread errors are negatively related to firm
size. Ogden treats this finding as a standing point in parallel to Fisher’s (1959)
liquidity hypothesis which puts forward that bonds of larger firms are more
liquid and have lower yields. Bond spreads should also be inversely related to
firm size, ceteris paribus. Since model spreads are invariant to firm size, the
spread errors are expected to be negatively related to firm size. Both term
structure variables are also significant which suggests stochastic interest rates
should be incorporated for better results.
It is interesting that both JMR and Ogden conclude their work by suggesting
the introduction of stochastic interest rates. Since Merton’s model does not
include stochasticity, this option has become available only in latter theoretical
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studies, particularly after the work by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). As we
will see later, in recent empirical studies the presence of stochastic interest rates
is tested with Longstaff/Schwartz’s model, although it has not significantly
improved the pricing. Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) suggest that the reason
why JMR and Ogden necessitate stochastic interest rates is that the data they
use was an interval in which Treasury rates were volatile. It is possible that
subsequent studies such as Wei and Guo (1997) did not face the same necessity
while using only 1992 data, with non-callable bonds in their analysis.
One of the first empirical studies that investigate the risk structure of pure
discount bonds is Sarig and Warga (1989). The authors compare their findings
to the behavior suggested by Merton’s (1974) model but do not price the
liabilities using a model. For the period of February 1985 to September 1987,
data of 137 zero-coupon bonds of 42 companies were collected. In contrast to
JMR and Ogden, the authors have omitted the callable bonds from their list.
As a result credit spreads can be easily computed by subtracting the yield of a
zero-coupon government bond from the yield of a zero-coupon risky bond with
identical maturity. The resulting term structures of spreads were increasing for
investment grade bonds, humped shaped for bonds rated BB, and decreasing
for bonds rated B or C. Sarig/Warga comment that these findings match with
the theoretical results of Merton, if leverage (the debt-to-firm value ratio, d)
and rating are negatively correlated.
The importance of Sarig/Warga’s study lies in being among the first testing
implications of the Merton model with limited non-callable zero-coupon bonds
data. A direct test of Merton’s model based on zero-coupon bonds is Gemmill’s
(2002) work. In the study, zero-coupon bonds issued by closed end funds in UK
are used as the source of data between the period of February 1992 and April
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2001. Thus, Black/Scholes equations can be used to calculate model prices of
bonds. Parameter estimation is also fairly simple given this database: The firm
value, V , is proxied by market value of the closed end funds portfolio. Volatility
can therefore be estimated from the time series data of firm value.
Gemmill confirms some results obtained in previous studies: Calculated spreads
are lower than observed spreads for less riskier bonds and for bonds that are
closer to maturity, by using zero-coupon bonds of closed-end funds as the
dataset. Moreover, in parallel to Ogden he finds that observed spreads increase
when interest rates fall and term structure steepens. However, in contrast to
previous results, Merton’s model performs surprisingly well in explaining credit
spreads with an average of monthly deviations of around 6 per cent. Interest-
ingly, the resulting term structures of credit spreads are consistently upward
sloping although Merton’s model predict and Sarig/Warga empirically con-
firm downward-sloping term structures for risky bonds. Gemmill comments
that this could be possible if it is assumed that there will be a drift in leverage
over time. The sample of bonds issued by close-end funds may be expected to
have a leverage falling over time, causing the spread to fall on each bond as
it approaches maturity. Gemmill suggests that this observation supports the
argument of Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) who specify a target for
leverage that has influence on model spreads.
In the eminent work of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), interest rate risk is
incorporated to the structural framework provided by Merton (1974). Thus,
the constant interest rate assumption is relaxed. Longstaff/Schwartz also follow
Black and Cox (1976) in allowing default earlier than maturity. In parallel to
the findings of Sarig/Warga, the model predicts an increasing term structure of
credit spreads for high quality bonds while low quality bonds show a humped
Overview on Empirical Credit Risk Literature 48
shaped structure within their model. Recall that the original Merton model
is in the same spirit which predicted a hump shaped structure for debt-to-
firm value ratio being d < 1, and a decreasing structure for d > 1. In a first
empirical analysis based on Moody’s monthly yield averages for the period of
1977-1992, Longstaff/Schwartz find significant contribution of the correlation
between asset returns and interest rates for pricing corporate bonds, when
stochastic interest rates are introduced.
In their contribution to the literature, Wei and Guo (1997) compare the pricing
ability of the Merton (1974) and the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) models
by utilizing Eurodollars as risky debt. Eurodollars are bank deposit liabilities
that are not subject to US regulations, but they are issued in US dollars.
Although they can be held anywhere outside US, the reason why they are
called Eurodollars is that they were originally most liquid in Europe. The
authors have chosen to work with Eurodollars since they are widely traded.
What Wei/Guo would specifically like to test is whether the stochastic interest
rates introduced with Longstaff/Schwartz’s model, have been an improvement
in the pricing ability over the Merton model. However, the authors only test
the fitting ability (in-sample) of the models rather than their predictive power.
In order to implement the model Wei/Guo perform two steps. In a first step
the term structures of risky and riskless interest rates are computed. For each
Thursday in 1992 Wei/Guo use the seven days, one month, three months, six
months and one year Eurodollar yield leading to a risky term structure con-
sisting of five data points at each date. In addition, they derive the riskless
term structure using T-bills ranging from seven days to one year. In a second
step, model parameters are estimated. The Merton model parameters (volatil-
ity, σ2v ; debt-to-firm value ratio, d) are estimated from the risky bond prices
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by inverting the Black/Scholes formula. Because of the number of parameters
and the stochastic term structure, the Longstaff/Schwartz model’s estimation
occurs in two steps. First, the term structure parameters that follow a Vasicek
(1977) process are estimated by non-linear least squares fitting of Treasury
term structure. Secondly, the credit structure parameters are estimated by fit-
ting the risky Eurodollar term structure of interest rates using a grid search
method. At the end, estimates are available for in-sample credit term structure
construction for each week in 1992.
As the sum of squared errors for the weekly calculations of the Merton model
are smaller than for the Longstaff/Schwartz model, the Merton model can be
commented to fit the observed credit structure better. This seems to be aston-
ishing in the first place, since the Longstaff/Schwartz model with eight parame-
ters might be expected to be more flexible in fitting the observed credit spreads.
However, the Merton and the Longstaff/Schwartz models are non-nested and
hence have superior characteristics to each other. Still, both do not exactly
reach the shape of the observed credit structure. The credit structure of the Eu-
rodollars has N-shape; however, both the Merton and the Longstaff/Schwartz
models only reach a hump-shaped structure since an N-shaped structure can-
not be obtained within these models. According to Wei/Guo, the Merton model
has shown more reasonable fit over the Longstaff/Schwartz model since when
time to maturity approaches infinity the authors reach a hump-shaped credit
curve that converges to a constant. The Longstaff/Schwartz model converges
to zero on the same circumstance, which limits the ability of the model to fit
the credit term structure.
The Merton and Longstaff/Schwartz models are also objects of Lyden and
Saraniti’s (2000) work. They are the first to test these structural models using
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individual, non-callable corporate bonds. Using the database of Bridge Infor-
mation Systems they select a sample of 56 firms with publicly traded common
stock and a single outstanding bullet bond without embedded options within
the period from 1990 to 1999. So as to estimate the parameters, Lyden/Saraniti
first compute the firm value by adding total equity, book value of short term
and other liabilities, and the market value of the bond. For asset volatility, the
standard deviation of the time series of firm values is taken. The riskless rates
are estimated with the Vasicek (1977) model from Treasury yields and the his-
torical correlation between stock prices and the ten year on the run Treasury
yield is used to proxy the correlation between asset value and riskless interest
rates.
Consistent with previous work Lyden/Saraniti have reached the conclusion
that both the Merton and the Longstaff/Schwartz models underestimate yield
spreads with considerable difference. When testing the Merton model, the au-
thors account for different possible debt structures. The assumption of equal
priority given to all creditors in the event of default leads to the lowest mean
absolute error (83 basis points), which is of course still extremely high. The
corresponding mean error of 61 basis points documents the strong underpre-
diction of market spreads by the Merton model, part of which is doubtlessly
due to a liquidity premium. When regressing model errors on bond character-
istics they confirm the finding of JMR and Ogden that the model particularly
overprices longer term debt. Testing the Longstaff/Schwartz model in its abil-
ity to explain spreads occurs in two steps. First, Lyden/Saraniti introduce
early default before incorporating stochastic interest rates. They do this by
applying Longstaff/Schwartz model with zero volatility of risk-free rates and
assume a recovery rate as 47.7 per cent, as suggested by Altman and Kishore
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(1996). In the second step stochastic risk-free interest rates were introduced.
Interestingly neither allowing early default nor volatile interest rates improves
the model. Interest rates do have an impact, but bring accuracy problems.
The model results deteriorate even more when industry specific recovery rates
are incorporated. So, to rescue the model, the well-known problem of joint
hypothesis must serve, stating that the rejection could either be due to an in-
correct model or due to misestimated asset volatility. Overall, Lyden/Saraniti
conclude by commenting that the Merton model has better performance in
prediction than the Longstaff/Schwartz model - a result which confirms and
extends the in-sample result of Wei/Guo to out-of-sample prediction.
The most comprehensive empirical analysis of structural models using corpo-
rate bonds is the recent study of Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) (hence-
forth EHH). Their comparison of five corporate bond pricing structural mod-
els includes the work of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995), Leland and Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001)
and is the first work that tests the Geske, the Leland/Toft, and the Collin-
Dufresne/Goldstein models.2 Similar to Lyden/Saraniti, EHH concentrate on
corporate bonds with simple capital structures. Restricting the sample to un-
subordinated, non-callable bonds of non-financial and non-utility firms with
standard cash flows and long maturities as well as to firms that have at least
five years of stock price data and not more than five bonds, they end up with
182 bonds. They retrieve the 1986-1997 data of last trading day of each De-
cember from the Fixed Income Database. Bond maturities are mostly in the
range of 5-10 years, although bonds that have maturities from one year to 30
2The Geske (1977) and Leland and Toft (1996) models are endogenous-default models
that are analyzed in more detail in the next section. However, for the continuity of EHH
study, a partition was not found useful.
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years are present in the sample.
In order to estimate parameters for the structural models, EHH use various
techniques. Asset volatility is estimated from (i) historical equity volatility,
similar to JMR with Equation (3.1), (ii) 150-day future equity volatility, (iii) a
GARCH (1,1) model, and finally (iv) implied volatility using previous-month
bond prices. Unlike JMR, the firm value is computed by adding equity value
and the book value of total debt. The firm’s annual payout (dividends, bond
coupons, share repurchases) is adjusted in the models as well. For the one-
factor models of Merton, Geske and Leland/Toft, the risk-free rate is estimated
using the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model. In both Longstaff/Schwartz and
Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein models, interest rate dynamics are described by the
Vasicek (1977) model, thus the authors implement these two models using
Vasicek estimates for consistency. Moreover, in the Longstaff/Schwartz and the
Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein models, the required correlation coefficient between
asset returns and interest rates is proxied with the correlation between equity
returns and changes in interest rates as in Lyden/Saraniti. EHH fix the recovery
rate to 51.31 per cent following the literature on default recoveries. For all
models except the Geske model, EHH can make use of analytical or quasi-
analytical formulas to derive model prices for the coupon bond. The Merton
model is extended to coupon bonds by simply pricing the coupon bond as
portfolio of zero-coupon bonds each of which is priced using the standard
Merton model. The more accurate treatment of coupons within the Geske
model leading to a compound-option pricing problem is numerically solved
with binomial trees.
Based on historical volatilities EHH find that the extended Merton model
underpredicts spreads. Only with implied volatilities this result disappears.
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However, a comparison of the model results using implied volatilities from
the previous month’s bond prices with a simple random walk model implying
that the previous month’s spreads is the best estimate for the current spread,
leads to the conclusion that the random-walk model performs superior. Fur-
ther analysis with the extended Merton model reveals that the specific form of
the risk-free term structure (Nelson/Siegel or Vasicek) is not important, as the
authors try the Vasicek model as an alternative source for the risk-free rate.
The Geske model also underpredicts spreads while reaching closer values to
the actuals. Specifically, the Merton and the Geske models generate very high
spreads on bonds that are risky, and low spreads for the ones that are con-
sidered safe. In contrast, Leland/Toft’s model overpredicts spreads. Since this
overprediction of the model is closely related to the coupon-level, the authors
suggest that the assumption of a continuous coupon payment, which can be
basically interpreted as exercise of the option to continue operations, is respon-
sible for this result. The Longstaff/Schwartz model also reaches high spreads
for risky bonds but low spreads for safer bonds. Although the accuracy substan-
tially worsens EHH argue that stochastic interest rates are important because
spread estimates are sensitive to interest rate volatility estimates thereby al-
lowing an additional source of volatility. Finally the Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein
model overpredicts spreads on the average while helps to raise the spreads that
are considered safe by Longstaff/Schwartz. With these findings, EHH conclude
that the accepted argument in the literature which is that the structural mod-
els underpredict spreads consistently, is not correct. However, maintaining ac-
curacy in prediction is important. Because of this reason, EHH suggest that
raising the model spreads should not be seen as the central focus of further
theoretical studies with structural models, rather it should be raising them for
safer bonds while keeping them for riskier bonds.
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A novel approach to testing structural models have recently arisen from the
work of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007). In their study the authors take a
different path, and instead of predicting bond spreads which are usually un-
derestimated by the Merton’s (1974) model, they choose to look at whether
the model can predict hedge ratios -of debt to equity- that are in line with
those observed empirically. They motivate their reasoning that the price of a
corporate bond can be thought to consist of a credit related component and
a non-credit related component as suggested by prior research (i.e. Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001)). If structural models provide a good
estimate of the credit related component, they will simultaneously predict the
hedge ratios of actual prices while failing to explain their level. Therefore their
starting point is to hypothesize that if they find a model that provides reason-
able prediction of hedge ratios but a poor prediction of the price, they may
identify the reasons of model failure.
With a sample of 1,360 bonds between 1996 and 2003 that do not have any
embedded option-like features, Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007) first look at
the sensitivity of corporate debt to changes in firm value. After having shown
the significance of the sensitivities of corporate debt returns to the underlying
equity and riskless debt, they check whether the magnitudes of the sensitivities
are consistent with the Merton’s model. By pursuing a simulation, the authors
find that the Merton model simulated sensitivities are very close to actual
sensitivities from data, although the model underestimates the observed level
of credit spreads by more then 80 per cent. After calculating the asset volatility
form historical equity and bond returns, they finally show that the Merton
model provides reasonable predictions for hedge ratios but poor predictions
for the bond price. Therefore, the authors suggest that the poor performance
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of the structural models might arise from the influence of non-credit factors,
rather than not being able to capture credit exposure of debt. By checking other
possible determinants of the bond returns, they document that the returns are
affected by some factors (such as return on S&P 500 index, or changes in VIX
index of implied volatility of options) that are not related to credit exposure.
The authors therefore conclude the study by a further evidence in line with
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) who find a significant non-credit
component in credit spread.
Overall, it can be concluded that all tested structural models have difficulties
in accurately predicting corporate credit spreads. The various extensions of the
Merton model do not really do a better job. Surprisingly, the Longstaff/Schwartz
model performs even worse with the incorporation of stochastic interest rates.
While it is a common argument that models underpredict spreads for safe
bonds there is no consensus on the pricing of riskier bonds. JMR found lower
spreads for risky bonds with the Merton model whereas EHH have reached
too high spreads for riskier bonds with the Longstaff/Schwartz model. In any
degree of riskiness, the Leland/Toft model overpredicts spreads in the analysis
of EHH. It is noteworthy to mention that many regression results with the er-
rors indicate that longer term bonds have higher spread prediction errors. The
criticism towards structural models that claim a common poor fit to empirical
data therefore has solid examples. However, as the quality of data more and
more improves and also as the techniques to estimate parameters become more
powerful, one can have hope to implement structural models more successfully.
Moreover, further efforts should investigate the differences of credit related and
non-credit related components in the light of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007)
and concentrate on the explainable parts with structural models.
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Studies on Structural Models with Endogenous Default
A renewed focus on structural models arises from the approach that endoge-
nously determines the default boundary. These studies analyze the impact of
firm’s financing decisions and make detailed assumptions about the default
event. Specifically, the firm has a management decision whether to continue
paying coupons on the debt or to declare bankruptcy. This type of studies was
initiated by Black and Cox (1976). Extensions of Black/Cox differ in the result-
ing default barrier, which is computed with optimization techniques. Uhrig-
Homburg (2002) provides an extensive review on different types of endogenous
models that extend the Black/Cox model with taxes, bankruptcy costs, and
debt renegotiation using game theoretic elements.
Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) is among the first empirical studies that tests
pricing ability of endogenous structural models. The purpose of their work is to
discriminate among different endogenous models and compare it to the results
of Merton. The two endogenous models they test are: (i) Leland (1994), which
extends Black and Cox (1976) with bankruptcy costs and tax advantage of
debt, and (ii) Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996) (henceforth AST);
which is a special case of both (a)Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) in which a
game-theoretic model of the bankruptcy process is introduced, and (b) Mella-
Barral and Perraudin (1997), in which the firm can be liquidated at any time at
some given liquidation value. Throughout the study, perpetual coupon bonds
are considered.3
Anderson/Sundaresan have chosen to work with indices instead of specific bond
issues, because they think indices are more linked to economic factors than in-
3 Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon (1996) is the continuous time version of the discrete
model of Anderson and Sundaresan (1996).
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dividual bonds which have a stronger connection to firm-specific factors. The
monthly data of yield indices were collected for the time period from August
1970 to December 1996. This data constituted 30-year BBB rated bonds ac-
cording to the rating system of Standard and Poor’s. Similar to exogenous
structural models the estimation of leverage and asset volatility is required,
which is undertaken as follows: A leverage proxy, computed as monthly series,
is obtained from annual aggregated balance sheet data and market values of
equity. In contrast to previous work done in the literature, asset volatility is
taken to be simply a multiple of equity return volatility from S&P 500, which
is implicitly estimated by non-linear least squares from the bond yields along
with other parameters. This can be viewed as a relaxation of the technique
utilized by JMR and followers, given in Equation (3.1). In their effort to esti-
mate parameters, Anderson/Sundaresan built a formulation for the yields on
corporate bonds, Yt:
Yt = λ+ Y (Lt, σEt, rt, a,K, θ, β) + ut (3.2)
and
ut = ρut−1 + ε (3.3)
where Yt is the observed market yield for corporate bonds. The additive con-
stant λ is included to capture a liquidity premium or some other effect that
is not captured by the model. Y (.) is the model-implied yield calculated from
Y = cP/B of the coupon bond with coupon c, principal P , and model value B
of the defaultable bond computed from Leland, AST, and a perpetual version
of Merton pricing formulas. As Equations (3.2) and (3.3) demonstrate, the yield
depends on Lt, the leverage proxy described above (which is estimated directly
from balance sheet information); σEt, the equity volatility (which is estimated
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from standard deviation of equity returns on the S&P 500); rt, the riskless rate
(proxied by moving averages of long-term Treasury yields); a, the equity/asset
volatility multiple; K, the fixed bankruptcy cost; θ, the proportional recovery
rate; β, the cash flow rate; and ρ, the autocorrelation coefficient. The constant
parameters, the liquidity constant, bankruptcy cost, recovery rate, cash flow
rate, and autocorrelation of residuals are estimated by the same nonlinear least
squares with the asset volatility multiple. Naturally, the bankruptcy cost, the
cash flow rate and the recovery rate are not present for the Merton model,
whereas AST model uses all of the above variables except the recovery rate.
For the Leland model, only a, λ, θ, and ρ are estimated and bankruptcy cost
and the cash flow rate are left out.
According to Anderson/Sundaresan, implied parameter estimates are more
plausible for the Leland and especially for the AST model compared to those
from the Merton model. Nevertheless, it should be noted that only the as-
set volatility multiple that enters the Merton’s model is estimated in-sample,
whereas the endogenous models have more parameters to be estimated. More-
over, the estimated parameters have a single constant value for the whole
estimation period, which is not on the same level of detail compared to weekly
estimation, such as in Wei/Guo. It is also worth mentioning that the recovery
rates estimated by the AST and the Leland models are over 90 per cent while
the literature agrees on a rate around 50 per cent (i.e. Altman and Kishore
(1996)).
The calculated spreads using the parameter estimates are compared to ob-
served BBB-rated bond spreads. For all models, observed spreads are more dis-
persed than in-sample calculated spreads. But, the endogenous models tested
have a better correlation with observed spreads than the Merton model. An-
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derson/Sundaresan conclude that the endogenous determination of default
boundary has led to an improvement among structural models. Still, the re-
sults should be evaluated in the light of the parameter estimation process as
described above. Another comment to include would be that the results of
Anderson/Sundaresan show the estimate of liquidity constant is attributed to
nearly all of the spread computed with the Merton model, leaving the model
to account for only 4 bps. This raises the question of how much the models
actually contribute to explaining spreads.4 Finally, the fit of the models with
firm specific data remains untested.
In their attempt to use structural models to explain credit spreads, Ericsson
and Reneby (2004) have also chosen an endogenous model, a variation of the
Leland (1994) model. They argue that the better fit of reduced-form models5
in the literature arises from the estimation techniques used, rather than the
model structure. Their aim is to show that structural models can perform as
well when properly estimated. Using a maximum-likelihood method proposed
by Duan (1994) and shown support in Ericsson and Reneby (2005), they esti-
mate model parameters from a time series of stock prices and previous periods’
bonds prices to predict current bond prices and spreads. The required capital
structure information is retrieved from balance sheet data and as a proxy for
the constant risk-free rate an interpolated Treasury yields is chosen. Erics-
son/Reneby use a sample of 141 corporate bond issues that consists of nearly
5,600 dealer quotes. The out-of-sample, one month-ahead spread predictions
result in finding a mean error of only 2 bps. When longer horizon out-of-sample
prediction is applied, the average error increases to -18 per cent of the spread.
4Liquidity constant also constitutes a major portion of the explained spreads with the
Leland and AST models.
5See Section 3.2.2 for the empirical results obtained with reduced-form models.
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Comparing these results to prediction errors obtained with reduced-from mod-
els (specifically Duffee (1999) and Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006)), the au-
thors conclude that incorporating bond prices information into the estimation
procedure of structural models provides valuable information and leads to a
performance that is well comparable to reduced-form models.
In one of the more recent studies, Teixeira (2007) tests three structural models
of default. These are the Merton (1974), Leland (1994), and Fan and Sun-
daresan (2000) models. The author uses 50 bonds of firms with simple capital
structures between 2001 and 2004. The sample is limited to US non-financial
firms that have no more than three bonds. Besides, only bullet, non-callable,
non-putable or non-convertible bonds are allowed, whereas floating rate bonds
and bonds with sinking fund provisions are excluded. The risk-free yield curve
is estimated by fitting the Nelson/Siegel model. For the necessary parameters
of asset value and asset volatility, the author solves the JMR equation and
the equity valuation equation specific for the model simultaneously using nu-
merical methods. This estimation method is an extension to JMR’s original
technique, first proposed by Ronn and Verma (1986). JMR’s single equation
is extended to solve two simultaneous equations for two unknowns, asset value
and volatility, where the second equation is simply used to view equity as the
call option on asset value. The results indicate that the fits of the models are
quite poor. The Merton model has a spread error of -193 bps and a relative
error of -78 per cent, whereas the Leland model has a spread error of 193 bps
and a relative error of -75 per cent. The study fails in generating risk-neutral
default probabilities close to actual probabilities as well. Merton and Leland
risk-neutral probabilities are 12.3 per cent and 10.5 per cent, whereas the ac-
tual probability lies in the range of 0.11 per cent given rating and maturity.
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Teixeira adds that the Fan/Sundaresan’s model delivers a better performance
with -62 per cent relative spread error. Nevertheless, in each of the three cases,
spreads are underestimated.
Although some of the studies of endogenous default models reach more promis-
ing results than previous studies of structural models, it is questionable whether
the endogenous default modeling itself is responsible for this improvement.6 In
contrast to most previous studies, the Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) and
Ericsson and Reneby (2004) use bond price information to estimate model pa-
rameters for their endogenous default models, which at least partly explains
better performance.
3.2.2 Reduced-Form Models with Bonds as the Instru-
ment
Within the last decades, a new path of modeling default has been opened in
credit risk analysis. This second approach is modeling default probabilities as
an exogenous variable represented by a default intensity. These type of models
remain silent about the cause of default, and model the unpredictable default
by a jump process. This constitutes the main difference between structural
and reduced-form models. Instead of a diffusing firm value term, there is the
default intensity as the parameter for a Poisson process. Extensions of the
constant intensity approach of Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) include Jarrow,
Lando, and Turnbull (1997), Lando (1998), Duffie and Singleton (1999), and
Das and Sundaram (2000).
6Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) explicitly investigate the influence of strategic behav-
ior on corporate spreads and find that bond prices are affected by the possibility of debt
restructuring. Though strategic variables are statistically significant in explaining credit
spreads their economic significance is quite low.
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Empirical studies with reduced-form models differentiate most significantly in
terms of (i) their choice of the default intensity process, whether it is taken as
a constant or as a Cox process, (ii) whenever Cox processes are used, the selec-
tion of the state variables as an unobservable Vasicek or Cox/Ingersoll/Ross
process, or as an observable credit risk factor extracted from financial infor-
mation, (iii) the methods used in estimating the default intensity, and (iv)
the choice and estimation of the riskless term structure. Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner
(2006) is among the few studies that tested a constant intensity approach. Al-
though computationally tractable, a constant intensity translates into limited
real-life examples. In the real world, the default probability of corporations
change continuously. Duffee (1999) was among the first to see this at a rela-
tively early time point, who conducted research with state variables depending
on Cox/Ingersoll/Ross processes. Another contribution by him was incorpo-
rating Kalman filter into the estimation of the riskless and default intensity
processes. Although his work was one of the first in-depth empirical studies
with reduced-form models, a substantial attention to observable credit risk fac-
tors was not given until the work of Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006). In their
work, Bakshi/Madan/Zhang investigate the effects of choosing various credit
risk factors from financial information of corporations, as the observable state
variable. Two other studies are also critical in this section: The study of Duffie,
Pedersen, and Singleton (2003) extends the analysis to multiple credit events
of sovereign bonds, whereas Tauren (1999) has the intention to describe the
dynamics of the spreads on their own. Overall, this section aims to show how
the empirical studies with reduced-form models have used bonds intensively
to explain credit risk premiums within.
In their contribution to the literature, Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2006) use daily
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prices of 51 German Mark or Euro denominated coupon bonds that do not have
sinking funds or embedded options between January 1999 and June 2000 to es-
timate a constant default intensity and test the Jarrow/Turnbull model. These
bonds are issued by banks and non-bank corporates which are rated as AA, A
or BBB by Standard and Poor’s during the period. In a three step procedure,
Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner first analyze with a simulation whether the joint estimation
of the default intensity and recovery rates is possible. The authors first calcu-
late riskless zero-coupon bond prices by using the Svensson (1994) parameter
estimates provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Then they estimate a con-
stant default intensity and a recovery rate jointly by minimizing the errors
between observed and the calculated bond prices with the Jarrow/Turnbull
model. However, the performed simulation study has proven the weak perfor-
mance of joint estimation. The estimates depend heavily on the initial values
and thus the results are not stable numerically. Instead, the study is continued
by estimating a constant default intensity keeping the recovery rate fixed at
50 per cent, following Altman and Kishore (1996) and Moody’s (2000).
Then in-sample results from bond prices are analyzed to discover whether (i)
cross-sectional estimation, using all bonds in a risk class, or (ii) separate es-
timation, using only one bond at a time among the total of 51, is a better
alternative for default intensity estimation. The initial estimation method of
the default intensity is by cross-sectional estimation within each rating class,
where it is observed that default intensities differ regardless of the rating of
bonds: As an example, the estimated intensity of banks rated A is lower than
safer bank bonds that are rated AA. Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner try to find determi-
nants of the default intensity by holding regressions on market and firm/bond
specific variables. The results are not in favor of cross-sectional estimation:
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The authors comment that intensities must be estimated separately since any
kind of classification by rating, industry or issuer ends in poorer results than
by bond basis. Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner therefore conclude that Jarrow/Turnbull’s
assumption of a constant default rate per issuer is not supported by their
analysis.
In a third step, optimal pooling intervals are determined such that out-of-
sample pricing errors are minimized. Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner incorporate a past
pooling time span up to 35 days, as well as using daily estimation. Utilizing
optimal pooling intervals, “ex-ante” pricing errors, which are the out-of-sample
testing results, show the mean absolute error between calculated and observed
price is 24 to 331 bps in cross-sectional estimation, while 10 to 31 bps for sep-
arate estimation. In conclusion, the authors suggest the inability of estimating
the default intensity and the recovery rate jointly can be used as a foundation
of credit risk models such as Duffie and Singleton (1999) where the recovery
rate is integrated into the default intensity. Their results suggest that focusing
on models where default intensity is autoregressive in structure and is a func-
tion of liquidity and the riskless term structure should be the goal of further
research.
Nevertheless, there are empirical literature already present partly at the direc-
tion they have pointed out. In his study, Duffee (1999) uses a model adapted
from the reduced-form approach of Duffie and Singleton (1997, 1999). Follow-
ing Pearson and Sun (1987), the interest rate process is assumed as the sum
of a constant and two factors that follow square-root stochastic processes. The
default intensity process is a single-factor square-root process plus two compo-
nents that include default-free interest rate factors. Therefore any correlation
between default intensities and riskless yields are targeted to be captured by
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the coefficients of the factors in the intensity process. Although incorporation
of riskless interest rate factors to the default intensity is a major contribution
of the study in the direction which Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner have mentioned, Duffee
further brings an innovative approach to the estimation process as well. The
author uses extended Kalman filter for the calibration of riskless and default-
able bonds. The model variables are estimated for the period from January
1985 through December 1995, with a total sample of 161 firms and around
40,000 prices. The estimation is undertaken first by estimating the two factors
for the interest rate process using Treasury yields, and then by separately es-
timating the instantaneous default intensity for each firm, given the estimates
of these factors. The estimates of the default intensities and yield spreads per
rating class are computed afterwards. Duffee’s in-sample results indicate a root
mean squared error of only 10 bps. Duffee argues that his model captures a
non-default component within spreads, even though his estimation process pro-
vided no information on liquidities. His model results also confirm the steeper
slope of low grade firm spreads with respect to the higher grade firm spreads.
In their contribution to reduced-form approaches, Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang
(2006) (BMZ henceforth) have followed Duffie/Singleton’s stochastic default
intensity framework. With an approach similar to Duffee, the risk-free factor is
included in computing default risk-adjusted discounting process. The adjusted
discounting factor is a sum of constant default factor, risk-free rate and a
distress factor. By such formulation, BMZ maintain economy-wide and firm-
specific variables to be presented simultaneously. The three factor model used
by BMZ has a two-factor interest rate process and a single factor for the
credit risk component. The long run mean of interest rates follows the Vasicek
process while the short rate is an extended Vasicek process that incorporates
Overview on Empirical Credit Risk Literature 66
the long run mean. Instead of an unobservable default intensity process, BMZ
have chosen to work with an observable credit risk factor, which differentiates
their study from its counterparts. BMZ constructed several proxies for distress
factors and tested a group of different reduced-form models: leverage, book-to-
market ratio, profitability, lagged credit spread and normalized stock price by
money market account. Leverage is proxied as long term book value of debt
divided by firm value (the sum of long term debt and market capitalization of
common equity). Another proxy, the book-to-market ratio is defined as book
value of equity to market value of equity, while profitability is computed as
operating income divided by sales.
The data of BMZ consists of 93 firms and over 46,000 coupon bond prices be-
tween 1989 and 1998. BMZ first confirm by OLS regressions that cross-section
of yields depends on firm specific distress factors. While estimating the in-
terest rate parameters, they found out that the stochastic mean factor added
to the one-factor Vasicek model improved performance. The firm-specific de-
fault parameters are estimated similarly, by minimizing the root mean squared
pricing error. The in-sample fit shows the firm specific distress factors do not
contribute substantially over the interest rate model. BMZ attribute this to
their usage of low risk bonds as data set. Following, one-month out-of-sample
predictions were undertaken. By dividing absolute valuation error to the bond
price, the authors report absolute percentage pricing error, of which a maxi-
mum of 1.9 per cent is reached. Another error term is reported by BMZ by
calculating the absolute deviation of the calculated yield from the observed
yield: the absolute yield basis points error, which is between 27-33 bps for
different model types when all rating classes are pooled. Ericsson and Reneby
(2004) have pointed out the similarity of the out-of-sample prediction and their
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results with BMZ although they test a structural model: The errors in spreads
are comparable in amounts and similarly rise as credit quality worsens. Fi-
nally, BMZ run OLS regressions to analyze pricing errors, and try to explain
them with systematic factors such as industrial production growth rate, term
premium, and default premium. Overall, the work of BMZ extends the ini-
tial work of Duffee and constant intensity approach of Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner with
observed credit risk factors.
Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003) (DPS henceforth) extended the appli-
cation of reduced-form models to sovereign bonds. They undertake the study
for the special case of Russian default in 1998. Although sovereign default is a
political decision at the end, bonds of sovereigns have been priced using sim-
ilar models that are applicable to corporate bonds. Nevertheless, the authors
comment that structural models, that capture the default incentives and sol-
vency, will not be appropriate if empirical analysis should be undertaken. They
note that nearly all of the studies in the literature have used reduced-form ap-
proach for pricing sovereign bonds (Pages (2000), Du¨llmann and Windfuhr
(2000), Merrick (2001)).
In parallel to the literature, DPS apply Duffie and Singleton’s (1999) reduced-
form approach using weekly data between the period of February 1994 to
August 1998, which is just before the default of Russian short-term discount
bonds. DPS extend the Duffie/Singleton recovery-of-market value formulation
to allow multiple types of credit events, specifically for (i) default or repudi-
ation, (ii) restructuring and renegotiation, and (iii) regime switch of govern-
ment. However, DPS comment that adequate data with the Russian bonds is
not available to separate the credit event effects.
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For the riskless yield, the authors use US Dollar swap yields with LIBOR-
quality. The decision to use swap rates instead of Treasury yields was due that
they are disburdened by repo specials and tax advantages, and that they can
be reached on the basis of constant maturity. A two-factor affine model with
stochastic volatility is used for the term structure model for which a maximum
likelihood procedure is utilized to estimate its parameters. After reaching in-
sample fits for the pre-crisis and default periods of Russia, DPS price two
additional Russian bonds out-of-sample. A good fit is observed until August
1998, the credit event. Another observation is that the out-of-sample model
prices are significantly lower than Eurobond prices after the credit event. DPS
conclude that Russian yield spreads are affected from political events and that
they are also correlated with the oil prices and foreign currency reserves. The
extension of DPS to allow multiple types of credit events is one of the major
contributions of the study.
A similar line of research to the aim of pricing corporate liabilities has the
goal to explain credit spreads on their own. Although these two aims have
close links, they distinguish in the fact that the estimation of the risk-free rate
from government bonds is not taken into account for when the aim is directly
explaining credit spreads. In his contribution to literature, Tauren (1999) at-
tempts to focus directly on the spreads in a Duffie/Singleton framework. The
selection of the default intensity is therefore in parallel to Duffee (1999), Bak-
shi, Madan, and Zhang (2006), and Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton (2003).
Focusing directly on spreads, Tauren formulates a stochastic differential equa-
tion for the expected loss rate, h(t)L(t). In doing this, Tauren assumes that the
expected loss rate and riskless rate are not correlated. 112 corporate bonds of
26 firms during the period of 1986 - 1994 are retrieved from Salomon Brothers
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for estimation purposes. The out-of-sample prediction data set consists of 22
corporate bonds from 8 companies. Tauren also collects the rating class yield
indices from Standard & Poor’s Bond Guides. The loss rate, L, is taken as
52 per cent as computed in Carty and Lieberman (1998) for senior unsecured
public debt.
The starting point of Tauren is to apply the methodology developed by Chan,
Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992) (CKLS henceforth) to reduced-form
models. CKLS have estimated and compared different models of short-term
interest rate using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). GMM brings
the ease that specifying the distribution of error terms is not required and
that autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity is allowed. To finalize the spread
dynamics formula, Tauren inserts a negative survivorship bias to the drift,
which produces an effect similar to mean reversion.
As the parameter estimates with CKLS model is reached the statistics show
that the model is misspecified. This leads Tauren to test robustness of CKLS
specification. One of the assumptions tested was the independence of riskless
rate and the spreads. Tauren points out that the bonds in the sample have
mostly call features, which may bring dependence on interest rates with call
premia. Results show that as long as mean reversion is included, CKLS model is
robust. A consequent subperiod analysis indicates that parameter estimates of
the two half-intervals are identical. Finally, the out-of-sample prediction results
show the mean-reversion included in CKLS model causes poorer performance.
Consistent with Duffee (1999), the results suggest that long-term levels of
spreads are higher for lower quality bonds than for higher quality bonds. The
author comments that repeating the study with the inclusion of non-investment
grade bonds would be a valuable effort.
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As can be observed from the studies mentioned in this section, reduced-form
modeling can involve various forms and techniques in application. Factors that
affect the prediction ability are therefore numerous, and it is difficult to dis-
criminate a model’s capability from each other. Constant default intensity
approach of Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2006) has shown the necessity of Cox
processes for better results. In using a Cox process, one major distinction
in application is whether the study uses observable distress factors for the
default intensity such as in Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006) or the default
intensity is modeled as an unobservable process as in Duffee (1999). Applica-
tion of reduced-form modeling to sovereign bonds with multiple credit events
has also been accomplished with the study of Duffie, Pedersen, and Singleton
(2003). Overall, reduced-form models can be accepted as viable tools as long
as mathematical techniques support economical intuition.
3.2.3 Studies with Credit Default Swaps
Credit risk literature has recently started considering the expanding market of
credit default swaps as a basis of research. The development of empirical studies
has been parallel to the development of the market, as usable empirical data
has been available in adequate time series only recently. Being unconstrained
by liquidity effects, the price of a CDS is a pure measure of credit risk, and
therefore is an appropriate tool to be used in studies with credit risk modeling.
In the preceding sections, studies with bonds in which only credit risk models
are tested were examined. However, in the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to
understand the credit default swap as a product with its many dimensions. This
section reviews both the studies that directly apply credit risk models to CDSs
and those that empirically investigate the nature of CDS prices. Naturally,
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studies that test models may include regressions that analyze CDS features.
Nevertheless, the first part contains studies that focus their study on mainly
testing the models, whereas the second part includes studies which do not use
models at all.
Studies that Test Credit Risk Models with CDSs
As a complementary tool to bonds as the empirical data source, prices of
CDSs have been recently popular as datasets. For instance, the recent work
of Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) (LMN henceforth) differs from other
empirical papers on credit spreads by that they use the default intensities esti-
mated from credit default swap premiums to analyze corporate bond spreads.
In the first approach they use, they follow the no-arbitrage comparison in
which the premium of default swap equals the credit spread of bonds. This as-
sumption is thoroughly analyzed in Duffie (1999). Still, as investigated in the
work by Duffie and Liu (2001), this approach can produce a biased measure
of the default component. Therefore as a second approach, the authors gener-
ate a reduced-form model in the Duffie and Singleton (1997, 1999) framework.
A major contribution of their work is the analysis they have undertaken by
showing a non-default component is present in corporate bond spreads due to
illiquidity measures.
LMN start their investigation with a case study of the default of Enron and
then extend the analysis to 68 firms. Because of the problem of finding a
matching five-year bond available at each date of five-year CDSs, the authors
use a bracketing set approach. A set of bonds with maturities that bracket
the five-year time span of the credit default swap are used, instead of working
with a single Enron bond. When LMN compare the CDS premiums to the bond
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spreads, it is observed that the premium is 49 per cent of the total spread for
AAA/AA-rated bonds, 53 per cent for A-rated bonds, 68 per cent for BBB-
rated bonds and 84 per cent for bonds that are below investment grade. These
are significant differences in absolute terms. Then they estimate the default
intensity for each firm from the observed CDS premiums. In order to obtain
default component for each bond, they regress the time series of yield spreads
of each firm on the estimated default components for the firm. After comparing
the ratio of default component to observed credit spreads, they comment that
the “model independent approach”, which is directly comparing default swap
premiums to spreads, performs poorer results.
LMN put forward that the corporate spreads do not only consist of a default
component, but also a non-default component as well. At the final stage, they
investigate the characteristics of the non-default component in a cross-sectional
and a consequent time series analysis. For this reason, they regress the non-
default component of the spread on variables such as the coupon, the bid-ask
spread, the principal, the age, the maturity, the financial institution dummy
and the rating dummy for high investment grade bonds. It came out that the
average bid-ask spread is significantly related to the non-default component,
which signals that the size of the non-default component increases as liquidity
decreases. The principal is negatively related, which confirms that large issue
sizes that are more liquid have smaller non-default components. This argument
that liquidity risk is priced in bond spreads is consistent with Fisher’s (1959)
early work. The following time series analysis aims to explain market wide
measures of illiquidity, since the cross-sectional analysis better explains bond-
specific measures. Finally, overall liquidity proxies for the market such as flows
into money market funds are significant, as well.
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Similar to the work of LMN, a two step procedure is used by Houweling and
Vorst (2005) to analyze the default swap premiums and bond spreads. In the
first step, under a no-arbitrage argument the authors directly compare ob-
served bond spreads and observed default swap premiums. The next step is
introducing a reduced-form model and calculating model default swap premi-
ums. Their major contribution to the literature lies in suggesting swap or repo
rates as a better benchmark for risk-free rate rather than government yields.
Houweling/Vorst use bond data between January 1999 and January 2001 from
Reuters and Bloomberg. They use a sample of 1,131 fixed coupon, senior un-
secured, bullet bonds with 258,000 price quotes. Their default data set is
retrieved from commercial and investment banks, and internet trading ser-
vices (Creditex and CreditTrade) which comprises of 225 reference entities
and around 23,000 CDS prices. As a benchmark of the riskless curve, Trea-
sury, swap and repurchase agreement (repo) rates are used for comparison.
When Houweling/Vorst analyze the default swap data, it is observed that the
average premiums decrease with credit quality as expected, whereas no appar-
ent relation between maturity and premium could be found. In order to provide
a basis for comparing observed bond spreads and CDS premiums, matching
is done by either finding a bond that has a maturity discrepancy of at most
10 per cent from default swap maturity or by interpolating bond maturities.
Pricing errors are calculated when a pair is formed by subtracting bond bid
spreads from default swap ask quotes and vice versa. By doing so, similar sides
of the market are compared. The interpolation method has proven better re-
sults, and in absolute terms premiums deviate from the market values about
68 per cent for AAA rated bonds and 19 per cent for BBB rated bonds.
In the second step of the study in which a reduced-form model is introduced,
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the default intensity is modeled as a polynomial function of time to maturity.
In the case of constant default intensity model, the intensity increases with
credit rating, and this suggests the success of credit ratings in assessing cred-
itworthiness. It is also observed that the selected default free curve has an
effect on the level of the default intensity. By constructing pairs similar to the
approach described above, but this time using model default premium, new
pricing errors are reached.
It is important to underline the approach difference between LMN and Houwel-
ing/Vorst studies: Houweling/Vorst have calculated default swap premiums
from default intensities estimated from bond spreads. In contrary, LMN have
estimated the default intensities from observed default swap premiums to cal-
culate bond spreads. Moreover, Houweling/Vorst have not included an illiquid-
ity premium in their model, while LMN have undertaken an in-depth analy-
sis. The main result of Houweling/Vorst assesses that a reduced-form model
performs better than the first method which directly compares spreads and
premiums - a finding in parallel to LMN, but still there occurs an absolute
deviation of 20 per cent to 50 per cent. The best performance for investment
grade issuers among different default intensities and risk-free curves is by the
quadratic model that uses the repo curve. A typical conclusion is that govern-
ment curve should not be seen as the sole choice of riskless curve.
Another recent study that incorporates a liquidity component in both bond
and CDS spreads is the work of Bu¨hler and Trapp (2005). Unlike previous
studies that assume perfect liquidity for CDS premiums, the authors point out
to the fact that bid-ask spreads of CDSs might be large enough to justify a
liquidity premium. Therefore the major contribution of the paper is to build a
reduced-form model for the CDS prices with an additional liquidity component.
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The study is designed so that bonds and CDSs of a given issuer have identical
default risks but different liquidity risks.
For a dataset of 37 bonds of 10 telecommunications companies between Au-
gust 2001 and May 2005, the authors assume a square-root process for the
default intensity as in the study of LMN, and the liquidity process also follows
a Brownian motion. Bu¨hler/Trapp find that adding a CDS-specific liquidity
component causes positive credit and liquidity premiums in the bond market.
Moreover, as the default risk increases, the bond market’s liquidity dries up,
whereas the CDS market becomes more liquid. Through modeling liquidity
components in both CDS and bond markets, the authors are able to explain
both positive and negative values of the basis.
The LMN, Houweling/Vorst and Bu¨hler/Trapp articles all study credit risk
with reduced-form models. A more recent study, Chen, Fabozzi, Pan, and
Sverdlove (2006), on the other hand, analyzes the sources of credit risk by
comparing the structural models of Merton (1974), Rabinovitch (1989), and
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), with fixed and random recovery barrier mod-
els. The authors are inspired by the end result of Wei and Guo (1997) that
the Longstaff/Schwartz and the Merton model do not outperform each other
due to their non-nested constructions. Therefore, they try to build pairs of
models which are nested, in which one model is the special case of the other,
and look at what kind of constraint makes a difference. From the study of
Wei/Guo in Section 3.2.1, one can recall that the Merton model has a single
default and barrier, constant interest rates, and random recovery, whereas the
Longstaff/Schwartz model has a continuous default barrier, stochastic interest
rates, and fixed recovery. Since the models did not dominate each other, it was
not possible to determine whether random recovery in the Merton model or the
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stochastic recovery in Longstaff/Schwartz model plays a more important role.
With a CDS dataset of 3,496 trade observations between February 2000 and
April 2003, the authors find that fixed recovery barrier and Longstaff/Schwartz
model overestimate CDS spreads whereas the Merton, Rabinovitch and ran-
dom recovery barrier models underestimate them. Their results indicate ran-
dom recovery and stochastic interest rates are important assumptions, whereas
they did not find support for the continuous default assumption. Their findings
are consistent with the study of Wei/Guo.
An adjacent field of application which tests credit risk models is making use of
sovereign crisis information. CDS prices of sovereign entities or of corporates
that reside in these countries should show a clear demonstration of the crisis
during turbulent times. A study that analyzes credit default swaps during such
crisis times is Skinner and Diaz (2003) which uses the period of Asian crisis as
a case study to compare Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) and Duffie and Singleton
(1999) models. By choosing these two models recovery of treasury value and
recovery of market value assumptions will be analyzed respectively. A binomial
version of the models is utilized, and 31 default swaps between the period of
September 1997 and February 1999 are used. The sample is divided into two
sub-categories; the “crisis swaps” had a reference entity in Asian countries
while the “non-crisis swaps” did not.
The main contribution of Skinner/Diaz is the comparison of the expected
premium and the expected payment in case of default, for crisis and non-
crisis CDSs. The Duffie/Singleton model reaches greater values for the ex-
pected payment than the premium consistently for non-crisis CDSs while for
Jarrow/Turnbull model the groups are in balance. This is mostly because
higher default intensities are reached by the Jarrow/Turnbull model, there-
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fore calculated premiums and insurance payments are lower than those of
Duffie/Singleton. The results show in general that for non-crisis default swaps
the expected payment is larger than the expected premium, while for crisis de-
fault swaps, the situation is the contrary. The authors suggest that this may be
due to a moral hazard problem, and point out that the credit event definition
involves restructuring for their sample. The buyer of the insurance who can be
same as the owner of the underlying bond, may therefore effect the insurance
payments.
On the other hand, Zhang (2003) includes several features to his default swap
valuation framework while focusing on the specific case of what the market
expected before the Argentina default. The model is first to untie the default
probabilities from the recovery rate, allow correlation between underlying state
variables, and incorporate counterparty default risk, in one framework. Sim-
ilar to Duffee (1999) and Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006) the hazard rate
is assumed to be linear in three state variables of economy. The data set con-
sists of mid market quotes from J.P. Morgan of 10 contracts on Argentinean
sovereign debt in a time span of January 1999 to December 2001. 149 weekly
observations therefore total to 1490 default swap quotes. It is noted that mean
absolute pricing errors of the model are within 10-20 bps while the performance
deteriorates as default on December 2001 is approached. It is an observation
that major rating agencies lagged the credit market in downgrading Argentina
debt, with their optimistic view during the period.
Studies that Empirically Investigate Features of CDSs
In addition to the studies that tested credit risk models by using CDSs, there is
a growing number of literature that investigate various features of this instru-
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ment. These studies fall mostly into one or more of the following categories:
(i)Studies that basically compared the bond spread with the CDS spread un-
der a no arbitrage comparison (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005); Hull, Pre-
descu, and White (2004)). As seen in the last section, this analysis is also a first
step towards understanding the relationship between bond and CDS spreads in
testing a credit risk model (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005); Houweling and
Vorst (2005)). (ii)Studies that have held regressions to understand the effects
of various features on CDS premiums (Skinner and Townend (2002); Cossin,
Hricko, Aunon-Nerin, and Huang (2002); Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005)).
These studies tried to find a significance between the underlying features and
CDS prices. (iii)Studies that have undertaken an event study around certain
credit risk events and looked at how CDS premiums changed (Hull, Predescu,
and White (2004); Norden and Weber (2004)). In the studies taken for this
review, this event was the rating announcements. All these studies try to be a
part in the larger picture of how CDS features could be understood.
The first task of Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) (BBM henceforth) has
been to compare the pricing of credit default swaps and bond spreads. Their
results suggest that the no-arbitrage equivalence holds mostly, and that credit
default swaps form an upper bound for the price of credit risk, whereas bond
spreads are observed to construct a lower bound, due to the delivery option
present in CDS premiums and the repo cost for short selling the cash bond.
Another major attempt of BBM is to check which market is ahead in price
discovery. New information is valued in credit default swap market prices more
quickly than in bond prices hence the default swap market can be thought as
more liquid.
BBM use daily closing price credit default swap data from CreditTrade like
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Houweling/Vorst. They also use J.P. Morgan mid-market data for a confir-
mation of prices of CreditTrade. From Bloomberg, corporate bond data are
retrieved and interpolated to fit the default swap data. At the end, the sample
is left with 33 reference entities that default swap and bond data match. As
the proxy for the risk-free yield, government bonds and swap rates are used at
the first attempt.
Testing the no-arbitrage assumption, in average absolute terms CDS rates
are 46 basis points higher than corporate bond spreads for treasury rates as
the risk-free proxy and 15 basis points higher for swap rates as the proxy.
BBM comment that these results are well comparable to the study of Houwel-
ing/Vorst, who found similar results for AA and A-rated bonds. In the second
step, BBM aim to investigate the lead-lag relationships and the price discov-
ery. The authors use two alternative methods (Hasbrouck (1995), Gonzalo and
Granger (1995)) for measurement. The results suggest that CDS premiums
clearly lead bond spreads. When final regressions are run with CDS price and
bond spreads as the dependent variables, the price discovery leading of CDS
premiums is confirmed. Variables like interest rates, term structure, stock mar-
ket returns and stock market implied volatilities have a higher effect on bond
spreads than CDS premiums while it is the opposite for firm-specific variables
such as stock price returns and implied volatilities. Nevertheless, the adjusted
R2 is low (around 25 per cent) for the regressions, signaling the low percentage
of explanation of the dependent variables.
The regressions held by Blanco/Brennan/Marsh had its early examples in
Cossin, Hricko, Aunon-Nerin, and Huang (2002) (CHAH henceforth) and Skin-
ner and Townend (2002). Although CHAH have also utilized only 75 obser-
vations to implement Das and Sundaram’s (2000) reduced-form model, the
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major strength of their study lies in the regressions that aims to explain deter-
minants of CDS transaction prices in a cross-sectional study. The sample set
consists of 392 traded contracts during January 1998 to February 2000. Their
results show that the credit rating is highly significant as a factor of credit risk
explaining the 47 per cent of variance for US corporates. Structural variables
such as asset value volatility, leverage, and interest rate are also significant
and explain together the 31 per cent of the variance for US corporates. It is
also an important observation that US and non-US corporates show different
behaviors which suggest that the international markets are not homogeneous.
In another early empirical study with credit default swaps, Skinner and Tow-
nend (2002) suggest that CDSs can be examined as put options. They con-
struct a sample of only 29 sovereign CDS quotes between September 1997 and
February 1999. The authors subdivide their sample into Asian and non-Asian
subgroups, with the thought of capturing a difference due to Asian currency
crisis in the given period. When regressions are run, variables that affect the
prices of put options such as riskless rate, volatility, underlying asset yield,
and time to maturity came out to be significant in explaining CDS prices.
Their R2 is as high as 99.5 per cent when the full sample is tested. However,
using the analogy of put options, Skinner/Townend have hypothesized that
the CDS premium should increase with increasing maturity. In contrast, their
results are robust to a negative relationship. As a reason, they highlight that
the non-Asian swaps have an average maturity of 7 years with lower premiums,
while Asian swaps are on average 3 years and have higher premiums due to
Asian crisis. Their results suggest that in order to manage the risk traded in
a crisis environment, buyers of a CDS could look for decreased premiums by
entering into shorter term default swaps.
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In a different path of examining CDSs, Hull, Predescu, and White (2004)
(henceforth HPW) and Norden and Weber (2004) have analyzed the impact of
credit rating announcements with event studies. In the first part of their study
HPW adjust the no-arbitrage assumption following Duffie (1999) and Hull and
White (2000) by dividing the difference of risky and riskless yield with accrued
interest on par yield bond:
CDS Spread =
Risky Y ield−Riskless Y ield
1 + Accrued Interest
(3.4)
By using the data between January 1998 and May 2002 from GFI, 370 CDS
quotes were matched with corresponding bonds on the same day. The matching
was done by simply regressing the yields of bonds on a given CDS quote day on
the maturities of the bonds. The accrued interest in Equation (3.4) is assumed
as (Risky Y ield/4) as all bonds paid interest semiannually. HPW compare
the outcomes with Treasury rates and swap rates independently and reach the
conclusion that swap rates are a better proxy for the risk free rate, given the
no-arbitrage equation holds.
HPW then proceed with analyzing the effects of credit rating changes. The
CDS market possesses an anticipation towards negative outlooks, reviews for
downgrades and downgrades, while only reviews for downgrades provide in-
formation. On the other hand with a similar range of data, from July 1998
to December 2002, Norden/Weber find that both CDS and stock markets an-
ticipate downgrades and review for downgrades. This finding is robust for all
three big rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. The same
results do not hold for positive rating events.
All the above studies with credit default swaps have either looked at the no-
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arbitrage relationship between bond and CDS spreads, or applied reduced-form
models to correctly price a CDS. Alternatively, there have been studies that
looked at price discovery and lead-lag relationships, or studies that have run
regressions for the determinants of the CDS premiums. In any case, these
studies should be treated as preliminary since the market is only at an infant
stage. It is of no doubt that the number of empirical studies with CDSs will
grow, and continue its field of research jointly with other topics in credit risk.
3.3 Summary
Obviously, there are numerous empirical studies in the field of credit risk. Struc-
tural models have on average failed to generate reasonable spreads, whereas
alternative reduced-form formulations yielded different prediction results. Re-
cently, studies with CDSs have emerged, bringing a new dimension to credit
risk analysis. Still obviously, all the above studies have reached contradicting
results. To date, there has been no common agreement in academia or practice
as to which model framework (structural or reduced-form) better represents
default risk. One main reason for the lack of consensus is that these empirical
studies have provided controversial guidance in the validation process for the-
oretical models. The unevenness of the empirical studies can be attributed to
three factors:
(i) When testing a given model empirically, the usage of different datasets
produces widely varying prediction results. For instance, structural mod-
els were often criticized by early empirical studies as under-predicting
credit spreads (Jones, Mason, and Rosenfeld (1984); Ogden (1987); Ly-
den and Saraniti (2000)), whereas more recent studies utilizing the same
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models suggest that this is not a consistent occurrence (Eom, Helwege,
and Huang (2004)). It is unclear, however, whether this is due to the
models or the datasets used.
(ii) Even though the prediction performances of structural and reduced-form
models have been compared within each framework, there have been no
empirical studies across modeling structures in which the same dataset
and methodology were applied to both frameworks. For instance, al-
though Eom, Helwege, and Huang’s (2004) study is the most compre-
hensive study to date in which several structural models are compared
in one setting, it does not address the results acquired with reduced-form
approaches. Similarly, empirical studies conducted by Anderson and Sun-
daresan (2000) or Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006) have approved a
special model setup without any basis of comparison across frameworks.
The only study that compares structural and reduced-form approaches
is the work of Arora, Bohn, and Zhu (2005). This study compares the
structural models of Merton and Vasicek/Kealhofer (the Moody’s KMV
approach) to a Hull/White type reduced-form model. Although the in-
tention is acceptable, the methodology undertaken by this study is poor.
The structural models are calibrated by stock prices whereas the reduced-
form model is calibrated with bond prices. Although all three models in
the end out-of-sample price CDSs, the methodology raises questions on
the fairness and validity of such a comparison.
(iii) Moreover, although the error results between the compared models might
turn out to be similar, the estimation technique and the sampling setup
for prediction highly influences the forecasting ability. As an example,
Ericsson and Reneby’s (2004) out-of-sample prediction results, obtained
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by using an extension of Leland’s (1994) endogenous structural model
and employing an innovative estimation technique in Duan (1994), seem
well comparable to Duffee’s (1999) in-sample results with a reduced-
form model utilizing Kalman filter estimation, both having a root mean
squared error of around 10 bps. Apparently, looking at the prediction
results alone would be misleading, since these do not express the detailed
aspects of both settings.
The presence of all these issues therefore necessitates that further efforts be
undertaken. Ideally, this would be accomplished by testing the structural and
reduced-form models via the application of the same methodology to the same
datasets, as will be presented in the following chapters.
Chapter 4
CDS Pricing with Basic
Framework Structures
In this chapter, a comparative study between the two basic forms of structural
and reduced-form frameworks is undertaken. This is in parallel to the work in
Gu¨ndu¨z, Uhrig-Homburg, and Seese (2006) and Gu¨ndu¨z and Uhrig-Homburg
(2007). In this first attempt to compare financial modeling frameworks in pric-
ing CDSs, the model of Merton (1974) has been chosen to work with, which
has the simplest form that a structural model can have. Meanwhile, the con-
stant default intensity as outlined by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) is employed,
which can be regarded as the simplest form in the reduced-form framework.
Although there are many extensions that have developed on top of these struc-
tures, a comparison of the two basic models has been concentrated on initially.
This comparison would give a first indication on how structural and reduced-
form frameworks vary in their structures. The results of both approaches are
contrasted with the prediction results of a machine learning approach. The
analysis is therefore three-fold:
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(i) It applies the most financially structured models to a CDS dataset under
the hypothesis that default is triggered by the asset value of the firm
being below a certain threshold at maturity.
(ii) It applies the intensity-based Poisson jump process setting to the same
dataset under the hypothesis that default is defined as a surprise event
that can occur at any time during the lifetime.
(iii) It applies Support Vector Machines - a machine learning algorithm that
does not have an economically-backed structure at all - under the hy-
pothesis that whatever resides in the prices is the best source to train
the function for predictions.
4.1 The Three Models
4.1.1 The Merton Model
Firstly, the Merton’s (1974) model is applied to the CDS dataset. This model
allows default only at maturity, and does not incorporate a stochastic process
for the interest rate. In order to value a CDS, consider its two legs, the premium
and the protection leg. The premium leg is the fee as a percentage of the
contract amount that the buyer of the insurance has to pay to the seller until
maturity or default, whichever comes first. The protection leg is the single
payment that the seller of the contract is obliged to undertake in case of
default of the entity upon which the contract is written. In Merton’s setting,
the premium leg is nothing but the discounting of each fair premium stheo paid
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until maturity:
PremiumLeg = stheo
n∑
i=1
e−r(i)T (i) (4.1)
where T (i) is the time interval in yearly terms, and, as the usual practice is
quarterly paid premiums, T (1) is 0.25, T (2) is 0.5, and so on; the maturity
of the contract T (n) is 5 years. r(i) is the riskless interest rate for maturity
T (i) on the contract setup date. The protection leg constitutes the discounting
of the probability of default at maturity, multiplied with the non-recoverable
amount:
ProtectionLeg = (1− ϕ)Φ(−d2)(e−r(n)T (n)) (4.2)
where Φ(−d2) is the risk-neutral default probability in the Merton setting.
The recovery rate in case of default, ϕ also enters the protection leg. It might
have been a sound approach to estimate the recovery rate simultaneously with
the default intensity; however, as mentioned in Chapter 3, recent applications
undertaken by Houweling and Vorst (2005) and Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2006)
have shown the insensitivity of the results based upon the selection of this
variable. To simplify methods, the recovery rate can be fixed to a value obtained
in empirical studies based on historically defaulted bonds. Following the results
produced by Altman and Kishore (1996) and recent practice, for the senior
class a value of 0.5 has been used.1 As a last step, the theoretically fair CDS
premium is reached by equating the premium and protection legs at time zero:
stheo =
(1− ϕ)Φ(−d2)(e−r(n)T (n))∑n
i=1 e
−r(i)T (i)
(4.3)
1Although the 0.5 figure is derived from the US market, recent efforts with European
data have also relied on this figure (Houweling and Vorst (2005); Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner
(2006)). Considering the fact that Basle 2 provisions accept a loss given default of 50 per
cent for bank loans independent of the country chosen, this is not an unrealistic assumption.
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This premium ensures that the CDS contract has zero value on initiation, which
in turn guarantees that the buyer and the seller are even under no-arbitrage
assumptions.
4.1.2 The Constant Default Intensity Model
The basic structure of a constant default intensity model was introduced by
Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). In contrast to more advanced intensity-based
models, the stochastic process driving the riskless term structure and the de-
fault process are assumed to be independent in the Jarrow/Turnbull setting.
While Jarrow/Turnbull assume a constant intensity under the real world mea-
sure, the intensity becomes time-varying when they turn to the risk-neutral
world. In this application, it has been started directly with a constant risk-
neutral intensity. Following Duffie and Singleton (2003), it can be shown that
the pricing of CDS is composed of a premium and protection leg as below:
PremiumLeg = stheo
n∑
i=1
e−(λ+r(i))T (i) (4.4)
ProtectionLeg = (1− ϕ)
n∑
i=1
e−r(i)T (i)(e−λT (i−1) − e−λT (i)) (4.5)
where λ is the constant default intensity parameter. Equating these two legs
to extract the theoretically fair premium leads to:
stheo = (1− ϕ)(eλ∆t − 1) (4.6)
when intervals T (i + 1) − T (i) = ∆t are constant between premiums. Thus,
in the case of quarterly payments, the interest rate parameters cancel out,
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and the constant intensity case is insensitive to interest rates. This is the most
significant difference in the constant intensity setting from the Merton model in
this application. A second important distinguishing feature is that the Merton
model allows default only at maturity, whereas the setup permits early default
in the intensity setting.
4.1.3 Support Vector Machines Regression (SVM)
In addition to comparing the two financial credit risk frameworks, a third alter-
native method is employed in this study. The recent developments in machine
learning have opened a new pathway for computing empirical predictions: Sup-
port Vector Machines (SVM) is an innovative technique for data classification
and regression. As an alternative to traditional neural network approaches,
SVM, whose fundamentals were developed by Vapnik (1995), have become
popular due to their promising empirical performance. Specifically, the SVM
regression method proposes alternative kernel functions to be used in mapping
into a high dimensional feature space. Literature on SVM regression appli-
cations on finance is sparse; there has been coverage especially on financial
time series forecasting (Cao and Tay (2001); Mu¨ller, Smola, Ra¨tsch, Scho¨lkopf,
Kohlmorgen, and Vapnik (1997)). To my knowledge, SVM has not been ap-
plied to credit derivatives pricing, and its results have accordingly not yet been
compared with financial methods.
SVM has proven to be a good alternative to traditional neural network appli-
cations: The problem of building architecture for neural networks is replaced
by the problem of choosing a suitable kernel for the SVM.2 In this study, the
2Without the use of kernels, the problem of non-linear machine construction would have
required two steps: First, a fixed non-linear mapping to transform the data into a “fea-
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results of the financial models are compared to SVM regression models with
linear, polynomial, Gaussian radial basis and exponential radial basis kernel
functions. These four fundamental kernel functions are described below. The
most basic kernel function is linear; it is simply the inner product of training
points u and test points v:
K(u, v) = 〈u, v〉 (4.7)
An alternative approach would be to analyze polynomial kernel function with
degree 2. This is a popular method for non-linear modeling:
K(u, v) = (〈u, v〉+ 1)2 (4.8)
The third type to have received significant attention in the literature is the
Gaussian radial basis function, which is:
K(u, v) = exp
(
− ‖ u− v ‖
2
2σ2
)
(4.9)
where σ is taken to be 0.5 after observing fits of alternative parameter choices
used in the literature (Mu¨ller, Smola, Ra¨tsch, Scho¨lkopf, Kohlmorgen, and
Vapnik (1997); Gunn (1998); Cao and Tay (2001)). A final choice would be
exponential radial basis function, which is a similar alternative to Gaussian
RBF.
K(u, v) = exp
(
− ‖ u− v ‖
2σ2
)
(4.10)
ture” space where the analysis is easier, and then a linear machine to classify/regress it in
the feature space. Kernel theory stipulates that an inner product in feature space has an
equivalent kernel in input space; utilizing kernel functions therefore simplifies the algorithm.
There is no more need to think about the mapping and evaluation of the feature map, but
only about the inner products of test and training variables (for details see Cristianini and
Shawe-Taylor (2000); Gunn (1998)).
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A parameter value ζ, which allows slack in the system that permits the samples
to be on the wrong side of the decision boundary (a penalty parameter of the
error term), is also taken as 10, in all runs, after a search for the best-fitting
value. Similarly, the ε insensitive band has been set to 10E-4.
4.2 Results of the Cross-Sectional Design
In order to pursue a cross-sectional analysis within a specific set of CDS prices,
the dataset is divided into certain risk clusters that ought to exhibit identical
risk characteristics. Thus the main hypothesis of the cross-sectional study is
that within certain risk classes, the credit risk is priced the same. From the
described data in Section 2.2, specific risk clusters were focused on, namely the
contracts on Aa- and A-rated companies with 5-year maturity ranked senior,
since these risk classes provided the adequate number of data points. Although
the literature does not distinguish between North American and European
entities, this breakdown would allow to analyze regional characteristics. An
additional split according to the currency of the contract that the CDS is
written on was not necessary, because European and North American entities
had a natural breakdown into euros and US dollars, respectively.
Table 4.1 provides the average midpoints and spreads across ratings for the
CDSs that are focused upon in this chapter of the study. The midpoints for
AA-rated CDSs are lower than A-rated CDSs for both Europe and North
America, in line with the theory. North American CDSs are consistently higher
than their European counterparts in each of the risk classes and years. There
are also relatively less observations for North American CDSs than European
CDSs. The offer price minus the bid price for a given quote in the dataset
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has an average of 4.75 bps for the Aa-European class, whereas it is 6.81 bps
for A-European CDSs. A similar rise is observed for North American CDSs.
Notably, the average premiums and spreads are observed to steadily decrease
over time.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of CDS Dataset between December 2002-
December 2004. Midpoints of Bid-Ask Prices, Average Bid-Ask Spreads and
Number of Observations across Ratings and Regions for 5-year, Senior CDS.
2002 2003 2004 Total
Rating Region Mid Spread Obs Mid Spread Obs Mid Spread Obs Mid Spread Obs
Aa Europe 30.83 9.17 400 22.06 6.06 5119 14.46 3.17 5382 18.63 4.75 10901
Aa N.America 46.99 13.66 231 33.81 10.40 2374 26.45 10.03 2441 30.85 10.37 5046
A Europe 65.06 13.18 858 48.91 8.69 10081 33.43 4.17 9273 42.49 6.81 20212
A N. America 98.28 21.12 459 53.27 14.56 5493 34.82 9.96 5187 46.53 12.69 11139
Mid (bps): Average of the midpoint of each bid and offer price.
Spread (bps): Average of the difference of offer price - bid price.
Obs: Number of observations in the cluster.
In addition to the CDS dataset, riskless interest rates are required as a major
variable in models. In doing this, USD- and Euro-denominated contracts have
to be treated separately. The daily estimates of the Svensson (1994) model are
used as the rates for the European region. Deutsche Bundesbank has estimated
these parameters from government bonds, which is in detail explained in the
Monthly Report of Deutsche Bundesbank (1997) in October (pp. 61-66). For
the North American region, US Treasury Constant Maturity rates were linearly
interpolated for quarterly intervals. The data are directly available from the
corresponding web sites.3
4.2.1 Setting with the Merton’s Model
The cross-sectional/out-of-sample prediction methodology is to first estimate
the daily risk-neutral default probabilities for each firm in a “risk cluster” de-
3http://www.federalreserve.gov and http://www.bundesbank.de
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scribed above from the observed CDS premiums of the firms in the estimation
sample. Individual default probabilities (Φj(−d2)) were estimated for each firm
j each day using:
Φj(−d2) =
sobsj
∑n
i=1 e
−r(i)T (i)
(1− ϕ)(e−r(n)T (n)) (4.11)
where sobsj is the observed CDS premium for firm j. Afterwards, the Black/
Scholes parameter d2 was averaged across the full set of companies in the
estimation sample to reach a daily value. The estimation therefore results in an
aggregate default probability for each class and day.4 Figure 4.1 plots the daily
risk-neutral default probability estimates for the Aa-rated North American and
European CDSs. Interestingly, the North American CDSs have a higher default
probability throughout the time horizon, which justifies the inclusion of the
regional breakdown when setting up risk classes.
This daily value is used to predict the theoretical CDS premiums of a second
set of firms in the prediction sample. Given the specific set of companies in the
cluster (all with the same rating class, rank, currency and region), the division
of the estimation sample and prediction sample are taken to be around the
ratio of 2:1 - 4:1. Sample selection for estimation and prediction groups was
fully random in order to preclude any biases due to sample choice.
4Minimizing the sum of squared differences was a possible alternative, which would have
simply returned the default probability for the average of sobs on any given day. The results
from using this approach do not differ significantly.
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Figure 4.1: Default Probability Estimates with the Merton Model AA-rated
North American vs. European Contracts
4.2.2 Setting with the Constant Intensity Model
To ensure that the parameter estimates of the constant default intensity set-
ting are comparable to the Merton model, the firms in the estimation and
prediction samples are kept the same. Similar to the Merton setup, the default
intensity is estimated for each firm j each day from the first sample of firms
using Equation (4.6):
λj =
ln
(
sobsj
(1−ϕ)
+ 1
)
∆t
(4.12)
Again, sobsj is the observed CDS premium for firm j. Next, an average daily
default intensity for each risk class is obtained. This value is then plugged
into Equation (4.6) to predict the fair value of the firms’ CDS premium in the
prediction sample.
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At this point, it would be insightful to compare the estimates with a recent
study. Table 4.2 compares the average default intensities with the results of
Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2006), which is an application of the Jarrow and Turn-
bull model to European corporate/bank bonds. Our default intensity estimates
from CDS prices and a larger dataset extend the estimates of this study. More-
over, some of the inconsistencies of their results have been overcome in our
findings.5
Table 4.2: Comparison of Two Studies with Constant Default Intensity
European, This Study Fru¨hwirth/So¨gner
Senior Risk Class No. of Obs Intensity from CDS Intensity from Bonds
Aa-rated Banks 4584 0.0036 0.0041
Aa-rated Corporates 3037 0.0041 0.0085
A-rated Banks 3366 0.0069 0.0035
A-rated Corporates 11179 0.0090 0.0116
4.2.3 Prediction Results with Cross-Sectional Design
Before comparing the out-of-sample prediction quality, some insights on the
parameter estimates of the two modeling approaches can be provided. In order
to make the intensity estimates comparable to the estimates advanced in Mer-
ton’s model, the intensity estimates are used to calculate the 5-year risk-neutral
default probability:
PD(T ) = 1− e−λT (4.13)
This enables the direct comparison of the default probability estimates for the
four risk classes. First, it is expected that the constant intensity model would
5The authors utilized a period between January 1999 and July 2000. In their estimates,
A-rated banks had a lower average intensity than Aa-rated banks, which should supposedly
be higher.
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yield lower default probability estimates than the Merton model, since it in-
corporates early default. Figure 4.2 provides the trajectories for the Aa-North
American risk class. Table 4.3 provides the means, deviations and the number
of days that the Merton default probability is higher than the 5-year estimate
obtained with the intensity model. It is observed that the means are close, and
except for a few weekly intervals, the Merton probability estimate is higher,
in line with the expectations. However, note that a higher default probability
does not directly translate into a higher CDS premium. In fact, although not
tabulated explicitly, the Merton model prediction for the premium is signifi-
cantly lower than the intensity prediction for three out of four risk classes. The
reason for this is that the default payment of ϕ is made available only at T in
the Merton setting, whereas in the intensity setting the same level of payment
can be made earlier.
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Figure 4.2: Default Probability Estimates with the Merton and the Constant
Intensity Models for Aa-rated North American Contracts
The out-of-sample prediction errors are summarized in Table 4.4. The results
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Table 4.3: 5-year Default Probability Estimates of the Merton and Intensity
Models
Mean PD Std Dev PD Obs Merton PD >
Intensity PD
(bps) (bps) (%)
Aa Europe 523 97.1%
Merton 197 67
Intensity 188 66
Aa N.America 524 100%
Merton 358 90
Intensity 328 83
A Europe 526 93.2%
Merton 422 148
Intensity 408 146
A N.America 524 100%
Merton 479 198
Intensity 452 196
Mean PD (bps): Average default probability in basis points.
Std Dev PD (bps): Standard deviation of the default probability in basis points.
Obs: Number of observation days.
Merton PD > Intensity PD (%): Percentage of the total sample where Merton default probability is higher
than 5-year constant intensity default probability.
indicate a low fit in basis points for all classes, while mean absolute percentage
errors (MAPE) are high. The best fit in terms of MAPE is around 23-25 per
cent. It can be observed that European/Euro-denominated CDSs have a better
fit than North American/USD-denominated CDSs.
A comparison of the prediction errors produced by the Merton and the constant
intensity models shows that the results are close. To test this observation statis-
tically, the difference between the absolute prediction errors has been focused
on in order to determine whether the models have predicted significantly differ-
ently. Table 4.5 summarizes the t-statistic results of the significance tests with
the Yule-Walker estimation method. By so doing, the autocorrelation adjusted
estimates of the time series for each rating class could be reached via backward
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Table 4.4: Out-of-sample Prediction Errors of the Merton and the Constant
Intensity Models in Cross-Sectional Design
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%) Estimation Prediction
Aa Europe
Merton -0.13 4.82 23.82% 7621 3135
Intensity 0.90 5.36 27.64% 7621 3135
Aa N.America
Merton 9.13 9.30 43.16% 3475 1571
Intensity 9.87 10.01 46.16% 3475 1571
A Europe
Merton -2.92 10.18 25.57% 14545 5393
Intensity 0.46 10.20 27.49% 14545 5393
A N.America
Merton 2.00 10.69 25.61% 9046 2093
Intensity 1.98 10.68 25.60% 9046 2093
Mean Error(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1 s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h
F.H
Mean AbsError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1|s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h|
F.H
Mean AbsPercError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1
|stheo
f
−sobs
f,h
|
sobs
f,h
×100
F.H
stheo is the theoretical CDS premium predicted by the Merton and Intensity models on day f , where F is
the number of available days in the time series. sobs is the observed CDS premium on day f for firm h,
where h = 1..H represents the number of firms in the prediction sample.
elimination of insignificant autoregressive lags. In one out of four classes, the
Merton model has lower average errors, while there is no statistical difference
in the remaining three. This result is rather surprising; by allowing default
only at maturity, the Merton model appears to be more restrictive. This may
be due to the treatment of default probability as a single parameter rather
than breaking it down into Black/Scholes parameters like asset value and as-
set volatility. Structural models have often been criticized for their weakness
of lacking a robust estimation process in these parameters, which hinders their
predictive performance. The cross-sectional results signify that in the absence
of an estimation process for the asset value and asset volatility parameters,
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Merton’s model can perform at least as well as a reduced-form model.
Table 4.5: Significance Tests for the Difference of Absolute Errors with the
Merton and the Constant Intensity Models in Cross-Sectional Design
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe -0.54 -1.64 0.1011
Aa N. America -0.72 -4.68 <0.0001 ***
A Europe 0.02 0.04 0.9713
A N.America 0.01 0.41 0.6816
Mean Difference (bps): Difference of Absolute Errors for prediction (Merton - Intensity) computed per day
per firm for risk class. Absolute Error on day f , for firm h is | stheo
f
− sobs
f,h
|
*** Significance at 95 per cent level
4.2.4 Setting and Prediction Results with
SVM Regression Method
In order to design cross-sectional samples for SVM comparable to the Mer-
ton/Intensity setups, two datasets are required for training the SVM function,
plus two additional datasets for test input and test output. Therefore, the
firms in the estimation samples in the previous sections have also been se-
lected for training input, training output and test input samples. For instance,
if the estimation in the Merton/Intensity setups includes data from 23 firms
(as in AA-North America), then these 23 firms were divided into 3 groups; the
training input, the training output and the test input samples. Specifically, an
out-of-sample SVM prediction is maintained as follows: First, within each risk
class, the firms’ CDS premiums within each of the four samples (three estima-
tive and one predictive) are averaged to obtain a daily value. In order to train
the function, the daily average of the training input sample is mapped to the
average of the training output sample. Afterwards, the daily average of the pre-
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miums in the test input sample are used to predict a theoretical daily premium
based on the SVM function. Finally, the predicted value is compared to the
test output sample daily average values, so that the out-of-sample prediction
errors can be computed.
The results from the cross-sectional approach can be found in Table 4.6. It can
be observed that the SVM algorithm yields poor results in comparison to the
financial models in most cases. Some kernels produce results that are too inac-
curate to be considered an alternative, e.g. the polynomial kernel. Among all
kernels, the linear kernel has the best MAPE in three out of four risk classes. In
Table 4.7, the difference between the absolute errors of the Merton/Intensity
models and the best performing linear kernel SVM is tabulated. The financial
methods are a better predictor in two risk classes, whereas there is insignif-
icance in the remaining two. For the indecisive risk classes, the linear kernel
MAPE results come close to the financial methods, one being the A North
American class, which produces the best result of all. Due to the overall poor
fit of SVM kernels, the efforts with the full set of kernels is discontinued, and
instead the linear kernel is focused on in the rest of the study.6
6Alternative to the cross-sectional setup, a panel setting was analyzed as well. There are
2,650 data points in the training input and output sets from the data of five companies for
each set, respectively; 2,120 data points in test input and output sets were used from the
data of four companies for each set. This is a setting that is computationally more expensive,
and whose prediction results are inferior to those yielded by the cross-sectional design. The
results are therefore not presented.
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Table 4.6: Out-of-sample Prediction Errors of SVM Algorithms in Cross-
Sectional Design
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%) Estimation Prediction
Aa Europe
Linear -0.55 5.60 26.77% 7621 3135
Polynomial (Deg:2) -1.05 5.25 24.69% 7621 3135
Gaussian RBF -6.87 9.31 41.04% 7621 3135
Exponential RBF -7.21 9.45 42.57% 7621 3135
Aa N.America
Linear 3.14 17.75 81.18% 3475 1571
Polynomial (Deg:2) 49.85 157.68 657.85% 3475 1571
Gaussian RBF -3.33 15.72 68.55% 3475 1571
Exponential RBF -4.01 14.44 61.89% 3475 1571
A Europe
Linear 6.82 12.57 37.17% 14545 5393
Polynomial (Deg:2) 6.57 12.51 37.30% 14545 5393
Gaussian RBF -0.59 1.15 166.51% 14545 5393
Exponential RBF -9.51 18.22 41.49% 14545 5393
A N.America
Linear -9.70 12.07 23.11% 9046 2093
Polynomial (Deg:2) 152.67 152.67 310.13% 9046 2093
Gaussian RBF -17.10 18.02 35.06% 9046 2093
Exponential RBF -4.01 14.44 61.89% 9046 2093
Mean Error(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1 s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h
F.H
Mean AbsError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1|s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h|
F.H
Mean AbsPercError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1
|stheo
f
−sobs
f,h
|
sobs
f,h
×100
F.H
stheo is the theoretical CDS premium predicted by SVM algorithms on day f , where F is the number of
available days in the time series. sobs is the observed CDS premium on day f for firm h, where h = 1..H
represents the number of firms in the prediction (test output) sample.
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Table 4.7: Significance Tests for the Difference of Absolute Errors between the
Merton/Intensity models and Linear Kernel SVM in Cross-Sectional Design
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe
Merton - SVM -0.85 -1.65 0.0998
Intensity - SVM -0.28 -0.60 0.5494
Aa N.America
Merton - SVM -8.46 -19.25 <0.0001 ***
Intensity - SVM -7.75 -24.29 <0.0001 ***
A Europe
Merton - SVM -2.32 -2.03 0.0426 ***
Intensity - SVM -2.30 -3.01 0.0026 ***
A N.America
Merton - SVM -0.49 -0.14 0.8897
Intensity - SVM -0.49 -0.14 0.8892
Mean Difference (bps): Difference of Absolute Errors for prediction (Merton - SVM) and (Intensity - SVM)
computed per day per firm. Absolute Error on day f , for firm h is | stheo
f
− sobs
f,h
|
*** Significance at 95 per cent level
4.3 Results of the Time Series Design
4.3.1 Credit Risk Models
As an alternative to cross-sectional estimation and prediction, the models are
analyzed in a time series design. This effort hypothesizes that every firm in
the sample has a constant default probability/intensity. In contrast to the
cross-sectional design, in which the daily default probabilities/intensities are
averaged, now the default probabilities/intensities are estimated from a fixed
interval, and one-, five-, and ten-day-ahead default probabilities/intensities are
predicted separately for each firm.
A rolling estimation and prediction is applied to both the Merton and intensity
settings. Fru¨hwirth and So¨gner (2006) analyzed the impact of the length of the
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estimation period on the prediction errors. Within a 5-25 day period, the 14-
day mark gave one of the best results. Parallel to these findings, the rolling
estimation period is set at 14 days. In order to estimate the default probabilities
and predict the CDS premium one day ahead, the approach below has been
adapted. First, default probabilities are estimated by minimizing the sum of
squared errors between the observed and theoretical CDS premiums:
Φ(−dˆ2)t+14 = arg min
Φ(−d2)
t+13∑
k=t
(sobsk − stheok (Φ(−d2)))2 (4.14)
where sobsk is the observed CDS premium on the k
th day within the 14-day
period, and stheok is the theoretically fair price computed from Equation (4.3).
For each firm’s 14-day period, a default probability estimate is reached, and
this figure is plugged into Equation (4.3) to obtain a theoretically fair CDS
premium for the 15th day. By comparing the observed and theoretical CDS
premiums for one day ahead in a rolling procedure, out-of-sample prediction
error statistics are computed.
In Table 4.8, mean errors (ME), mean absolute errors (MAE) and mean ab-
solute percentage errors (MAPE) for the prediction process are given.7 As can
be observed from Table 4.8, MAEs and MAPEs are significantly lower in the
time series prediction in comparison to cross-sectioning. The Merton model
predicted the four datasets with a MAPE of around 6 per cent. Furthermore,
all the error statistics decline in increasing credit quality.
With the constant intensity model, a similar analysis is applied to the same
dataset. The sum of squared errors was minimized in 14-day periods to reach an
7Only consecutive 14-day periods of observation were used to ensure the continuity of
the time series. The estimation sample is simply 14 more for each firm in the risk class and
have not been explicitly tabulated.
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estimate of the default intensity, as can be seen in Equation (4.15), where stheok
corresponds to the theoretically fair price of the CDS premium from Equation
(4.6).
λˆt+14 = argmin
λ
t+13∑
k=t
(sobsk − stheok (λ))2 (4.15)
Again, Table 4.8 shows that a fit superior to cross-sectional estimation has
been reached. A similar pattern of decreasing errors with increasing credit
quality is also indicated by the figures. Moreover, the time series prediction
results of the Merton and intensity settings appear even closer than in the
cross-sectional setup. Nevertheless, a test for significance has revealed that the
intensity model outperformed its counterpart in three out of four risk classes in
absolute error terms. Panel A of Table 4.10 tabulates these results. Although
the mean difference of absolute errors is close, low standard deviation and large
sample size caused high significance.
A second step would be to look at further horizon out-of-sample results. In a
similar setup, 14-day time series are utilized to predict five-day- and ten-day-
ahead CDS premiums. These results can be found in Table 4.9. As expected,
the prediction quality deteriorates stepwise, to a MAPE of around 7-9 per cent
for five-day-ahead and to around 9-11 per cent for ten-day-ahead predictions.
When viewed side by side, the differences between the models become less
pronounced. The significance tests in Table 4.10 Panels B and C reveal that for
five-day-ahead prediction, the intensity model outperforms the Merton model
in only two cases now (Aa-Europe, A-Europe), and in one (A-North America),
the Merton model even provided smaller absolute errors. Turning to the ten-
day-ahead prediction, there is a balance between the Merton and intensity
models, with each proving superior for one class apiece (Aa-North America
and AA-Europe, respectively), and the two remaining classes are indifferent
CDS Pricing with Basic Framework Structures 105
Table 4.8: One-Day-Ahead Out-of-sample Prediction Errors of the Merton
and the Constant Intensity Models in Time Series Design
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%) Prediction
Aa Europe
Merton 0.30 1.06 5.71% 10373
Intensity 0.28 1.00 5.25% 10373
Aa N.America
Merton 0.33 1.56 5.30% 4850
Intensity 0.33 1.54 5.17% 4850
A Europe
Merton 0.49 2.78 6.15% 19200
Intensity 0.46 2.75 6.04% 19200
A N.America
Merton 0.93 2.97 6.61% 10672
Intensity 0.93 2.98 6.59% 10672
Mean Error(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1 s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h
F.H
Mean AbsError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1|s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h|
F.H
Mean AbsPercError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1
|stheo
f
−sobs
f,h
|
sobs
f,h
×100
F.H
stheo is the theoretical CDS premium predicted by the Merton and Intensity models on day f for firm h,
where f = 1..F is the number of available days for prediction (preceded by 14 consecutive days of CDS
premiums for estimation), with h = 1..H being the number of firms in the risk class. sobs is the observed
CDS premium on day f for firm h.
for the models. Again, these results have mostly arisen from a very small mean
difference, complemented by a very low standard error and large sample size.
Overall, the comparison shows that it is hard to distinguish between the Merton
and intensity model in a time series setup as well. Nevertheless, the errors are
much lower than in the cross-sectional analysis. This better fit in the time series
analysis over cross-sectioning signifies that credit risk may not be uniformly
priced in a given risk class. This result parallels the findings of Fru¨hwirth and
So¨gner (2006), who have applied the constant intensity model to out-of-sample
bond price prediction and concluded that any kind of cross-sectioning would
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Table 4.9: Five- and Ten-Day-Ahead Out-of-sample Prediction Errors of the
Merton and the Constant Intensity Models in Time Series Design
Panel A. Five-Day-Ahead Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%) Prediction
Aa Europe
Merton 0.47 1.39 7.51% 10270
Intensity 0.44 1.34 7.11% 10270
Aa N.America
Merton 0.50 2.09 7.13% 4798
Intensity 0.50 2.09 7.08% 4798
A Europe
Merton 0.76 3.73 8.32% 19004
Intensity 0.72 3.71 8.23% 19004
A N.America
Merton 1.41 4.00 9.02% 10567
Intensity 1.42 4.02 9.04% 10567
Panel B. Ten-Day-Ahead Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%) Prediction
Aa Europe
Merton 0.67 1.71 9.30% 10150
Intensity 0.64 1.67 8.96% 10150
Aa N.America
Merton 0.69 2.62 9.02% 4733
Intensity 0.70 2.61 9.00% 4733
A Europe
Merton 1.10 4.69 10.64% 18768
Intensity 1.05 4.67 10.54% 18768
A N.America
Merton 2.00 4.99 11.47% 10437
Intensity 2.01 5.01 11.51% 10437
Mean Error(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1 s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h
F.H
Mean AbsError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1|s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h|
F.H
Mean AbsPercError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1
|stheo
f
−sobs
f,h
|
sobs
f,h
×100
F.H
stheo is the theoretical CDS premium predicted by the Merton and Intensity models on day f for firm h,
where f = 1..F is the number of available days for prediction (preceded by 18(or 23) consecutive days, with
the first 14 consisting of the CDS premiums for estimation) and h = 1..H representing the number of firms
in the risk class. sobs is the observed CDS premium on day f for firm h.
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Table 4.10: Significance Tests for the Difference of One-Day-Ahead, Five-Day-
Ahead, and Ten-Day-Ahead Absolute Prediction Errors with the Merton and
the Constant Intensity Models in Time Series Design
Panel A. Significance Tests for the Difference of One-Day-Ahead
Absolute Prediction Errors
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe 0.06 11.67 <0.0001 ***
Aa N.America 0.03 3.23 0.0012 ***
A Europe 0.03 5.09 <0.0001 ***
A N.America -0.01 -0.94 0.3488
Panel B. Significance Tests for the Difference of Five-Day-Ahead
Absolute Prediction Errors
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe 0.05 8.45 <0.0001 ***
Aa N.America 0.01 1.28 0.2010
A Europe 0.02 3.32 0.0009 ***
A N.America -0.02 -2.49 0.0128 ***
Panel C. Significance Tests for the Difference of Ten-Day-Ahead
Absolute Prediction Errors
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe 0.04 6.62 <0.0001 ***
Aa N.America 0.01 0.97 0.3297
A Europe -0.01 -0.96 0.3348
A N.America -0.02 -2.78 0.0054 ***
Mean Difference (bps): Difference of Absolute Errors for prediction (Merton - Intensity) computed per day
per firm. Absolute Error on day f , for firm h is | stheo
f
− sobs
f,h
|
*** Significance at 95 per cent level
provide poorer estimates than a bond-by-bond analysis.
4.3.2 SVM Regression Method
In the last step, the machine learning approach was compared to the financial
models in a time series setup. To this end, the concentration was given to the
linear kernel due to its overall best performance in the cross-sectional setting.
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In order to use an analogous setup with the same number of observations as
in the financial models, the time series of prices of each firm was divided into
estimation and prediction samples. A ratio of 3:1 for estimation and prediction
sample sizes was applied to each firm, which indicates that the first three quar-
ters of the time series was used to train the SVM function. With a rolling time
horizon in this estimation sample, the consecutive 14-day observations were
used as the training input dataset, whereas the observation on the following
day was used as the training output. After the function was trained, the un-
used last quarter of the time series was utilized for prediction. This time the
remaining consecutive 14-day observations were used as test input to predict
the observation on the following day as the test output. By virtue of such a
setup, the comparability of the out-of-sample design to the design used for the
financial models is ensured.
Interestingly, the results presented in Panel A of Table 4.11 are very promising.
For one-day-ahead prediction, the SVM method exhibited a surprisingly good
fit in terms of mean absolute percentage errors, which are around 2-3 per
cent. Similar to financial models, as the prediction horizon extends, this figure
worsens. Panels B and C present the five-day- and ten-day-ahead prediction
errors; these deteriorate to 4-6 per cent and 6-8 per cent, respectively. Again,
these figures indicate that the time series design achieved results superior to
those of the cross-sectional design for SVM as well.
Furthermore, in comparison to the financial model results with the same set-
ting, this time the SVM method also yielded very strong results. Each of the
one-day-, five-day- and ten- day-ahead prediction results signifies a better fit
than either of the financial models presented in Table 4.8. In all four risk classes,
SVM errors were significantly lower than both the Merton and intensity one-
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Table 4.11: One-Day-, Five-Day-, and Ten-Day-Ahead Out-of-sample Predic-
tion Errors with Linear Kernel SVM in Time Series Design
Panel A. One-Day-Ahead SVM Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%)
Aa Europe 0.09 0.32 2.48% 10373
Aa N.America 0.34 0.87 3.18% 4850
A Europe 0.005 0.90 2.32% 19200
A N.America -0.02 1.02 2.88% 10672
Panel B. Five-Day-Ahead SVM Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%)
Aa Europe 0.25 0.60 4.65% 10270
Aa N.America 0.62 1.38 5.14% 4798
A Europe 0.85 2.52 6.23% 19004
A N.America 0.35 1.96 5.84% 10567
Panel C. Ten-Day-Ahead SVM Out-of-Sample Prediction Errors
Mean Mean Abs Mean Abs Total
Error Error Perc Error Sample Size
(bps) (bps) (%)
Aa Europe 0.47 0.92 7.12% 10150
Aa N.America 0.99 1.86 7.15% 4733
A Europe 0.83 3.17 8.61% 18768
A N.America 0.97 2.73 8.68% 10437
Mean Error(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1 s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h
F.H
Mean AbsError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1|s
theo
f −s
obs
f,h|
F.H
Mean AbsPercError(bps)=
PF
f=1
PH
h=1
|stheo
f
−sobs
f,h
|
sobs
f,h
×100
F.H
stheo is the theoretical CDS premium predicted by the SVM algorithm with a linear kernel on day f for firm
h, where f = 1..F is the number of available days for test output (approximately 1/4th of the full sample)
and h = 1..H representing the number of firms in the risk class. sobs is the observed CDS premium on day
f for firm h.
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day-ahead absolute prediction errors (Table 4.12).8 This result is interesting
and suggests that further work on the subject is warranted. However, it should
be kept in mind that the best performing case among different kernels has been
chosen, whereas structural and reduced-form models were presented in their
simplest forms. It therefore remains to be seen if these results would vary if
more sophisticated financial models were applied.
Table 4.12: Significance Tests for the Difference of One-Day-Ahead Absolute
Prediction Errors between the Merton/Intensity models and Linear Kernel
SVM in Time Series Design
Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Aa Europe
Merton - SVM 0.31 4.36 <0.0001 ***
Intensity - SVM 0.21 2.85 0.0044 ***
Aa N.America
Merton - SVM 0.30 2.20 0.0277 ***
Intensity - SVM 0.26 1.88 0.0607 *
A Europe
Merton - SVM 0.91 3.56 0.0004 ***
Intensity - SVM 0.84 3.30 0.0010 ***
A N.America
Merton - SVM 0.91 7.58 <0.0001 ***
Intensity - SVM 0.88 7.31 <0.0001 ***
Mean Difference (bps): Difference of Absolute Errors for prediction (Merton - SVM) and (Intensity - SVM)
computed per day per firm. Absolute Error on day f , for firm h is | stheo
f
− sobs
f,h
|
*** Significance at 95 per cent level
* Significance at 90 per cent level
4.4 Summary
This chapter compared basic versions of structural (Merton) and reduced-form
(constant intensity) models as a first attempt. In this regard, four aspects of
8The five-day- and ten-day-ahead prediction errors are also significantly better than the
financial models, which have not been tabulated.
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the study stand out: First, while cross-sectional results indicated a better fit of
the Merton model in only one out of four cases, the one-day-ahead time series
analysis revealed the significance of lower absolute prediction errors with the
constant intensity model in three classes. Five-day- and ten-day-ahead pre-
dictions produced mixed results, signifying that one framework’s performance
does not significantly outperform the other. The most distinctive feature of the
models is the default timing, which revealed in the cross-sectional setup that
the Merton model estimated higher default probabilities on average, as the
constant intensity model allows early default. The second major feature is the
inclusion of interest rates in the Merton model, whereas the intensity model is
insensitive to this parameter. Despite these factors, the error results are rather
close. This could be attributable to treating the default probability in the Mer-
ton setting as the firm value variable on its own, rather than breaking it down
into Black/Scholes parameters, such as asset value and volatility. Therefore, it
has been decided to extend the results of this chapter with an analysis where
structural model parameters are estimated as well. This extension will inves-
tigate whether the differences in prediction power between frameworks arises
from this choice.
Secondly, estimation and out-of-sample prediction using solely CDS data was
unique to this study and requires special attention. The usage of CDS data
allowed to concentrate the prediction ability of credit models directly on the
default risk premiums that constitute the prices. Without the presence of liq-
uidity and other non-default premiums in CDS prices, the models could be ap-
plied to investigate the credit risk factors. Nevertheless, further efforts should
include bond and stock price data to extend the estimation process for both
modeling classes. The analysis in the next chapter will take this point into con-
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sideration and make use of bond, stock price, and balance sheet information
in the prediction of CDS prices.
Third, the results from this study confirm recent results in the literature
indicating that cross-sectioning is inferior to separate estimation. The high
prediction errors from cross-sectional analysis in comparison to lower errors
in the time series analysis revealed that credit risk is priced separately for
each individual firm, rather than the joint classification provided by rating
classes/regions. Taking this into consideration, the extension in the next chap-
ter will analyze credit risk on firm basis.
Fourth, although most of the cross-sectional predictions with SVM algorithms
have ended in poor results, it is important to underline that one-day-, five-
day-, and ten-day-ahead time series prediction results with the linear kernel
SVM have achieved significantly lower error figures than financial methods. A
thorough analysis for applying alternative kernel functions should be pursued
that investigates cross-sectional and time series mappings of the data. Never-
theless, for the sake of brevity, the analysis with SVM is ceased, and a focus
on financial models are given in the next chapter.
Overall, the results of this chapter will be extended in the next section by
applying different versions of structural and reduced-form models. Introducing
stochastic interest rates for structural models while modeling intensity to be
stochastically dependent on state variables for reduced-form models should
be the next step in the comparison of both frameworks. The next chapter will
therefore provide a comparison of more sophisticated models, using bond, stock
price and balance sheet data as the source of the empirical investigation.
Chapter 5
CDS Pricing with Advanced
Framework Structures
In this chapter, the analysis will be taken a step further, and more advanced
forms of structural and reduced-form models will be compared in their ability
to correctly price CDSs, by making use of additional bond, stock price, and
balance sheet data. Which components should the model setups accommodate?
Structural models have components that are rarely part of a reduced-form
framework. Only alternative is to make use of structural variables that are also
explanatory in an intensity setup. This leads to recalling possible structural
variables: The original Merton model included leverage and asset volatility as
key parameters. These have been extended to many others in more advanced
settings. Focusing on the initial key variables, the question that needs to be
answered is whether they are explanatory for CDS premiums as well. The
answer could be found in recent research: In Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo
(2007), leverage alone explains 45 per cent of CDS premium levels, and together
with equity volatility and interest rates, this raises to 60 per cent. It is well
113
CDS Pricing with Advanced Framework Structures 114
known since the study of Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) that
changes in leverage are significant in explaining change in bond spreads. These
findings suggest that leverage can be chosen as a key variable both in structural
and reduced-form models.
Given this choice, the model of Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) (hence-
forth CDG) with a stationary leverage ratio on the structural side and a best-
comparable intensity model with the leverage process as the state variable on
the reduced-form side seem to be a perfect match. This selection had a very
distinctive reason. The main aim is to construct a comparable model setup
with both frameworks, so that the fundamental model prediction capabilities
could be compared. How could this ideally be done? The CDG model incor-
porates stochastic interest rates and a leverage process as the second source of
uncertainty. Thus, a reduced-form model should be set up according to these
characteristics. Following this reason, the adjusted discount rate has been se-
lected to be an affine sum of the default intensity and the short rate as in Lando
(1998). First, the short rate is taken to be stochastic to keep the comparable
structure with the CDG setup. Second, the default intensity is assumed to be
the affine sum of a constant and a state variable, which this state variable
is nothing but the leverage process, exactly the same as in the CDG model.
This setup is therefore believed to accommodate a best comparable structure
between structural and reduced-form frameworks, enabling to understand the
impact of model structures in the prediction of credit default swap prices.
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5.1 Structural Approach -
Collin-Dufresne / Goldstein (2001) Model
5.1.1 The Model
Besides treating the interest rate process as a stochastic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process, the Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) model accommodates a sta-
tionary leverage ratio. With the typical asset value process following a geomet-
ric Brownian motion, the model setup includes a stochastic leverage process.
The steps that result in the structural defaultable claim pricing model of Collin-
Dufresne/Goldstein (CDG) would be as follows:
The dynamics of the short rate is a Vasicek (1977) process:
drt = κr(θr − rt)dt+ σrdWQ1 (5.1)
Here r is the risk-free interest rate, κr is the mean reversion rate, θr is the
long-run mean, σr is the volatility of the short rate, and W
Q
1 is a Brownian
motion under the risk-neutral measure.1 The asset value follows a GBM with
dVt/Vt = (rt − δ)dt+ σvdWQ2 (5.2)
where δ is the payout ratio, σv is the asset volatility and W
Q
2 is the Brownian
motion under the risk-neutral measure. Moreover, in the CDG setup, the loga-
rithm of the default threshold K, which can be taken as the total liabilities of
the firm, is considered to follow a stationary process. In the log-representation,
1For an in-depth description of risk-neutral and physical measures, see Bjo¨rk (2004).
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with k = lnK and y = lnV , this stationary process is modeled as:
dkt = κl(yt − ν − kt)dt (5.3)
Here, κl is the mean-reversion rate of the leverage to its long-run mean and
ν is a buffer parameter for default distance of log-asset value to log-default
threshold. When kt is less than (yt − ν) the firm acts to increase kt, and vice
versa. Therefore, the firm issues new debt when leverage ratio falls below a
target level, and would not issue new debt to replace maturing debt when the
ratio is above the target. CDG define the log-threshold k as the logarithm of
book value of debt. In their paper they state that “even though the default
threshold need not be equal to the outstanding book value of debt, it seems
reasonable to assume both are related.”
It is noteworthy to mention that, CDG also make use of an extended version
of the above stationary leverage ratio formula in their study. The drift of the
log-default threshold can be taken as a decreasing function of the spot interest
rate, since debt issuances drop during high interest periods. This formulation
is consistent with the findings of Malitz (2000) for the high interest period of
early 1980s. The extended version of the formula in the CDG study is,
dkt = κl(yt − ν − φ(rt − θr)− kt)dt (5.4)
where φ is the sensitivity parameter to interest rates, and θr is the long-run
mean for short-term interest rates as defined before. In order to reduce the
complexity of the model, this study will implement the basic version where
the sensitivity of log-default threshold to interest rates is neglected.
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By defining log-leverage as,
lt = kt − yt = lnK
V
(5.5)
the firm defaults at the first passage time of the firm value reaching the default
boundary, or equivalently, the log-leverage ratio l reaching zero. This idea is
in line with Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) where
default happens the first time when the firm value reaches an exogenously spec-
ified boundary. The CDG Model is therefore an advanced form of structural
models, extending the basic idea of Merton (1974) with (i) stochastic interest
rates, (ii) first-passage time, and (iii) stationary leverage ratios.
From Ito’s Lemma, lt follows the one-factor Markov dynamics:
dlt = κl(θl(rt)− lt)dt− σvdWQ2 (5.6)
where we have
θl(rt) =
δ + σ
2
v
2
− r
κl
− ν = − r
κl
− ν¯ (5.7)
5.1.2 Pricing Corporate Debt
CDG assume a recovery-of-treasury payment, which is that a risky coupon
bond recovers a ϕ proportion of the otherwise identical riskless coupon bond.
The difference from the recovery-of-face value assumption is that instead of
the ϕ amount being received at the time of default, it is received at maturity.
Let vtheo(r0, l0, T ) be the theoretical price of a risky discount bond that matures
at T . Then with the recovery-of-treasury assumption, a transformation will be
necessary to switch from the expectation under risk-neutral measure EQ to
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the expectation under T -forward measure EFT .2
vtheo(r0, l0, T ) = E
Q
(
e−
R T
0
r(s)ds · 1{τ>T} + e−
R τ
0
r(s)ds · ϕ · b(rτ , T ) · 1{τ≤T}
)
= EQ
(
e−
R T
0
r(s)ds · (1{τ>T} + ϕ · 1{τ≤T})
)
= EQ
(
e−
R T
0
r(s)ds · (1− (1− ϕ) · 1{τ≤T})
)
= b(r0, T ) · EFT
(
1− (1− ϕ) · 1{τ≤T}
)
= b(r0, T ) ·
(
1− (1− ϕ) ·QFT (r0, l0, T )
)
(5.8)
where b(r0, T ) is the price of a riskless bond. It remains to determineQ
FT (r0, l0, T )
which is the time-0 probability of default occurring before maturity T , un-
der the T -forward measure (See Geman, El-Karoui, and Rochet (1995) and
Jamshidian (1989)). Similarly, considering a coupon-paying risky bond with
N coupons on payment dates tj, we have,
vtheo(r0, l0, T ) =
N∑
j=1
C · b(r0, tj) ·
(
1− (1− ϕcoup) ·QFtj (r0, l0, tj)
)
+ b(r0, T ) ·
(
1− (1− ϕ) ·QFT (r0, l0, T )
)
(5.9)
where C is the coupon fraction and ϕcoup is the recovery rate of coupons in
case of default. Generally, certain assumptions must hold in order to price each
coupon as a zero-coupon bond as in Equation (5.9). This is called the “portfolio
of zeroes” approach. However, since the pricing is under recovery-of-treasury
approach, there is no need to concern about the applicability. Additionally, in
practice, CDG note from Helwege and Turner (1999) who claim that future
coupon payments are of low priority, and are rarely recovered in default. There-
fore ϕcoup is set to 0, letting only the principal payment receive compensation
at default. The recovery rate on principal is fixed at 0.5, following the results
2See Bjo¨rk (2004) for measure transformations.
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produced by Altman and Kishore (1996) and recent practice.
For the critical variable of QFT (r0, l0, T ), CDG follow Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995) and implement a version of Fortet’s (1943) implicit formula for the
first passage time density. Utilizing this framework, Eom, Helwege, and Huang
(2004) make use of the derivation of CDG and arrive at the below formulation
(pp. 537-539):
QFT (r0, l0, T ) =
n∑
i=1
q(ti−1/2; t0) (5.10)
In deriving this formula, t0 is set equal to 0 and the time is discretized into n
intervals as ti = iT/n,
for i = 1, 2, ..., n,
q(ti−1/2; t0) =
N(a(ti; t0))−
∑i−1
j=1 q(tj−1/2; t0)N(b(ti; tj−1/2))
N(b(ti; ti−1/2))
(5.11)
The sum on the right hand-side of the equation becomes zero when i = 1. N
is the cdf of Normal distribution. a and b are defined as
a(ti; t0) = −M(ti, T |X0, r0)√
S(ti|Xtj)
(5.12)
b(ti; tj) = −
M(ti, T |Xtj)√
S(ti|Xtj)
(5.13)
X = V/K is the inverse of the leverage ratio, where M and S are
M(t, T |X0, r0) = EFT0 [lnXt] (5.14)
S(t|X0, r0) = varFT0 [lnXt] (5.15)
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M(t, T |Xu) =M(t, T |X0, r0)−M(u, T |X0, r0)cov
FT
0 [lnXt, lnXu]
S(u|X0, r0) , u ǫ (t0, t)
(5.16)
S(t|Xu) = S(t|X0, r0)− (cov
FT
0 [lnXt, lnXu])
2
S(u|X0, r0) , u ǫ (t0, t) (5.17)
What remains is to have closed form solutions forEFT0 [lnXt] and cov
FT
0 [lnXt, lnXu]
which are computed in Eom/Helwege/Huang (pp. 538-539).
EFT0 [lnXt] = e
−κlt
[
lnX0 + ν¯(e
κlt − 1)
+
( 1
κl − κr (e
(κl−κr)t − 1)(r0 − θr + σ
2
r
κ2r
− σ
2
r
2κ2r
e−κrT )
+
1
κl + κr
σ2r
2κ2r
e−κrT (e(κl+κr)t − 1) + 1
κl
(θr − σ
2
r
κ2r
)(eκlt − 1)
)
−ρσvσr
κr
(eκlt − 1
κl
− eκrT e
(κl+κr)t − 1
κl + κr
)]
(5.18)
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covFT0 [lnXt, lnXu] = e
−κl(t+u)
[ σ2v
2κl
(e2κlu − 1)
+
ρσvσr
κl + κr
(e2κlu − 1
2κl
− e
(κl−κr)u − 1
κl − κr
)
+
ρσvσr
κl + κr
(1− e(κl−κr)t
κl − κr +
e2κlu − 1
2κl
+e(κl+κr)u
e(κl−κr)t − e(κl−κr)u
κl − κr
)
+
σ2r
2κr
(
− (e
(κl−κr)t − 1)(e(κl−κr)u − 1)
(κl − κr)2
− κr
κ2l − κ2r
e2κlu − 1
κl
+ (e(κl+κr)u − 1)e
(κl−κr)t − e(κl−κr)u
κ2l − κ2r
+
1
κ2l − κ2r
(1− 2e(κl−κr)u + e2κlu)
)]
where
ν¯ = (ν − (δ + σ2v/2)/κl) (5.19)
From these equations one can obtain QFT (r0, l0, T ) required for pricing the
bond.
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5.2 Reduced-Form Approach -
The Stochastic Leverage Model
5.2.1 The Model
In this attempt to compare the CDS price prediction ability of structural and
reduced-form models of default, it has been decided to make the modeling
structures of the approaches as close as possible. This would then enable us to
understand whether the model structure has an impact on prediction power. In
order to maintain this, it has been chosen to use the stochastic leverage compo-
nent in the CDG model, directly in the intensity setup. The below formulation
will explain the reduced-form setting in detail.
In an intensity model, the critical choice is the selection of the state variables
driving the credit risk. There have been many empirical studies with reduced-
form models that either estimated a stochastic process for the unobserved
intensity (Duffee (1999), Driessen (2005)), or made use of a credit risk factor
as part of the adjusted discount rate (Bakshi, Madan, and Zhang (2006)).
This study accommodates the second approach, where the leverage process
has been defined as the credit risk factor that drives the intensity. By letting
the stochastic leverage process to be the main driver of credit risk in both
models, it could be possible to have a basis of comparison.
5.2.2 Pricing Corporate Debt
In order to be comparable with the CDG model recovery assumption, it has
been chosen to work with Lando’s (1998) doubly stochastic model with recovery-
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of-treasury value. The theoretical default risky discount bond price vtheo(r0, l0, T )
that matures at T is:
vtheo(r0, l0, T ) = E
Q
(
e−
R T
0
r(s)ds · 1{τ>T} + e−
R τ
0
r(s)ds · ϕ · b(rτ , T ) · 1{τ≤T}
)
= EQ
(
e
−
T
R
0
r(s)ds(
1{τ>T} + ϕ · 1{τ≤T}
))
= EQ
(
e
−
T
R
0
r(s)ds(
ϕ+ (1− ϕ)1{τ>T}
))
= ϕ · b(r0, T ) + (1− ϕ) · EQ
(
e
−
T
R
0
r(s)ds
1{τ>T}
)
= ϕ · b(r0, T ) + (1− ϕ) · EQ
(
e
−
T
R
0
R(s)ds)
(5.20)
Equation (5.20) is the reduced-form version of Equation (5.8). Notice that the
two equation series only differ in the last two lines. In deriving the formula,
there was a switch to the forward measure in the structural model. On the
other hand, the default probability is incorporated into the adjusted discount
rate in the Lando setting. Here, the important decision is how to formulate
the adjusted discount rate at the last part of Equation (5.20). In choosing the
adjusted discount rate setup, the classical Lando (1998) formulation could be
kept in mind. In his model, the adjusted discount rate is the sum of short rate
r and default intensity λ. Recalling the arguments of keeping the structural
and reduced-form models comparable, the following formulation is proposed.
R(t) = a+ r(t) + c · l(t) (5.21)
With this setting, the Lando-type form is preserved, by letting a+ c · l(t) to be
equal to default intensity λ. The adjusted discount rate is the sum of the short
rate, and a credit risk component. This component consists of a constant part
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a and a stochastic part, c · l(t). Here, l(t) is nothing but the log-leverage ratio,
which has a process exactly the same as in the structural part (see Equation
(5.6)). The two stochastic differential equations parallel to the structural setup
are:
drt = κr(θr − rt)dt+ σrdWQ1 (5.22)
and
dlt = κl(θl(rt)− lt)dt− σvdWQ2 (5.23)
where we have
θl(rt) =
δ + σ
2
v
2
− r
κl
− ν = − r
κl
− ν¯ (5.24)
Let v be the defaultable bond price as in the last part of Equation (5.20) in
expectation brackets. One can interpret this as the price of a defaultable zero-
coupon bond with zero recovery. Following the property of affine structures
as discussed in Duffie and Singleton (2003), the closed form solution of the
expectation is,
v = EQt
(
e
−
T
R
t
R(s)ds)
= eA(t,T )−B(t,T )rt−C(t,T )lt (5.25)
for which the following PDE can be derived:
∂v
∂t
+κr(θr−r)∂v
∂r
+κl(θl(r)−l)∂v
∂l
+
1
2
σ2r
∂2v
∂r2
+
1
2
σ2v
∂2v
∂l2
−ρσvσr ∂
2v
∂r∂l
= (a+r+cl)v
(5.26)
where θl(r) is as in Equation (5.24). In doing this calculation, the boundary
conditions of A(T, T ) = 0, B(T, T ) = 0, and C(T, T ) = 0 are necessary. By
taking the partial derivatives of v in Equation (5.25) with respect to t, r, l and
second derivatives with respect to rr, ll, and rl and replacing into the PDE,
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the below closed form solution could be reached where,
C(t, T ) =
c
κl
(1− e−κl(T−t)) (5.27)
B(t, T ) =
[
e−κr(T−t)
( c
κlκr
+
c
κl(κl − κr) −
1
κr
)]
+
[ 1
κr
− c
κlκr
− c
κl
e−κl(T−t)
κl − κr
]
(5.28)
A(t, T ) = −a(T − t)− Ξ−Υ+ Γ + Λ− Π (5.29)
with
θ˜l =
δ + σ
2
v
2
κl
− ν (5.30)
W =
c
κrκl
+
c
κl(κl − κr) −
1
κr
(5.31)
Z =
1
κr
− c
κlκr
(5.32)
Ξ = θ˜lc
[
(T − t)− 1− e
−κl(T−t)
κl
]
(5.33)
Υ = κrθr
[
W
1− e−κr(T−t)
κr
+ Z(T − t)− c
κ2l (κl − κr)
(
1− e−κl(T−t)
)]
(5.34)
Γ =
σ2vc
2
2κ2l
[
(T − t)− 2(1− e
−κl(T−t))
κl
+
1− e−2κl(T−t)
2κl
]
(5.35)
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Λ =
σ2r
2
[W 2
2κr
(1− e−2κr(T−t)) + 2WZ
κr
(1− e−κr(T−t)) + Z2(T − t)
−2Wc(1− e
−(κl+κr)(T−t))
κl(κl − κr)(κl + κr) −
2Zc(1− e−κl(T−t))
κ2l (κl − κr)
+
( c
κl(κl − κr)
)21− e−2κl(T−t)
2κl
]
(5.36)
Π = ρσvσr
[Wc(1− e−κr(T−t))
κlκr
+
Zc(T − t)
κl
− c
2(1− e−κl(T−t))
κ3l (κl − κr)
−Wc(1− e
−(κl+κr)(T−t))
κl(κl + κr)
− Zc(1− e
−κl(T−t))
κ2l
+
c2(1− e−2κl(T−t))
2κ3l (κl − κr)
]
(5.37)
5.3 Empirical Methodology and Results
The structural and reduced-form models are calibrated to corporate bond
prices, leverage ratios and US Treasury rates. For both of the models, the
interest rate process parameters (κr, θr, σr), the initial values of the lever-
age ratio and the short rate (l0, r0), the leverage process parameters (κl, θl),
and the correlation between the interest rate process and the asset value
process (ρ) enter similarly. Each of the models will use their theoretical bond
prices vtheo(r0, l0, T ) to estimate their unique asset volatility (σv) figure. In
the reduced-form setup, two additional constant parameters a and c are also
necessary. After calibration of the models to market prices, CDS prices can
be predicted out-of-sample, without making use of any information used prior.
This setup will allow to see how well the CDG and the reduced-form model
perform in correctly pricing CDSs. Utilizing bond, stock and balance sheet
information is a large step after the analysis provided in Chapter 4 with only
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using CDS data for prediction. However, it is necessary to take an advanced
step towards the assessment of more state-of-the-art types of models. The fol-
lowing section will introduce the datasets used in analysis.
5.3.1 Data
CDS Data
An extended version of the dataset described in Section 2.2 has been used
in this analysis. Time series of CDS prices were extended until the end of
December 2005. This was required in order to have enough observations. After
this extension, mid-month observations were selected for 5-year, senior CDSs,
for the period of January 2003 - December 2005 due to the matching with
bond and balance sheet data. The mid-month value is typically on the 15th of
each month. In case that the 15th is a non-working day, the next working day
is selected. The indicative bid and ask quotes are averaged to reach a daily
CDS premium, in the end attaining 36 mid-month observations for the three
year period. The credit quality of the issuers varies between Aa and Ba rated
by Moody’s. The lowest CDS midpoint of 9 bps is within the series of the
Aa-rated WAL-MART, whereas the highest midpoint is as much as 412.5 bps
for the Baa/Ba-rated HILTON.
Interest Rate Data
The 3-, 6-monthly, and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10-yearly yields are retrieved for the
interest rate calibration process. Because the sample consists of US companies,
Constant Maturity Treasuries from the Federal Reserve Board have been used.
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These are historical series of on-the-run US Treasury yields that also have been
utilized in recent research. The series are actually the average yields on US
Treasury securities adjusted to a constant maturity. Yields are interpolated
by the US Treasury from the daily yield curve. This curve, which relates the
yield on a security to its time to maturity, is based on the closing market bid
yields on actively traded Treasury securities in the over-the-counter market.
This method therefore provides a yield for a 10-year maturity, for instance,
even if no outstanding security has exactly 10 years remaining to maturity. A
detailed explanation of how these series are constructed can be found on the
web page of Federal Reserve Board. The time span used to calibrate the model
is January 1998 to December 2005.
Corporate Bond Data
REUTERS was the main source for the bond dataset, which has been con-
structed after considering the removal of the bonds with the following proper-
ties:
• callable, putable, or convertible bonds
• perpetual bonds
• index-linked bonds
• floating rate notes
• foreign currency bonds (bonds should be in the same denomination as
the CDS)
• any rank else than senior unsecured bonds
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• financial companies’ bonds
Bonds with non-standard properties are excluded due to the necessity of in-
cluding intricate techniques in bond price calculations. Senior unsecured bonds
are utilized since CDSs have only these as deliverable obligations. Financial
companies are excluded due to having significantly different capital structure.
The time span of the bonds match the CDS dataset, being from 2003 to 2005.
Balance Sheet and Stock Market Data
Leverage values are constructed by dividing the total liabilities to the sum
of market value of equity and total liabilities. This approach has also been
followed by recent studies (see Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004)). Quarterly
total liabilities figures were retrieved from REUTERS balance sheet pages,
while market value of equity (MVE) is the product of number of outstand-
ing shares times the closing stock price on a given day. MVE figures can be
retrieved daily, whereas total liabilities figures are available only quarterly. In
order to avoid loss of data, a method similar to Eom/Helwege/Huang has been
used. For the mid-month dates where bond and CDS data are available, the
leverage ratios are computed, by making use of the latest available quarterly li-
abilities figure from balance sheets. For a consecutive three month period after
the quarterly announcement, the leverage ratio is constructed from a constant
liabilities figure and an MVE figure unique for the day.
Since European companies are not obliged to report their balance sheets on a
quarterly basis, their leverage ratios could not be constructed without rough
interpolation and therefore only US companies were focused on. The remaining
dataset had 16 firms with 48 bonds. In Table 5.1, the descriptive statistics for
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the leverage ratio, total liabilities, and market capitalization can be found,
whereas in Table 5.2 below, the short list of the firms and their bonds used
in the study with details such as the issue date, maturity date and coupon
amount can be observed. In the last column the ratings given by Moody’s
during the observation period are presented.
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Leverage Ratios
Firm Avg. Max. Min. Avg. Total Avg. Market
Lev. Lev. Lev. Liab. Capital.
Ratio(%) Ratio(%) Ratio(%) (Mil.USD) (Mil.USD)
CITIZENS 61.01 71.84 53.12 6,005 3,840
DEERE & CO 61.00 69.78 54.80 22,847 14,758
DELL 13.86 20.28 11.41 13,861 86,054
FEDERATED 66.88 78.55 48.22 9,434 4,728
HP 36.87 42.87 31.25 36,703 63,534
HILTON 47.08 60.37 37.85 5,960 6,880
IBM 4.00 4.62 3.34 5,960 144,175
INT.PAPER 57.47 61.81 52.67 24,479 18,173
MGM MIRAGE 69.01 79.79 42.60 9,577 4,870
MOTOROLA 35.05 51.87 22.77 18,515 36,940
NORDSTROM 50.65 71.36 21.87 2,865 3,477
NORFOLK 58.40 65.44 47.88 14,873 10,941
NORTHROP 58.43 84.87 44.70 18,135 13,650
TARGET 33.47 42.77 26.14 19,491 39,581
WAL-MART 22.53 29.32 17.50 64,975 224,869
WALT DISNEY 36.40 44.89 31.58 27,000 47,812
5.3.2 Estimation of the Parameters
Interest Rate Process Parameters
There can be alternative estimation techniques for calibrating the Vasicek
process in Equation (5.1). It has been chosen to work with the method of
Kalman filter, since it allows making use of cross-sectional and time series in-
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Table 5.2: Short List of Firms/Bonds Used in Analysis
Firm Bond ID Issue Date Maturity Date Coupon First Coup. Rating
CITIZENS 1 23/05/01 15/05/11 9.250 15/11/01 Baa2-Ba3
CITIZENS 2 11/03/02 15/08/08 7.625 15/08/02 Baa2-Ba3
CITIZENS 3 12/11/04 15/01/13 6.250 15/07/05 Baa2-Ba3
DEERE & CO 1 17/04/02 25/04/14 6.950 25/10/02 A3
DELL 1 27/04/98 15/04/08 6.550 15/10/98 A2-A3
FEDERATED 1 14/07/97 15/07/17 7.450 15/01/98 Baa1
FEDERATED 2 14/06/99 01/04/09 6.300 01/10/99 Baa1
FEDERATED 3 06/06/00 01/06/10 8.500 01/12/00 Baa1
FEDERATED 4 27/03/01 01/04/11 6.625 01/10/01 Baa1
HP 1 16/12/02 17/12/07 4.250 17/06/03 A3
HP 2 26/06/02 01/07/07 5.500 01/01/03 A3
HILTON 1 15/04/97 15/04/07 7.950 15/10/97 Baa3-Ba1
HILTON 2 22/12/97 15/12/09 7.200 15/06/98 Baa3-Ba1
HILTON 3 22/12/97 15/12/17 7.500 15/06/98 Baa3-Ba1
HILTON 4 11/05/01 15/05/08 7.625 15/11/01 Baa3-Ba1
HILTON 5 22/11/02 01/12/12 7.625 01/06/03 Baa3-Ba1
IBM 1 01/10/98 01/10/08 5.400 01/04/99 A1
IBM 2 03/12/98 01/12/08 5.400 01/06/99 A1
IBM 3 15/01/99 15/01/09 5.500 15/07/99 A1
IBM 4 22/01/99 22/01/09 5.390 22/07/99 A1
IBM 5 26/01/99 26/01/09 5.400 26/07/99 A1
IBM 6 01/08/02 15/08/07 4.200 15/02/03 A1
IBM 7 27/12/02 15/12/06 3.000 15/06/03 A1
IBM 8 30/01/03 15/01/09 3.500 15/07/03 A1
IBM 9 06/02/03 15/02/13 4.200 15/08/03 A1
IBM 10 01/02/05 01/02/08 3.800 01/08/05 A1
INT.PAPER 1 27/08/01 01/09/11 6.750 01/03/02 Baa2
MGM MIRAGE 1 15/09/00 15/09/10 8.500 15/03/01 Ba1-Ba2
MGM MIRAGE 2 17/09/03 01/10/09 6.000 01/04/04 Ba1-Ba2
MGM MIRAGE 3 27/02/04 27/02/14 5.875 27/08/04 Ba1-Ba2
MGM MIRAGE 4 23/03/04 27/02/14 5.875 27/08/04 Ba1-Ba2
MGM MIRAGE 5 30/11/04 01/09/12 6.750 01/03/05 Ba1-Ba2
MOTOROLA 1 14/01/02 01/11/11 8.000 01/05/02 Baa2-Baa3
MOTOROLA 2 13/11/00 15/11/10 7.625 15/05/01 Baa2-Baa3
NORDSTROM 1 20/01/99 15/01/09 5.625 15/07/99 Baa1
NORFOLK 1 26/04/99 15/04/09 6.200 15/10/99 Baa1
NORFOLK 2 23/05/00 15/05/10 8.625 15/11/00 Baa1
NORFOLK 3 06/02/01 15/02/11 6.750 15/08/01 Baa1
NORTHROP 1 14/04/00 15/10/09 8.000 15/04/00 Baa2-Baa3
NORTHROP 2 12/07/01 15/02/11 7.125 15/08/01 Baa2-Baa3
NORTHROP 3 16/08/04 16/11/06 4.079 16/11/04 Baa2-Baa3
TARGET 1 26/03/01 01/04/07 5.500 01/10/01 A2
TARGET 2 10/10/01 01/10/08 5.400 01/04/02 A2
TARGET 3 02/05/03 15/05/18 4.875 15/11/03 A2
WAL-MART 1 10/08/99 10/08/09 6.875 10/02/00 Aa2
WALT DISNEY 1 28/06/99 28/06/10 6.800 01/08/99 Baa1
WALT DISNEY 2 20/06/02 20/06/14 6.200 20/12/02 Baa1
WALT DISNEY 3 27/10/93 27/10/08 5.800 01/02/94 Baa1
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formation at the same time, and therefore is an appropriate tool for short rate
process estimation. The literature on Kalman filter estimation of the short
rate processes have mostly focused on Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1985) processes due to their linear structure (i.e. Duan and Simonato
(1999); Geyer and Pichler (1999); Babbs and Nowman (1999); Chen and Scott
(2003)). A detailed explanation of the Kalman filter technique can be found
in Appendix A.
The method results in time series of the short rate rt, plus the Vasicek process
parameters κr, θr, σr, and the market price of risk parameter η. In Table 5.3,
the estimated values for the risk-neutral parameters can be found.
Table 5.3: Kalman Filter Estimates of the Interest Rate Process
Parameter Value
κr 0.247
θr 0.061
σr 0.012
η -0.205
The risk-neutral (under Q) and physical (under P ) processes of the short rate are:
dr = κr(θr − r)dt+ σrdWQ and dr = κr(θ˜r − r)dt+ σrdWP where θr = θ˜r − σrηκr
The mean reversion rate is in accordance with the values found in the literature.
The same is true for the volatility parameter. The risk-neutral long-run mean is
relatively high at 6.1 per cent. This converts to a physical mean of 5.1 per cent.
Considering that the US interest rates varied between 1 and 6 per cent during
the observation period, this value is within feasible range. Further efforts with
the structural and reduced-form models described in the following sections
will use the short rate series and Vasicek parameter estimates generated by
the Kalman filter.
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Leverage Process Parameters and the Correlation Coefficient
For the leverage process parameters (κl, θl), the approach of Eom/Helwege/
Huang is followed (pp. 540-541). The authors use a regression method in order
to estimate κl and θl. First, notice that θl is a function of ν¯, where ν¯ has been
defined in Equation (5.7). Under the physical measure P ,
dVt/Vt = (µv − δ)dt+ σvdW P (5.38)
and
dln(Vt/Kt) = [µv + κlν¯ − κl(ln(Vt/Kt)]dt+ σvdW P (5.39)
where µv is a constant, and dW
P is a standard Brownian motion under the
physical measure P . Let
αl = µv + κlν¯ (5.40)
A regression of the change in the log-leverage ratio against log-leverage ratio
lagged one period will generate parameter estimates αˆl and κˆl:
ln(Vt/Kt)− ln(Vt−1/Kt−1) = β0 + β1ln(Vt−1/Kt−1) + ǫ (5.41)
As a result, β0 will be equal to the αl in Equation (5.40), and β1 will be equal
to −κl in Equation (5.39). In addition, the µˆv can be estimated from the mean
return of the asset value over the prior 5 years. Then ν¯ can be estimated as
follows:
ˆ¯ν = (αˆl − µˆv)/κˆl (5.42)
In the implementation, monthly market leverage ratios are regressed on one
month lagged ratios for the period of 2001-2005.
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The correlation coefficient ρ arises from the presence of correlated Brownian
motions in the processes. The correlation between asset returns and the in-
terest rate process is estimated from correlation between equity returns and
changes in the interest rates. Over the 2001-2005 sample horizon, the correla-
tion between changes in the 3-monthly interest rates series and daily closing
stock returns is computed.
Asset Volatility and Reduced-Form Model Specific Parameters
From the target parameter set (κr, θr, σr, κl, ν¯, ρ, σv), the remaining variable is
the asset volatility, σv. It has been chosen to retrieve “bond-implied” volatility,
by making use of bond prices. By minimizing the sum of squared errors over
each observation day and each bond price, one can reach the implied asset
volatility for the structural CDG model:
min
σv
ObsDays∑
i=1
Bonds∑
j=1
(vtheoi,j (lt, rt)− vobsi,j )2 (5.43)
On the reduced-form side, there are two additional parameters to be estimated.
These are the adjusted short rate parameters a and c. It is an option to si-
multaneously estimate a and c from the minimization of sum of squared errors
formula, per firm:
min
σv ,a,c
ObsDays∑
i=1
Bonds∑
j=1
(vtheoi,j (lt, rt)− vobsi,j )2 (5.44)
Note that the number of free parameters used to calibrate the models to bond
prices differs across approaches. In CDG there is the asset volatility as the
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only free parameter, whereas in the intensity case there will be three para-
meters. The results will be analyzed taking into account the number of free
parameters.3
5.3.3 Estimation Results
Parameter Estimates from Bond and Stock Prices, and Balance
Sheet Information
As described in Section 5.3.2, the bond and stock prices, as well as the balance
sheet information are the source for the CDG and intensity model parameter
estimates, which will be used for the prediction of CDS prices at a latter
step. By inserting the interest rate process parameters, the estimated leverage
process parameters κl, ν¯, and the correlation coefficient ρ into the CDG and
intensity formula, the SSE method enables to pull out the asset volatility σv
from bond prices. In the intensity case, there are additionally the adjusted
discount rate parameters a and c. Firstly, the parameter estimates common in
both models can be found in Table 5.4.
The parameter estimates are mostly in a reasonable range. First, the mean-
reversion rate of the leverage κl, has a value around 5-10 per cent, although
very low figures as well as higher figures are also estimated from regressions.
These values fall in a consistent range with prior studies: To Fama and French
(2002) who reach a value around 7-10 per cent in their regression analysis and
to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) who have a sample weighted towards large
3Although not documented, an alternative version of the intensity model has also been
tested in the runs. This model estimated the a and c parameters common to all firms,
instead of individual estimation. The out-of-sample prediction results were inferior to both
the firm-specific intensity setup and the CDG model.
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Table 5.4: Parameters Common to Both Models
Firm κl ν¯ ρ
CITIZENS 0.031 0.727 0.003
DEERE & CO 0.136 0.438 0.078
DELL 0.009 0.082 0.070
FEDERATED 0.061 0.216 0.133
HP 0.279 0.972 0.090
HILTON 0.105 0.567 0.176
IBM 0.052 2.795 0.049
INT.PAPER 0.197 0.595 0.119
MGM MIRAGE 0.169 0.282 0.137
MOTOROLA 0.030 1.024 0.048
NORDSTROM 0.002 -2.398 0.116
NORFOLK 0.030 0.432 0.094
NORTHROP 0.028 0.261 -0.086
TARGET 0.083 1.022 0.154
WAL-MART 0.027 1.053 0.120
WALT DISNEY 0.078 1.011 0.151
and financially conservative firms and reach a value around 40 per cent. The
correlation coefficient between the stock returns and change in interest rates is
comparable to the figure of Eom/Helwege/Huang who report that they have
relatively low correlation values all below 15 per cent. They also note that
the correlation variable has not been found to effect the spreads significantly.
Although there are no comparable figures for the value of ν¯ in the literature,
one can compute the long-run means and infer the soundness of these estimates.
The CDG model and the intensity model have their unique asset volatility
figures. For the CDG model, the asset volatilities which are inferred from
bond prices are between 15-40 per cent except a few outliers. These values
are compared to option-implied volatilities computed from at-the-money call
options with a maturity of June 2007 for all of the above listed companies. This
comparison reveals that option-implied volatilities are in the range of 15-35 per
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cent, indicating that the bond-implied figures are economically reasonable as
well. Nevertheless, there are significant outliers such as the values for IBM and
DELL. The estimated and option-implied volatilities for the CDG model can
be found in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: CDG Model Estimation Figures
Firm σv σv θl θK/V
Estimated Option-implied
CITIZENS 0.213 0.226 -1.70 0.36
DEERE & CO 0.177 0.370 -0.66 0.58
DELL 0.594 0.312 -3.38 >1
FEDERATED 0.141 0.237 -0.71 0.58
HP 0.392 0.240 -1.08 0.45
HILTON 0.345 0.292 -0.85 0.75
IBM 0.913 0.173 -3.37 >1
INT.PAPER 0.240 0.192 -0.75 0.55
MGM MIRAGE 0.178 0.347 -0.46 0.68
MOTOROLA 0.350 0.237 -2.02 >1
NORDSTROM 0.147 0.320 -13.04 <0.01
NORFOLK 0.176 0.299 -1.42 0.40
NORTHROP 0.102 0.168 -1.33 0.32
TARGET 0.365 0.230 -1.38 0.48
WAL-MART 0.429 0.181 -1.13 0.41
WALT DISNEY 0.384 0.208 -1.39 0.64
In Table 5.5, the last two columns indicate the long-run mean of the log-
leverage process and the leverage itself by applying Ito’s lemma to log-leverage
process in Equation (5.6). In calculating the long-run mean of the log-leverage
from θl = −ν¯ − r/κl, the short rate r is assumed at a constant 3 per cent.
It can be observed that the long-run means are at a reasonable level. Except
three outliers, all long-run leverage ratios are between 0 and 1. The higher
figures for DELL and IBM arise from a very high asset volatility estimate and
a very low mean-reversion rate, which end up in a figure higher than one. For
the other companies, the value for the long-run mean of leverage falls close to
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Table 5.6: Intensity Model Parameter Estimates
Firm a c σv θK/V
CITIZENS 0.045 0.001 0.501 >1
DEERE & CO 0.034 0.033 0.014 0.52
DELL 0.020 0.001 0.828 >1
FEDERATED 0.043 0.043 0.211 0.71
HP 0.024 0.003 0.335 0.35
HILTON 0.165 0.158 0.001 0.43
IBM 0.022 0.002 0.112 0.03
INT.PAPER 0.024 0.001 0.987 >1
MGM MIRAGE 0.078 0.062 0.844 0.63
MOTOROLA 0.095 0.058 0.003 0.13
NORDSTROM 0.034 0.015 0.042 <0.01
NORFOLK 0.056 0.057 0.007 0.24
NORTHROP 0.036 0.025 0.247 0.26
TARGET 0.055 0.035 0.001 >1
WAL-MART 0.015 0.001 0.232 0.31
WALT DISNEY 0.106 0.071 0.356 0.56
the empirically used monthly leverage figures as well, which can be seen from
the values in Table 5.1.
Using bond prices as a source for the parameter estimation, the intensity model
described in Section 5.2.2 is also calibrated. The sum of squared errors method
in Equation (5.44) has yielded the results in Table 5.6. The interest rate process
parameters, the leverage process parameters κl, ν¯ and the correlation coefficient
ρ are estimated exactly the same as in the CDG model. From the intensity
model for bond prices, one can extract the asset volatility σv, and the intensity
parameters a and c.
In Table 5.6 the a and c figures convert mostly into reasonable values for the
default intensities. The next section will present a more detailed analysis of
how these figures transfer into default probabilities. Note also that the long-
run mean for the leverage figures calculated by equating the short rate r to 3
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per cent lie in a reasonable range. For instance, for IBM, the actual leverage
inputs are also in the range of 3-4 per cent. The model was able to capture
these successfully. Except four outliers which have long-run means above the
standards, all the long-run means are near the range of original input leverage
parameters.
In-Sample Fits to Bond Prices
To assess the estimation results, the in-sample fit to bond prices can be found,
in Table 5.7. In the table, the mean error (ME), the mean absolute error
(MAE), and the mean absolute percentage errors (MAPE) are computed. The
results indicate that there is a good fit to prices with rather low error figures.
A better fit is observed with the intensity model, also indicated by the signifi-
cance test. However, note that the intensity model has three free parameters in
estimation whereas the structural model has only one. The Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) is an ideal measure in case there are free parameter differences
between the models whose fits are tested. But also after considering the free
parameters, the AIC values in the lower panel show that the intensity model
has a better (lower) value, and thus a better fit. Further analysis in Section
5.4 will show whether the better in-sample fit to bond prices carries over to an
out-of-sample fit to CDS prices.
Default Probabilities from Bond Prices
Before taking a step towards prediction of CDS prices, it might be insight-
ful to compute the default probabilities indicated by the parameter estimates.
With the structural model, the forward risk-neutral probability of default is
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Table 5.7: Structural and Intensity Models - In-Sample Fit to Bond Prices
Bonds Structural Intensity
Firm No. of No. of ME MAE MAPE ME MAE MAPE
Bonds Prices (pts) (pts) (%) (pts) (pts) (%)
CITIZENS 3 86 1.89 7.94 7.23% 0.06 3.75 3.41%
DEERE & CO 1 36 0.35 3.48 3.00% -0.24 3.04 2.63%
DELL 1 36 0.05 1.13 1.04% -0.02 1.01 0.92%
FEDERATED 4 144 1.12 3.96 3.47% -0.06 1.94 1.69%
HP 2 66 0.26 1.02 0.99% 0.00 0.82 0.79%
HILTON 5 180 -0.37 4.22 3.98% 0.01 2.00 1.88%
IBM 10 331 0.23 1.19 1.17% -0.01 1.03 1.01%
INT.PAPER 1 36 -0.05 2.51 2.28% -0.21 2.32 2.10%
MGM MIRAGE 5 119 1.53 4.99 4.89% -0.06 2.04 2.00%
MOTOROLA 2 72 0.47 2.57 2.23% -0.08 2.52 2.21%
NORDSTROM 1 36 2.45 3.38 3.21% -0.02 1.13 1.08%
NORFOLK 3 108 0.54 2.00 1.76% -0.06 1.46 1.28%
NORTHROP 3 89 3.62 4.85 4.25% 0.04 1.17 1.02%
TARGET 3 104 0.64 2.46 2.44% 0.12 1.48 1.46%
WAL-MART 1 36 0.05 1.75 1.55% -0.04 1.25 1.10%
WALT DISNEY 3 108 -0.07 2.21 2.06% -0.09 1.92 1.79%
Average 0.79 3.10 2.85% -0.04 1.80 1.65%
AIC 232.65 145.25
Significance Test Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Difference of 1.34 20.27 0.000
Str. - Int.
“Mean Error (ME)” is the difference between the model and the observed bond price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAE)” is the absolute value of the difference between the model
and the observed bond price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAPE)” is the percentage value of the division of MAE by the
observed bond price.
“AIC” is the Akaike Information Criterion calculated from 2k+nln(RSS/n) where k is the
number of free parameters for the model, n is the number of observations, and RSS is the
residual sum of squares.
“Difference of Structural - Intensity” is the significance test between the difference of the
structural model mean absolute errors and the intensity model mean absolute errors per
firm per day.
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QFT (r0, l0, T ) mentioned in Equation (5.10). One can easily compute the 5-year
probability of default and compare it with the actual default probabilities for
the same rating class reported by Moody’s. Moody’s actual default rates cor-
respond to a period of 1970-2003. Model-implied 5-year default probabilities
are the average values of the full observation period (36 mid-month observa-
tions). Table 5.8 presents this comparison. Similar to the structural side, one
can look at default probabilities as a result of the estimation process with
the reduced-form setting as well. The default probability PD in the intensity
setting is:
PD = 1− EQ
(
e
−
T
R
0
λds)
(5.45)
Afterwards, the risk-neutral probability can be converted into the forward
probability easily. With this formulation, the 5-year model-implied default
probabilities with the intensity model can be found in the second column of
Table 5.8.
For both models, the default probability figures seem indistinguishable. One
model is not consistently higher or lower than its counterpart. Actually, the
model-implied default probabilities draw a clear picture. Although not strictly
monotonous, the higher the actual probability of default, the higher is the
model-implied probability. For example, the Ba rated companies are estimated
to have the highest PD’s, whereas the less riskier rating classes have signifi-
cantly lower values. The model-implied probability is the highest for CITI-
ZENS, HILTON, and MGM MIRAGE, which have the lowest ratings in the
sample. Another important point is that the risk-neutral probabilities are al-
ways higher than real world probabilities, in line with the theory and other
empirical findings.
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Table 5.8: Model-Implied and Actual Probabilities of Default
Firm Structural Intensity Rating Actual PD in
Model-implied Model-implied (Moody’s) Rating
5 year PD 5 year PD Class
CITIZENS 19.37% 20.11% Baa2-Ba3 2.16%-11.17%
DEERE & CO 9.46% 8.51% A3 0.54%
DELL 11.43% 8.93% A2-A3 0.54%
FEDERATED 12.21% 12.17% Baa1 2.16%
HP 10.35% 9.99% A3 0.54%
HILTON 24.79% 22.44% Ba1-Baa3 2.16%-11.17%
IBM 8.17% 7.43% A1 0.54%
INT.PAPER 13.04% 11.19% Baa2 2.16%
MGM MIRAGE 24.33% 22.14% Ba1-Ba2 11.17%
MOTOROLA 13.23% 14.97% Baa2-Baa3 2.16%
NORDSTROM 11.67% 11.13% Baa1 2.16%
NORFOLK 9.63% 11.73% Baa1 2.16%
NORTHROP 9.28% 10.57% Baa2-Baa3 2.16%
TARGET 10.07% 8.11% A2 0.54%
WAL-MART 8.18% 7.29% Aa2 0.24%
WALT DISNEY 14.53% 14.45% Baa1 2.16%
The observation that the model-implied probability increases with decreasing
credit quality can be also seen from Table 5.9. If the default probabilities
are averaged across companies with respect to rating classes, a clear stepwise
increase in the model-implied default probabilities in comparison to the rating
implied actual default probabilities can be observed. The applicable rating
class is taken as the rating at the beginning of the observation period (January
2003).
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Table 5.9: Model-Implied and Actual Probabilities of Default, Breakdown into
Rating Classes
Rating Structural Intensity Actual PD in
(Moody’s) Model-implied Model-implied Rating
5 year PD 5 year PD Class
Aa 8.18% 7.29% 0.24%
A 9.90% 8.59% 0.54%
Baa 12.87% 13.29% 2.16%
Ba 24.56% 22.29% 11.17%
5.4 Prediction of Credit Default Swap Prices
5.4.1 Prediction Methodology
The final aim with both types of models is to predict the prices of CDSs out-of-
sample. The fair price of a credit default swap (CDS) with recovery-of-treasury
assumption would be:
CDS(T ∗) =
EQ
(
e
−
τ
R
t
r(s)ds
(1− ϕ · e−
T
R
τ
r(s)ds
) · 1{τ<T ∗}
)
EQ
( n∑
i=1
e
−
ti
R
t
r(s)ds · 1{τ>ti}
) (5.46)
The denominator is the cumulation of n discount factors which are at time
points ti. The numerator gives the recovered amount in case of default prior
to the maturity (T ∗) of the CDS. The recovery leg (the numerator) has to be
equal to the premium leg (the denominator) under no-arbitrage assumptions,
which will yield the theoretically fair price of CDS(T ∗).
A simulation algorithm has been used in order to reach the fair price of a
credit default swap. Paths of the short rate and the leverage ratio are simulated
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where default occurred at the first time when the log-leverage is larger than
zero (leverage is greater than or equal to 1). For a typical 5-year horizon of the
maturity of the CDS, the simulation algorithm generates paths and at each
time point the log-leverage is checked for whether it has a value higher than
zero:
(i) At first step, the short rate is simulated using an Euler discretization of
the Vasicek process: Start with rt=r0, and generate rt+1 through
rt+1 = rt + κr(θr − rt)∆t+ σr
√
∆tǫ1t (5.47)
where ǫ1t ∼ N(0, 1).
(ii) Substitute the simulated rt+1 into
θl(rt+1) = −ν¯ − rt+1
κl
(5.48)
(iii) Generate lt+1 through Euler discretization of the leverage process:
lt+1 = lt + κl(θl − lt)∆t− σv
√
∆t(ρǫ1t +
√
1− ρ2ǫ2t ) (5.49)
Here, note that the Brownian motions of the two processes are correlated
with a factor of ρ and ǫ2t ∼ N(0, 1).
a. If lt+1 < 0 (log leverage having a negative sign) then no default
occurs. The CDS premiums up to this time point are cumulated,
when a quarter is complete (typical quarterly payments is assumed).
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This accumulation constitutes the “Premium Leg” of a CDS.
PremLegi = PremLegi−1 +
(
e
−
ti
P
0
rti∆t
)
(5.50)
Here, ti is the i
th premium date. Simulation continues with step
(iv).
b. If lt+1 ≥ 0, default happens. Simulation is terminated and the re-
covery leg is computed to constitute the numerator of the fair price
of a CDS. τ = t+ 1 and
RecLeg =
(
e
−
τ
P
0
rt∆t
(1− ϕ · b(rτ , T − τ))
)
(5.51)
In addition, the accrued premium since the last premium payment
is calculated and added to the premium leg. In this implementation,
the recovered bond maturity (T ) is taken to be the longest dated
bond’s maturity. According to the intuition, with no recovery on
coupons, the longest available bond should be delivered in case the
“cheapest-to-deliver” option is available. Recall from earlier chap-
ters that the delivery option denotes the possibility of the buyer to
deliver the cheapest bonds available in case of default. By assuming
no recovery on coupons, the bond with longest maturity should be
the deliverable obligation.
(iv) Go back to step (i) to generate rt+2.
For simulating the fair price of a CDS in the reduced-form case, Euler dis-
cretizations for the short rate and leverage process as in Equations (5.47) and
(5.49) have been used. Following Scho¨nbucher (2003), a uniform random vari-
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ate U is generated as the trigger level. Let γ be the default countdown process,
which is initiated by letting γ(0) = 1. Different from the CDG model described
above, step (iii) is replaced by:
(iii) Generate lt+1 through Euler discretization of the leverage process:
lt+1 = lt + κl(θl − lt)∆t− σv
√
∆t(ρǫ1t +
√
1− ρ2ǫ2t ) (5.52)
Compute the associated default intensity as:
λ(t+ 1) = a+ clt+1 (5.53)
Then at each time step, the default countdown process is decreased by,
γ(t+ 1) = γ(t)eλ(t+1)∆t (5.54)
a. If U < γ(t + 1) then no default occurs. Similar to the structural
side, the CDS premiums up to this quarter are cumulated, when a
quarter is complete. This is the premium leg of the CDS.
PremLegi = PremLegi−1 +
(
e
−
ti
P
0
rti∆t
)
(5.55)
b. If U ≥ γ(t+ 1), default happens and the recovery leg is computed.
RecLeg =
(
e
−
τ
P
0
rt∆t
(1− ϕ · b(rτ , T − τ))
)
(5.56)
Accrued premiums are taken into account since the last premium
payment date, as well.
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5.4.2 CDS Prediction Results
In the final step, model implied CDS prices can be generated using the method-
ology described in Section 5.4.1. Once the parameter estimates are available,
it is straightforward to use the steps described in the mentioned section. This
out-of-sample prediction of CDS prices can be evaluated using deviations from
the observed prices. The mean errors (ME), the mean absolute errors (MAE),
and the mean absolute percentage errors (MAPE) can be computed to under-
stand the deviation from the market prices. In Table 5.10, the out-of-sample
prediction error figures for the CDG and the intensity model can be found.
The results indicate that both models have mostly underpredicted CDS pre-
miums with an average of 25 bps. The absolute errors for the structural and
reduced-form models are 33 and 30 bps respectively. At first sight, the struc-
tural model has a higher percentage error (49 per cent) than the intensity
model (37 per cent). Parallel to this, a comparison of the absolute errors of
two models indicate that the difference between the two models is statistically
significant, the intensity model yielding lower error figures. However, it should
not be forgotten that the intensity model had three free parameters for fitting
to bond prices while the structural model had only one. After checking the
Akaike Information Criterion values, it can be observed that the figures of the
two models are quite close, with the intensity model having a slightly bet-
ter (lower) value. Overall, it can be concluded that constructing comparable
approaches have yielded comparable results in pricing CDSs, as well.
The errors can further be analyzed by classifying to ratings and number of
bonds used in the estimation. The rating, which the company possesses at
the beginning of the observation period (January 2003) was taken as the ap-
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Table 5.10: CDG and Intensity Models - Out-of-Sample Fit to CDS Prices
CDG Intensity
Firm ME MAE MAPE ME MAE MAPE
(pts) (pts) (%) (pts) (pts) (%)
CITIZENS -126.19 130.91 58.47% -115.87 115.87 51.95%
DEERE & CO -2.69 7.52 26.80% -5.95 7.77 23.75%
DELL 17.94 19.33 113.91% 10.39 12.95 75.15%
FEDERATED -11.49 15.37 32.37% -12.41 16.93 29.25%
HP -4.52 8.16 22.59% -3.98 8.65 22.67%
HILTON -55.98 59.91 31.51% -84.41 84.58 50.02%
IBM -3.93 6.95 25.63% -3.49 7.36 25.58%
INT. PAPER -29.36 29.71 42.84% -32.68 32.98 46.89%
MGM MIRAGE -85.61 91.97 49.50% -88.07 88.50 43.61%
MOTOROLA -42.18 42.18 52.82% -40.81 40.81 43.53%
NORDSTROM -29.00 29.00 72.98% -13.50 13.85 27.55%
NORFOLK -4.84 10.33 30.91% -4.35 7.30 19.36%
NORTHROP -32.24 34.47 84.30% -9.59 10.22 21.99%
TARGET 8.94 10.01 47.38% -3.55 7.90 29.08%
WAL-MART -10.64 10.64 59.34% 3.16 5.38 35.54%
WALT DISNEY 0.48 13.81 29.94% 0.92 17.51 39.13%
Average -25.71 32.52 48.83% -25.26 29.91 36.56%
AIC 235.90 232.39
Significance Test Mean Difference t-statistic p-value
Difference of 2.61 3.03 0.003
CDG - Intensity
“Mean Error (ME)” is the difference between the model and the observed CDS price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAE)” is the absolute value of the difference between the model
and the observed CDS price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAPE)” is the percentage value of the division of MAE by the
observed CDS price.
“AIC” is the Akaike Information Criterion calculated from 2k+nln(RSS/n) where k is the
number of free parameters for the model, n is the number of observations, and RSS is the
residual sum of squares.
“Difference of Structural - Intensity” is the significance test between the difference of the
structural model mean absolute errors and the intensity model mean absolute errors per
firm per day.
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plicable class. Panel A of Table 5.11 shows that mean absolute errors almost
always increase as the rating worsens. This is reasonable, since the higher rated
companies have lower CDS premiums on average. Both models have difficulty
especially in reaching the high CDS premiums for low rated classes, where
almost always underprediction is observed. Although not monotonous for the
structural model, the intensity model’s underprediction continuously increases
as the credit rating worsens. Moreover, it is observed from the significance tests
that although the intensity model outperforms the structural model in better
rated CDSs, the structural model performs better in the pricing of Ba-rated
firms.
In Panel B of Table 5.11 the error figures are averaged with respect to the num-
ber of bonds used in the estimation. For both models, the lowest MAE figures
are with 1, 4, and 10 bonds. It can also be inferred that using a single bond in
estimation almost always results in a higher MAPE than using more bonds.
However, a trend depending on the number of bonds can not be observed for
either of the approaches. Significance tests indicate that the intensity model
performs better for 1 and 3 bonds, whereas the structural model is better for
5 bonds. Other cases do not show any significance.
These results are comparable to prior research results in two ways. First, the
testing of Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein model has few examples in the liter-
ature. Among them, the study of Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004) (EHH),
which compares the CDG model with four other structural models, is the most
noteworthy one. EHH make use of bond data only, which is the major differ-
ence from this study. They find that the CDG model suffers from an accuracy
problem, where predicted bond spreads are either too small or incredibly large.
In particular, they note that a more accurate term structure model than Va-
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Table 5.11: Structural and Intensity Models - Out-of-Sample Fit, Breakdown
to Ratings and No. of Bonds Used in Estimation
Panel A Structural Intensity t-test Structural-Intensity
Rating ME MAE MAPE ME MAE MAPE Mean Diff. t-stat p-value
(pts) (pts) (%) (pts) (pts) (%)
Aa -10.64 10.64 59.34% 3.16 5.38 35.54% 5.25 4.77 0.000
A 3.15 10.39 47.26% -1.32 8.93 35.25% 1.47 2.13 0.034
Baa -34.35 38.22 50.58% -28.54 31.93 34.95% 6.29 5.23 0.000
Ba -70.80 75.94 40.50% -86.24 86.54 46.81% -10.60 -2.51 0.014
Panel B Structural Intensity t-test Structural-Intensity
No. of ME MAE MAPE ME MAE MAPE Mean Diff. t-stat p-value
Bonds (pts) (pts) (%) (pts) (pts) (%)
1 -10.75 19.24 63.17% -7.72 14.59 41.78% 4.65 4.77 0.000
2 -23.35 25.17 37.70% -22.40 24.73 33.10% 0.44 0.37 0.713
3 -30.77 39.91 50.20% -26.49 31.76 32.30% 8.15 5.10 0.000
4 -11.49 15.37 32.37% -12.41 16.93 29.25% -1.56 -0.50 0.624
5 -70.80 75.94 40.50% -86.24 86.54 46.81% -10.60 -2.51 0.014
10 -3.93 6.95 25.63% -3.49 7.36 25.58% -0.41 -0.61 0.548
“Mean Error (ME)” is the difference between the model and the observed CDS price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAE)” is the absolute value of the difference between the model
and the observed CDS price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAPE)” is the percentage value of the division of MAE by the
observed CDS price.
sicek’s model could be of use. As a result, they reach an percentage error of
out-of-sample spread prediction in the level of 269.78 per cent and an absolute
percentage error of spread prediction of 319.31 per cent. These results extend
the EHH study to the prediction of CDS prices, and on average yield a relative
mean absolute error of 48.83 per cent.
Secondly, the results can be compared with recent studies that predict CDS
prices using other types of structural and intensity models. For instance, Eric-
CDS Pricing with Advanced Framework Structures 151
sson, Reneby, and Wang (2006)’s CDS premium prediction mean errors, with
Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000) are in
the range of 10 - 52 bps, whereas Arora, Bohn, and Zhu (2005) have reached 27
- 102 bps with the Merton (1974) model and -80 - 2 bps with Vasicek/Kealhofer
model.4 These results are well comparable with the mean error of -25.71 bps
and mean absolute error of 32.52 bps. The error figures signify that the CDS
price prediction ability of the structural model is competitive with respect to
other models used in the literature. On the other hand, Bakshi, Madan, and
Zhang’s (2006) observable credit risk factor approach in an intensity model has
yielded out-of-sample absolute bond yield prediction errors in a range of 26-49
bps when log-leverage is selected as the factor. These results extend Bakshi,
Madan, and Zhang’s (2006) results with bond prices to a CDS price prediction.
5.4.3 Robustness Check
The analysis in the last section showed that the prediction power of the mod-
els are close. At a further step, looking at whether significant differences in
approaches are revealed in a time out-of-sample analysis, can be insightful. In
order to check this, the estimation results from the full observation period were
used to compute the theoretical CDS prices of mid-month January 2006. By
doing this, it is ensured that the out-of-sample analysis does not include the
time horizon of estimation.
Table 5.12 shows the mean absolute errors and mean absolute percentage errors
for this time point. It is observed that the prediction power deteriorates - an
expected outcome with time out-of-sample analysis. The percentage errors
4See Crosbie and Bohn (2003), Kealhofer (2003a), Kealhofer (2003b), and Vasicek (1984)
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have increased to 79 and 47 per cent for January 2006. The significance tests
this time indicates indifference between the prediction power of the structural
and intensity models in terms of absolute errors, as can be seen from the lower
panel of the table. Once again, the results show that the two models do not
outperform one another.
Table 5.12: Structural and Intensity Models - Time Out-of-Sample Fit
Firm January 2006
Structural Intensity
MAE MAPE MAE MAPE
(bps) (%) (bps) (%)
CITIZENS 161.33 81.89% 109.76 55.71%
DEERE & CO 0.42 1.99% 1.35 6.45%
DELL 63.47 409.47% 21.55 139.00%
FEDERATED 4.38 10.43% 1.64 3.92%
HP 8.09 35.18% 7.62 33.15%
HILTON 59.06 46.51% 94.40 74.33%
IBM 5.65 33.25% 4.57 26.86%
INT. PAPER 41.31 57.37% 35.18 48.86%
MGM MIRAGE 120.74 73.17% 60.77 36.83%
MOTOROLA 14.30 59.57% 17.16 71.49%
NORDSTROM 29.14 88.31% 19.31 58.52%
NORFOLK 17.81 74.21% 8.12 33.84%
NORTHROP 16.92 76.92% 0.18 0.81%
TARGET 20.24 161.95% 6.44 51.49%
WAL-MART 4.91 37.80% 4.84 37.24%
WALT DISNEY 8.36 23.88% 23.43 66.94%
Average 36.01 79.49% 26.02 46.59%
Significance Test t-statistic p-value
Difference of 1.67 0.116
Structural - Intensity
“Mean Absolute Error (MAE)” is the absolute value of the difference between the model
and the observed CDS price.
“Mean Absolute Error (MAPE)” is the percentage value of the division of MAE by the
observed CDS price.
“Difference of Structural - Intensity” is the significance test between the difference of the
structural model mean absolute errors and the intensity model mean absolute errors per
firm.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter has provided a comparison of the pricing of CDSs by alternative
frameworks. On one hand, with a structural approach that has a stationary
leverage ratio, it has been aimed to extract credit information from bond, stock
and balance sheet information in order to correctly price CDSs. On the other
hand, it has been examined whether a comparable reduced-form model with
the leverage process as the state variable could better price a CDS. The re-
sults show that the overall out-of-sample prediction performance is equally well
with both models. The intensity model has yielded slightly better prediction
results possibly due to three free parameters. After incorporating this infor-
mation, the Akaike Information Criterion showed that the results with both
models are quite close, with the intensity model yielding slightly lower values.
Moreover, the time out-of-sample analysis indicated insignificance between the
prediction powers of the two models. Attributing the default intensity not as
an unobservable latent factor but instead as an observable credit risk fac-
tor, the leverage process, has yielded competitive results in comparison to the
structural model.
This analysis has been carried for the most liquid entities’ bond and CDS
prices. The CDSs utilized had a five-year maturity, which are the most liquidly
traded contracts. This should be taken into account when judging the results
that showed indifference between the two frameworks. It remains for future
research to look at the capability of the models to fit to the full term structure
of CDSs and bonds.
Other issues worth noting are the basis between bond and CDS prices, and
liquidity. As seen in the studies of Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and
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Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) the no-arbitrage equality between CDS pre-
miums and bond spreads may not perfectly hold. This may be partly due to
liquidity. Recent studies such as Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) have in-
vestigated the bond and CDS price differences including a liquidity premium
in bond prices. However, in this analysis liquidity differences are not explic-
itly taken into account. Although it is interesting to check whether extensions
with liquidity yield better performance of the models on an absolute level, liq-
uidity should affect market prices in a way that enters both models similarly.
Therefore significant differences is not expected in relative terms.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
Credit default swaps are already a critical instrument for hedging and risk
transfer purposes in financial markets worldwide. The market volume is in-
creasingly expanding, which is a result of the product creating numerous fi-
nancial opportunities. Until the arrival of credit derivatives, risk management
in an asset portfolio was based on few broad activities. The traditional meth-
ods to safeguard against losses were to maintain a level of economic capital to
cover any unexpected losses on loans, and to limit the size of any loan to any
customer so as to maintain diversification of the portfolio risk. In the presence
of CDSs, credit risk can be managed or traded independently of the owner-
ship of the underlying asset. Properly functioning CDS markets are therefore
a major benefit for any institution that would like to hedge or transfer credit
risk.
This study has contributed in understanding how markets of CDSs function
and how a theoretically fair price could be reached. First, the direct OTC
and interdealer broker markets have been analyzed in depth. Markets were
155
Conclusion 156
compared regarding one of their most crucial ingredients, their liquidity. Most
of the contractual variables were shown to be determinants of the bid-ask
spread of the brokered market. The two markets seem to be integrated in prices,
which leaves only the trading cost differences in the bid-ask spreads. Moreover,
the liquidity differences between the two market venues were attributed to the
added value provided by the brokers. These two alternatives have recently been
complemented by the first exchange traded credit derivatives by Eurex. These
are futures on CDS indices of the 125 most traded entities. With the inclusion
of exchanges into the trading arena, the market venues for CDS are likely to
attract more and more counterparties.
There are certain implications for further research concerning this first part of
the study. First, once they become liquid, the electronic platform data of the
interdealer brokers will be a unique source in understanding differences in mar-
ket venues. Then, it would be possible to look at three alternatives; the direct
conversations in the OTC market, the voice brokerage offered by IDBs and the
electronic platforms. Such a study would have implications on the effects of
transparency on liquidity. It remains an open question for further research on
how an open limit-order book in the CDS market would be different from other
markets. The first exchange-traded CDS indices have not yet reached abun-
dant liquidity in the Eurex system, as reported in different sources. Exchange
traded CDS data would be an indispensable source for looking at default corre-
lations. This analysis with single-name CDSs can be extended to basket-CDSs
with the inclusion of correlation.
The second part of the study deals with pricing CDSs in a theoretically fair way.
With the Basel II Capital Accord in effect, there has been increased attention
to credit risk modeling. The Basel II, being a revision of the original Basel Cap-
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ital Accord, has reformed the way how solvency requirements are computed.
During this process, credit risk models have been under focus, since financial
institutions are now allowed to make use of their own internal rating systems
for their risk exposure in credit contracts. This study provides an insight on
how these credit risk models can give guidance in reaching the theoretically
fair price of credit risk, in case they need to be applied for institutional use.
Structural models which are based on diffusion processes and reduced-form
models which depend on Poisson jump processes have been utilized in the
credit risk literature in various studies. Structural models have the strength
of being intuitive, however, they have yielded poor results in predicting credit
risky instrument prices. Reduced-form models, on the other hand, have reached
a relatively better performance, despite the fact that they have less economic
intuition. Due to natural differences, there could be no basis of comparison
between the prediction power of these frameworks, since they could take vari-
ous forms, and were applied to different datasets. One of the most important
contributions of the study is trying to build a comparable structure between
structural and reduced-form models. Up to date only Arora, Bohn, and Zhu
(2005) tried to pursue an empirical study that compares the two frameworks.
However, their study had limitations, such as that bond data was used to cal-
ibrate the intensity model (Hull/White) whereas equity price data was neces-
sary in calibrating the structural Merton and Vasicek/Kealhofer models. This
raises doubts with respect to the comparability of the two approaches.
The analysis in Chapter 4 provided a comparison on how basic framework
structures could price CDSs. The basic Merton model and the constant inten-
sity model have been compared in their ability to generate cross-sectional and
time series out-of-sample predictions. The Support Vector Machines (SVM)
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method has been included in this section to look at whether the absence of fi-
nancial structure affects prediction power. The results indicate that the Merton
and the constant intensity models show quite close performance. The cross-
sectional results demonstrated a better fit of the Merton model in one out
of four cases, whereas the one-day-ahead time series analysis revealed better
results for the constant intensity model in three classes. Five-day- and ten-
day-ahead predictions produced mixed results, showing that one framework’s
prediction power does not outperform the other. This result might be partly
attributable to not breaking down the default probability in the Merton model
into Black/Scholes parameters. The basic comparison study can be extended
by including the asset value process and the asset volatility for this version
of the Merton model. This has been the most significant difference from the
original model that is not used in the study.
The Support Vector Machines method has also implications on further work.
Although not suitable for cross-sectional analysis, the SVM Regression method
has proven to be a useful tool in time series settings. Alternative kernels should
be used until the most suitable fit has been reached in a given setup. A further
extension might include SVM in an advanced comparison analysis and use
bond prices, stock prices and balance sheet information as inputs for training
the SVM function. Alternatively, the SVM Classification method can be used
for preprocessing the data, where one can classify CDS entities into risk classes.
In Chapter 5, the analysis has been taken a step further. The simplistic Mer-
ton and constant intensity models were replaced by more advanced forms of
structural and reduced-form models. Inspired by the fact that leverage has
been an explanatory variable for CDS levels, it has been used as a key credit
factor in both frameworks. The structural Collin-Dufresne/Goldstein model,
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which contains a stationary leverage ratio has been compared to an analogous
intensity model, in order to determine whether the model structure has an
impact on prediction power. By creating this model pair, the study provides
an answer to the challenging question that which type of framework better
prices credit risk. Given comparable settings, they similarly price this risk.
Both models contained a 1-factor Vasicek model for the riskless interest rate
process, which was calibrated by a Kalman filter. This method has proven to
be a useful approach in estimating the term structure parameters. Once the
process involves an affine term structure model, Kalman filters can be applied
without any hesitation. Further, in the comparison of advanced model struc-
tures, this study has used exactly the same bond and stock price datasets to
calibrate the models in predicting CDS prices. In this way, the CDG model,
which models the evolution of the asset value, could be brought in close prox-
imity to an intensity model which takes into account Poisson processes. The
out-of-sample prediction performances by both models indicated that the in-
tensity model is slightly better than the CDG model, possibly due to more
free parameters. The Akaike Information Criterion that takes this into account
has yielded quite similar results with both models. The advanced comparison
study can be further extended with alternative setups. It is a task for further
research to maintain even better accuracy of predictions, and to find the best
performing structural and reduced-form models.
The implicit testing of credit risk models also has implications for bench-
marking purposes. The models that fit the observed prices best have not only
provided an accurate estimate for the fair price, but have also been used as a
benchmark for market participants in their actions. For equity and FX deriv-
atives, applying the Black/Scholes option pricing framework has been widely
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accepted as the benchmark model. This price may be used for looking at
hedge ratios and arbitrage possibilities and treated as fundamental informa-
tion. Black/Scholes prices are well comparable to actual prices in the market,
and provide guidance in market actions. Although the results from this study
did not point out a specific credit risk model among others, a successful model
in future efforts can serve as a benchmark model in credit risk.
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Appendix A
Kalman Filter Estimation
In 1960, R.E. Kalman has published his famous article which describes a re-
cursive solution to the discrete-data linear filtering problem (Kalman (1960)).
Since then, the Kalman filter has been subject to extensive research and ap-
plications. The Kalman filter is a set of mathematical equations which enables
recursive computation to estimate the state of a process. The filter has been
proven to be very powerful and precise, and has been widely applied.
One of the application fields is the estimation of the unobserved short rate
series. Applying the filter to affine term-structure models, numerous studies
have aimed to estimate term-structure parameters. The affine term structure
models of Vasicek (1977) and Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) have received at-
tention in application of the Kalman filter with single or multi-factor variations.
These studies have mostly reached a good fit in estimating the term-structure
parameters in-sample. The procedure described below consists of estimating
process parameters and short rate time series of a single factor Vasicek model
using the Kalman filter.
176
Appendix 177
A.1 State-Space Formulation
In this section, the basic structure of a linear Kalman filter is described. Fol-
lowing, the application to term-structure models will be discussed.
Proposition 5.1 Suppose that there is an n-dimensional state vector xt =
[x1t , ..., x
n
t ] corresponding to the number of factors and an m-dimensional vector
zt = [z
1
t , ..., z
m
t ] corresponding to the number of cross-sectional measurement
observations. Then the following set of equations represent the time update
equation and the measurement equation of the Kalman filter, which should
have the form
xt = Axt +Bxt−1 + ωt−1, time update equation (A.1)
zt = Ct +Hxt + ςt, measurement equation (A.2)
The random variables ωt and ςt represent the process and measurement noise
respectively. They are assumed to be independent from each other and have
normal probability distributions,
ωt ∼ N(0, Q), (A.3)
ςt ∼ N(0, R) (A.4)
These equations constitute the backbone of the recursive estimation using the
Kalman filter. The below propositions describe the time update and measure-
ment update recursive equations for the filter.
Proposition 5.2: Time Update The filter computes the best prediction for
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xt based on information available until xt−1, which is described by Ft−1.
Time update projection:
xˆt|t−1 = E[xt|Ft−1] = A+Bxˆt−1, (A.5)
Update error covariance:
Pˆt|t−1 = V ar[xt|Ft−1] = BPˆt−1B′ +Qt (A.6)
Up to now only time has been incremented but no measurement has been taken.
The below proposition incorporates the effect of measurement equation to the
recursive solution of the filter. First the “Kalman gain” is computed which
determines the weight given to the new observation. Then new estimates of
the state and error covariance are derived.
Proposition 5.3: Measurement Update Including the contribution of the
measurement, the measurement update equations are as follows:
Computing the “Kalman gain”:
Kt = Pˆt|t−1H
′
(
HPˆt|t−1H
′ +R
)−1
(A.7)
Update state after measurement zt:
xˆt = E[xˆt|Ft] = xˆt|t−1 +Kt(zt − E[zt|Ft−1]) (A.8)
Update error covariance after measurement:
Pˆt = V ar[xˆt|Ft] = (I −KtH)Pˆt|t−1 (A.9)
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After the Kalman recursions, finally a maximum likelihood estimator can be
used to estimate the parameters of the process desired.
Proposition 5.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimation The log-likelihood
function consists of the following elements:
̟t = zt − zˆt (A.10)
Gt = Cov[̟] = HPˆt|t−1H
′ +R (A.11)
The log-likelihood equation:
logL =
T∑
t=1
(Ntlog(2π)
2
− log|Gt|
2
− 1
2
̟
′
tG
−1
t ̟t
)
(A.12)
where T is the full range of the time series and Nt = dim(̟t).
In the end, the parameters that are contained in A,B,C and H are estimated
through the optimization of the maximum likelihood function.
A.2 Estimation of the Short Rate Process through
Kalman Filter
Given the above state-space formulation, the Kalman filter can be applied to
the estimation of the short rate process time series and parameter estimation.
Being a method that takes into consideration both time series and cross section
of yields, Kalman filtering is an appropriate tool in estimating the unobserved
short rate time series and process parameters. As described in the last section,
the Kalman filter makes use of measurement and update equations in order to
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iteratively find the best parameter estimates. Both the CDG model and the
intensity model derived contains the Vasicek process as the driving source for
the short rate as below:
drt = κr(θr − rt)dt+ σrdWQ1 (A.13)
where κr is the mean reversion rate, θr is the long-run mean, σr is the volatility
of the short rate, andWQ1 is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure.
The unobserved series of short rate and the parameters of this Vasicek process
will be estimated using the filter. For this purpose, the closed form solution
of the Vasicek bond pricing formula are used as the measurement equations,
whereas the transition process of the Vasicek equations are used as the time
update equations. The following sections describe the data and the results of
the estimation. Only the one-factor version of the Vasicek process is applied,
therefore, n, the number of factors described in Proposition 5.1 is only 1. Eight
yields at each time point are used as an observation for the Kalman filter, so
m described in the state space formulation is 8. Moreover the length of time
series, T , is 2188 days, spanning a period of over eight years.
A.3 Calibration of the Interest Rate Process
In the Vasicek setup, the closed-form bond pricing formula constitutes the
measurement equation, making use of the cross-sectional information of each
of the eight yields on a given day. The bond pricing formula of Vasicek is:
b(r0, T ) = e
C(T )−H(T )r0 (A.14)
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where C(T ) and H(T ) correspond to the measurement equation vectors on a
given day, which are in the form:
H(T ) =
1
κr
(1− e−κrT ), (A.15)
C(T ) =
(H(T )− T )
(
κ2r(θ˜r − σrηκr )−
σ2r
2
)
κ2r
− σ
2
rH
2(T )
4κr
(A.16)
Here, the η is the market price of risk parameter, and the θ˜r is the long run
mean under the physical probability measure. The risk-neutral long run mean
θr of the process is reached by:
θr = θ˜r − σrη
κr
(A.17)
Moreover, the transition equations, which will comprise the time update equa-
tions, in the Vasicek setup are as follows:
A(t) = θ˜r(1− e−κr∆t) (A.18)
B(t) = e−κr∆t (A.19)
Q(t) =
σ2r
2κr
(1− e−2κr∆t) (A.20)
